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Abstract 
Associated with the emergence of a new managerial approach known as new public 
management (NPM), accountability and performance measurement have become two 
essential elements in public sector reform processes (Akbar, Pilcher, and Perrin, 2012). 
Accountability has become a significant influential force in driving a greater interest in 
measuring government performance (Greiling and Halachmi, 2013b). A wide range of 
public management reforms for public sector organisations throughout the world have 
been initiated with the intent of holding public sector agencies accountable. For 
example, the reporting of financial and non-financial measures to broader audiences has 
been a common approach employed to enhance public sector accountability 
(Christensen and Skærbæk, 2007). Indonesia has joined the growing trend of developing 
countries whereby managerial control has become a cornerstone in a bureaucratic 
environment. To reform public sector management, the President required all public 
sector entities to adopt a management control system (MCS) known as Sistem 
Akuntabilitas Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah (SAKIP). SAKIP allows and encourages 
agencies to describe their strategic objectives and key performance indicators while at 
the same time linking these to agency budgets.  
The main objective of this research was to investigate the implementation of SAKIP in 
the Indonesian local government (ILGs) and its impact on ILGs’ organisational learning 
capabilities. The annual evaluation of SAKIP’s implementation in the Indonesian Local 
Governments (ILGs) signals the dynamic in the institutional environment that may 
influence the effectiveness of SAKIP’s adoption and use. The findings are expected to 
highlight the complexity and dynamic process of adopting and implementing a MCS 
such as SAKIP in a highly bureaucratic environment, in this case the ILGs.  
While there is a significant body of literature exploring the relationship between 
strategy and MCS, studies that link the adoption and use of centralistic MCS and 
organisational learning in government are still limited. In the context of the Indonesian 
public sector, no study has linked this dynamic in the institutional environment with the 
diagnostic and interactive use of SAKIP as a means to enhance organisational learning 
capabilities in ILGs. This thesis addresses these gaps in the management control 
literature by providing insights into how a management control practice, driven by the 
central government, became accepted and modified by the local governments in 
Indonesia. This thesis also provides a deeper understanding of the relationship between 
the utilisation of a control system and its impact on organisational learning capabilities 
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leading to ILGs strategic success. The research used a mixed methods approach by 
incorporating elements of both quantitative and qualitative research. It proposes a 
conceptual model developed from the literature that observes factors surrounding 
adoption of SAKIP by ILGs and how those factors influence SAKIP’s utilisation and 
ILGs organisational learning capabilities. Institutional theory is used to identify and 
explain the process represented in the model and to answer the research questions.  
The findings of this research are: (i) regulations from central government agencies are 
still able to impose coercive pressures upon public sector organisation’s that affect their 
decisions to adopt and implement new systems; (ii) ILG’s leader and top management 
are important in SAKIP’s implementation. Moreover, their perception toward the 
importance of SAKIP influences the degree of SAKIP utilisation in ILGs; (iii) central 
government agencies have important roles in facilitating the process of SAKIP’s 
adoption and implementation. With their resources and knowledge, central government 
agencies are able to impose effective normative pressures upon ILGs to implement 
SAKIP; (iv) the demand to implement SAKIP is conflicted with other institutionalised 
elements in ILGs; (v) the adoption of SAKIP does not lead to the diagnostic use of the 
MCS system. It positively contributes to the interactive use of SAKIP but it only 
provides a small effect size; (vi) ILGs strategically alter their institutional scripts to 
align SAKIP innovation with the organisational characteristics and the complexity 
within their environment; (vii) in order to achieve legitimation and avoid negative 
attention, ILGs respond to conflicting institutional demands by diagnostically and 
interactively using SAKIP to meet minimum regulatory requirements; and (viii) the 
ILGs’ strategic response of compromise brings an undesirable consequence to the 
organisational learning capabilities of ILGs. The application of institutional theory helps 
explain the findings and provides a valuable insight into the influence of ILGs and other 
institutional actors on altering SAKIP to maintain pre-existing relationships with other 
stakeholders.  
The contribution of this research relates to empirical findings that enrich MCS research 
in the public sectors of developing countries. The research also contributes to the 
utilisation of institutional theory to explore the responses of public sector organisations’ 
as they seek to accommodate and satisfy all institutional referents in the face of 
conflicting demands.  
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 Introduction Chapter 1:
1.1 Introduction 
Associated with the emergence of a new managerial approach known as new public 
management, accountability and performance measurement have become two essential 
elements in public sector reform processes. Indonesia has joined the growing trend of 
developing countries whereby managerial control has become a cornerstone in a 
bureaucratic environment. To reform public sector management, the President required 
all public sector entities to adopt a management control system (MCS) known as Sistem 
Akuntabilitas Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah (SAKIP). This research aims to investigate 
the adoption of a centralistic management control system (SAKIP) by local 
governments in Indonesia (ILG) and its impact on the ILG’s organisational learning 
capabilities. It explores the complexity and dynamic process of adopting and 
implementing a MCS, such as SAKIP, in a highly bureaucratic environment – in this 
case ILGs. The issues were investigated through a mixed methods approach 
incorporating elements of both quantitative and qualitative research. This chapter covers 
the background of the thesis (Section 1.2), the gaps in the literature (Section 1.3) and 
research objectives and questions (Section 1.4), the overview of research methodology 
(Section 1.5), the overview of underpinning theory (Section 1.6), the significance and 
contribution of research (Section 1.7), the outline of the thesis (Section 1.8), and a 
summary of the chapter (Section 1.9). 
1.2 Background to the study 
Over the past 30 years, public sectors around the world have undergone significant 
change. The term New Public Management (NPM) was introduced in the 1980s and 
later became the dominant approach to public administration in many developed 
countries in Europe, United States and Australia (Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg, 2014; 
Pilcher, 2011). The main aim of the NPM reform is to improve the performance the 
public sector by adopting private sector management techniques and emphasising on 
market mechanism in providing efficient good and services (Speklé and Verbeeten, 
2014). There has been varying forms of NPM; however, its application to public sector 
is revolved around the seven basic principles of NPM. Hood (1995) described the basic 
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principles of NPM are: (1) more emphasis on professional management, (2) 
encouraging the use of standards to measure performance, (3) more emphasis on output 
control and results measured by performance indicators, (4) moving toward a 
decentralised system, (5) competition is seen as a preferred way to deliver effective and 
efficient government services, (6) implementing more private sector management 
practice and (7) emphasis on discipline and frugality in resource use. The NPM reform 
advocated public sector to shift their focus toward performance improvement, managing 
results and customer orientation (Nuhu, Baird, and Bala Appuhamilage, 2017). 
Demand for greater efficiency and accountability becomes the main concern because of 
financial and budgetary constraints experienced by governments (Verbeeten and Speklé, 
2015). NPM advocates the adoption of private sector management approaches and 
techniques such as strategic planning, priority setting, comprehensive program 
budgeting, customer responsiveness, contract employment for managers, performance 
auditing and monitoring employees’ performance (Pérez-López, Prior, and Zafra-
Gómez, 2015). The key purposes of establishing performance targets are to align 
individual goals with the organisation goals, and to guide public employees in achieving 
the organisations’ objectives (Speklé and Verbeeten, 2014). NPM also initiates market 
mechanism to encourage competition among service providers. Market mechanisms 
through contracting out or putting a price on public services, are believed to be able to 
reduce cost and improve responsiveness of service providing agencies (Pérez-López et 
al., 2015). The market mechanism requires financial and performance information that 
is more comparable, transparent and useful for evaluating the implementation of a 
policy (Bryson et al., 2014). Therefore, the NPM reform endeavour to respond to public 
and political pressures by being more accountable and transparent while at the same 
time providing their services in an effective and efficient manner (Messner, 2009).  
Following almost three decades of implementation, the effect of NPM reform on 
government organisational performance has shown mixed results (Nuhu et al., 2017; 
Pérez-López et al., 2015). The adoption of management technique from the private 
sector is followed by limited evidence that NPM indeed improves efficiency in public 
sector. For example, decentralisation and the creation of new and autonomous agencies 
have increased coordination cost and reduced efficiencies in public sector (van Der 
Kolk, Ter Bogt, and van Veen-Dirks, 2015). The contracting out public services to 
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private entities does not always lead to an increased flexibility or to a lower production 
cost through competition. However, the specific nature of public services has led to an 
absence of competition and limited cost saving achieved by contracting out (Pérez-
López et al., 2015). The participation of private companies in providing public services 
can also create a goal conflict between profit and social benefit maximisation. Pérez-
López et al. (2015) also noted the limited empirical evidence that shows the relationship 
between private-public partnership and efficiency of public services. 
The increasing cost and inefficiency resulted from coordinating private agencies in the 
private-public partnership within NPM reform has also led to the introduction of post-
NPM or Neo-Weberian Administration approach (Ibarra Salazar and Lopez De Arkos 
Martínez, 2013; Nuhu et al., 2017; Pérez-López et al., 2015). The approach proposes 
recentralisation by creating an integrated public services in order to achieve a better 
vertical and horizontal coordination of public agencies as opposed to fragmented 
agencies proposed by NPM (Nuhu et al., 2017).  
Following the financial and political crisis that occurred in 1998, Indonesia embraced 
the concept of the NPM in an attempt to reform the public sector (Harun and Robinson, 
2010). The reform aimed for greater transparency in government transactions and 
clearer accountability for results to be reported to the public. This was achieved by 
incorporating various performance reports (Rhodes et al., 2012). In terms of public 
sector reform, accountability and performance measurement are viewed as being two 
essential elements of NPM in public sector reform (Akbar et al., 2012).     
Accountability in the public sector can be defined as efforts to maintain public trust by 
being answerable for behaviour and decisions made (Quinn and Schlenker, 2002; 
Romzek, 1987; Romzek, 2000). Accountability is seen as a positive quality of a public 
organisation being transparent and fair in conducting their business. Bovens, 
Schillemans, and 't Hart (2008) described it as a mechanism in which the citizen and 
interest groups are able to ask questions or express their opinion to the administrator’s 
decisions, and the administrator can explain the justification of their decisions. Public 
sector accountability is acknowledged to be an important element in a democratic 
system where the acts of government are considered to be the reflection of the will of 
the public (Bourn, 2007; Peters, 2009). It explains the way policy and programs are 
developed and managed. Demands for greater accountability from the public sector are 
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frequently observed in political debates and public discussion. Transparency can be 
defined as "legal, political, and institutional structures that make information about 
internal characteristics of government and society available to actors both inside and 
outside of the domestic political system" (Otenyo and Lind, 2004, p.3). Calls for 
increased transparency require public sector entities to provide more financial and 
performance information that is comparable, relevant and useful for decision-making 
(Pilcher, 2011). By disclosing more information regarding the use of public resources, 
bureaucracy will be more exposed to public scrutiny. However, the increasing need for 
public sector entities to be more accountable and transparent, does not diminish the 
obligation for public sector entities to provide their services in an efficient and effective 
manner (Greiling and Halachmi, 2013a, 2013b; Messner, 2009). As the main intention 
of employing a control system is to hold individuals accountable for their actions and 
decisions, any discussion of accountability is strongly linked with management control 
systems (MCSs) and performance measurement (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007; 
Batac, 2009; Hughes, 2003; Merchant and Otley, 2007).  
Public sector accountability is acknowledged to be an important element in a 
democratic system where the acts of government are considered to reflect the will of the 
public (Bourn, 2007; Peters, 2009). It explains the way policy and programs are 
developed and managed. By objectively measuring the performance of government 
action, accountability provides a degree of assurance to citizens that any individual 
given the mandate to act on their behalf is doing their best to carry out these delegated 
tasks (Hughes, 2003). According to Dendi (2010, p. 3):   
“Performance measurement has been considered to be a management instrument 
to enhance the quality of services produced by public sector agencies. An 
effective performance measurement system can promote organisational learning 
and strengthen customer-orientation among public agencies. A coherent 
performance measurement regulatory framework and effective collaborative 
implementation efforts are essential to improve the performance of public 
agencies at all levels.” 
Therefore, performance measurement has played an important part in government 
agencies’ efforts to meet the accountability demand (Christensen and Skærbæk, 2007; 
Harrison, Rouse, and De Villiers, 2012; Polidano, 2000). Through governmental 
performance measurement initiatives, the expectation is that public sector agencies will 
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improve operational efficiency and effectiveness, enhance decision making, and exhibit 
greater accountability for achieving results (Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004). 
Accountability is also linked to an increase in transparency and organisational learning. 
It provides a mechanism in which the citizens and interest groups are able to ask 
questions of, or to express their opinion about, the administrator’s decisions, and the 
administrator can explain the reason for and a justification of their decisions (Bovens, 
Schillemans, and Hart, 2008).  
Organisational learning can be defined as as an organisation’s ability to monitor 
environmental changes and adjust its processes, products, and services to capitalize on 
those changes (Simons et al., 2000). Organisational learning can also be defined as the 
process of detecting and correcting errors in order to maintain the characteristics of an 
organisation (Argyris and Schon, 1996). It develops knowledge from past actions to 
deliver more effective future actions.1 Accountability facilitates organisational learning 
by enabling public sector agencies to use their performance information to stimulate 
managerial thinking, revise the strategies, improve operational performance, enhance 
decision making, and display greater accountability for achieving results (Ammons and 
Rivenbark, 2008; Ammons and Roenigk, 2015; Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004; Rhodes et 
al., 2012). 
On the other hand, the demand for greater accountability also is accompanied by a 
negative consequence to organisational learning. Ebrahim (2005) argued that the desire 
to have more accountability arrangement such as audits, performance measures or other 
extra compliance-oriented reports can distract organisations from achieving their 
original goals.  
The 1998 Asian financial crisis gave rise to government reforms in Indonesia, 
comprising the adoption of more democratic principles. Indonesia incorporated the 
concept of the NPM to reform the public sector. In October 1999, the legislative passed 
a decree that instructed government agencies to improve their efficiency, transparency 
and professionalism. Since the initiation of the reform, the President ordered all tiers of 
government, including central, provincial and district levels, to prepare a Laporan 
Akuntabilitas Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah, a performance accountability report known 
                                                            
1 Organisational learning is further elaborated and explained in Chapter 3. 
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as LAKIP and develop a performance measurement and accountability system known as 
Sistem Akuntabilitas Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah (SAKIP). The purpose of the SAKIP 
system was to integrate performance measurement into the management process and to 
promote efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability within the 
Indonesian public sector.  
SAKIP’s position as the Indonesian government control system, became more important 
when the President launched the bureaucracy reform initiative in 2010 (Dwiyanto, 
2011). This reform initiative aimed to implement clean government, provide fast and 
responsive public services, increase government program visibility, and modernize all 
agencies management system. The initiative used the implementation of SAKIP in 
government agencies as one of the reform milestones. The number of agencies that 
adopted SAKIP had also grown significantly. In 2011, there were 290 out of 612 
Indonesia agencies that failed to fulfil the mandate to submit LAKIP to Minister of 
State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucracy Reform and Bureaucracy Reform 
(MSAEBR). All of these were local governments consisting of 3 provinces and 287 
municipalities (Kompas, 2012). In 2014, all of Indonesian local governments (ILGs) 
claimed that they have implemented SAKIP (the system) and submitted LAKIP (the 
report) to MSAEBR. 
After 15 years of LAKIP implementation, the government issued a Presidential 
Regulation (PR) 29/2014 on the 21st of April 2014 that clarified the difference between 
LAKIP and SAKIP. PR 29/2004 states that SAKIP integrates planning, budgeting, 
treasury, government accounting and performance reporting (Thahar, 2016). Whereas, 
LAKIP is the performance accountability report that is submitted to MSAEBR. SAKIP 
was designed to enhance accountability and help agencies to plan, measure and report 
their performance. According to PR 29/2014, agencies are required to describe their 
mission and vision; to prepare their strategic objectives and key performance indicators 
(KPIs); and to integrate KPIs with agencies budget. SAKIP can be classified as a 
management control system (MCS) that allows and encourages agencies to describe 
their strategic objectives and key performance indicators while at the same time linking 
them to their budget. 
Every year, the MSAEBR assesses SAKIP’s implementation in all Indonesian 
government agencies. The assessment covers the planning, reporting, and evaluation 
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process of agencies performance. The purpose of the evaluation is to analyse the 
implementation of SAKIP and give recommendations for improvement. Following a 
comprehensive evaluation process, each agency is given a score and then grouped into 
seven categories. The highest category is AA or excellent. Agencies with “AA” score 
are perceived to be the most accountable. The lowest category is D or very bad. 
Agencies with “D” score are perceived to be the least accountable or to have no 
accountability framework at place. 
Besides transparency and clearer accountability in government, the other main theme of 
the NPM reform is the organisation’s ability to improve their performance by detecting 
problems and applying the information gathered to influence future decisions 
(Moynihan and Landuyt, 2009). SAKIP has the potential to be utilised by ILGs’ leaders 
to align strategic decisions with strategy implementations by providing them with 
information for learning and improving performance. Unfortunately, the role of SAKIP 
in tackling these issues is still unclear. Government agencies still report unsatisfactory 
programs outcomes indicating a continuing inability to learn from past experiences. 
1.3 Gaps in the literature  
Over the past decade, several studies have focused on implementation factors and the 
use of performance measurement systems in the Indonesian public sector, particularly in 
the ILG. Some studies have identified various factors that influence the successful 
adoption and implementation of performance management reform (Ahyaruddin and 
Akbar, 2016; Akbar et al., 2012; Harun and Robinson, 2010). Most studies 
acknowledge that the implementation of a performance-based control system in the 
Indonesian government is a complex issue. However, very few studies have focused on 
management control systems (MCSs) and the antecedent factors that drive the 
utilisation of control systems and effect on an organisation’s ability to learn and achieve 
desired performance outcomes (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007; Bisbe and Otley, 
2004; Henri, 2006; Kloot, 1995; Mahler and Posner, 2014; Nuhu et al., 2017). In the 
context of the Indonesian public sector, no study has linked this dynamic in the 
institutional environment with the diagnostic and interactive use of SAKIP as a means 
to enhance organisational learning capabilities in ILGs. Factors surrounding adoption of 
SAKIP by ILGs and how those factors influence SAKIP’s utilisation and ILGs 
organisational learning capabilities are key variables examined in the conceptual model 
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employed (see Chapter Three for more detail on the theoretical framework and research 
design). 
While there is a significant body of literature exploring the relationship between 
strategy and MCS, studies that link the adoption of a centralistic MSC and 
organisational learning in government are still very limited. This study addresses this 
gap in the literature by examining the adoption of SAKIP in the ILG and the 
relationship between the use of SAKIP and ILGs’ organisational learning capabilities. 
Despite the increasing attention received by MCS studies over the last two decades, 
most of the research is focused on the for-profit sector, where the respondents have 
some degree of flexibility in designing their MCS. Since SAKIP was designed and 
initiated by MSAEBR, this study investigates the impact of adopting and implementing 
a centralistic control system by local government. 
Within the performance management literature, organisational learning is viewed as a 
very important concept that links the ability of public organisations’ managers to use 
knowledge and experience gained from performance information in order to make better 
decisions and improve their performance (Moynihan and Landuyt, 2009). The 
capability to learn becomes more important in public sector agencies due to the many 
interests involved in their policy making process. Most of the organisational learning 
research is focused on the for-profit sectors. Despite the substantial reform in the public 
sector, relatively little attention has been given to the development of organisational 
learning concepts in the public sector (Gilson, Dunleavy, and Tinkler, 2009; Mahler and 
Posner, 2014; Nuhu et al., 2017; Rashman, Withers, and Hartley, 2009). The concept of 
organisational learning in the government sector is different to those of the private 
sector as the goals and agency interrelationships are distinct. This study specifically 
focuses on the diagnostic and interactive use of SAKIP and organisational learning 
leading to improve ILG outcomes. 
This research addresses these gaps in the management control literature by providing 
insights into how a management control practice, driven by the central government, has 
become accepted and modified by Indonesian local governments. This research also 
provides a deeper understanding of the relationship between the utilisation of a control 
system and its impact on organisational learning capabilities leading to improved ILGs 
outcomes. 
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1.4 Research objectives and questions 
The main objective of this research is to investigate the implementation of SAKIP in 
ILG and its impact on organisational learning capabilities. The annual evaluation of 
SAKIP’s implementation in ILG signals the dynamic in the institutional environment 
that may influence the effectiveness of SAKIP’s adoption and use. The findings 
highlight the complexity and dynamic process of adopting and implementing a MCS, 
such as SAKIP, in a highly bureaucratic environment – in this case ILGs. While the 
reform, through the mobilization of a new system, aims at improving the performance 
of the public sector operation, there is no guarantee that a government will be any more 
accountable nor will it provide higher quality goods and/or services (Harun, 2012). 
Previous literature shows that the mobilization of a new management accounting system 
that challenges the values of the old system may encounter some form of resistance and 
barriers to change (Norhayati and Siti Nabiha, 2009; Siti Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). 
Harun and Robinson (2010) identified legal issues, the lack of political support, and 
lack of skilled human resources as implementation barriers that may threaten the 
intended purposes of public sector reforms in Indonesia. 
This research examines the pressures surrounding the adoption and use of SAKIP by 
using institutional theory2. Institutional theory is used to understand the relationship 
between organisational structures and the wider social environment. The theory is suited 
to explain the powers that influence individuals and organisational behaviours within 
social structures (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). It further holds that organisations 
attempt to accommodate internal and external pressures to build their image in 
accordance with a set of society’s rules and expectations (Kasperskaya, 2008). The 
development of institutional theory has led to a distinction between old institutional 
economics (OIE) and new institutional sociology (NIS). NIS proposes that organisations 
within the same field face competing institutional demands. On the other hand, the OIE 
proposes that the institutions’ interpretation of the institutional pressures surrounding 
the organisation and transformation into organisational practices will be different from 
one organisation to another (Delmas and Toffel, 2004). Human actions and routines are 
also factors that shape institutions. Therefore, the process of conforming to institutional 
pressures is not always passive. Despite the distinction between the NIS and OIE, this 
                                                            
2 Institutional theory has been widely used to understand the process of change in organisations (Ashworth et al., 2009; Pilcher, 
2011). The overview of the theory is described in Section 1.6.  The theory is further elaborated and explained in Chapter 3  
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study will combine characteristics from both theories (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Munir and Phillips, 2005). 
Institutional theory is used in this study because it has been empirically used in 
observing the isomorphic pressures in the diffusion of new practices or programs among 
organisations (Aurini, 2006; Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004; Pilcher, 2011). Opinions were 
sought from key internal stakeholders of ILG regarding the institutional pressures and 
factors affecting the use of SAKIP in their organisations. This was achieved by a 
combination of survey and semi-structured interviews. The data from the survey was 
analysed using a structural equation model that relates the adoption and utilisation of 
SAKIP to the diagnostic and interactive use of SAKIP – hypothesised to affect 
organisational learning. The conceptual model shown below in Figure 1.1 below is 
based on an adapted version of Upping and Oliver (2011) accounting change model and 
Widener (2007) levers of control framework model. 
 
Figure 1.1: Conceptual Schema 
 
 
Full details of the conceptual model variables and hypotheses developed and tested are 
provided in Chapter Three that outlines the theoretical framework and research design 
of the study. 
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The implication of isomorphic pressures on SAKIP were investigated and discussed. 
The findings highlight the complexity and dynamic process of adopting and 
implementing a MCS such as SAKIP in a highly bureaucratic environment – in this case 
the Indonesian public sector. In turn, the study provides possible solutions to help 
increase SAKIP’s utilisation in ILG, thus encouraging greater accountability in the 
Indonesian public sector. 
Therefore, the objectives of this research were to: 
1. Investigate the adoption of a centralistic management control system known as 
SAKIP by local governments in Indonesia. 
2. Examine the relationship between the diagnostic and interactive use of SAKIP 
and organisational learning in ILG. 
3. Determine the different motivations and scenarios behind the adoption and the 
use of a centralistic control system in local government. 
4. Establish a framework for adopting and implementing a management control 
system (MCS) in the public sector to facilitate effective practice. 
The subsequent research questions were: 
1. What are the factors that influence the adoption of SAKIP in local governments 
in Indonesia? 
2. Does the adoption of SAKIP influence the diagnostic and/or interactive use of 
SAKIP in local governments in Indonesia? 
3. Does the diagnostic and/or interactive use of SAKIP affect local governments’ 
organisational learning capabilities? 
4. Do the isomorphism mechanisms of institutional theory aid in explaining the 
utilisation of a centralistic MCS as local governments’ attempt to comply with 
the associated regulations?  
 
1.5 Overview of Research Methodology 
To answer these four research questions, this research used a mixed methods approach 
by incorporating elements of both quantitative and qualitative research. The approach of 
establishing quantitative methods complemented with elements of qualitative methods 
improves the credibility of results since the strengths of one approach counterbalanced 
the weaknesses of the other (Akbar, 2011; Modell, 2005). The combination of both 
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methods provided a more holistic contextual understanding of survey results and in 
explaining anomalies emerging from the survey (Modell, 2005).  
 
 
Table 1.1: Research Phases 
Phase Research Design Chapter Outcome of phase 
1 Conduct literature review 
and develop research 
model. 
Chapter 2 
& 3 
Identified the gaps in the past literature 
and developed a research model 
2 Conduct quantitative 
survey 
Chapter 4 
& 5 
Identified significant factors affecting the 
adoption and utilisation of SAKIP. 
3 Conduct qualitative survey Chapter 6 Interpreted the results of the quantitative 
survey. 
 
The research was conducted in three distinct phases. Table 1.1 illustrates the three 
phases of the study. The first phase focused on providing a critical literature review to 
facilitate the development of the research model. The concept of accountability in the 
public sector is discussed, followed by describing the adoption and use of SAKIP as a 
centralistic management control system in ILGs. The theoretical model of the adoption 
of SAKIP in ILG and the relationship between the use of SAKIP and ILGs’ 
organisational learning capabilities is also described. After identifying and 
accommodating the gaps found in the literature, the outcome of phase 1 was 
development of the research model. 
The second phase focused on the quantitative survey. The survey was conducted in 
April and May 2014. The survey identified factors that affect the adoption and 
utilisation of SAKIP in ILG. Factors that influence the ILG organisational capabilities, 
as well as an improved understanding of the conceptual relationships between adoption 
and utilisation of SAKIP and organisational learning was also elicited. The survey 
questions were adapted from questionnaires used by Upping and Oliver (2011) and 
Widener (2007). Some original questions were modified to adapt the questionnaire to fit 
the context of the current study. Following a pilot study, the survey was sent to all 
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Indonesian local governments – Provinces, Districts and Cities. Phase 2 identified the 
relevant factors that affect the implementation of SAKIP and ILGs learning capabilities.  
The third phase focused on qualitative interviews. Semi-structured interviews with 20 
ILGs senior officials were conducted. Interviews explored and elicited responses that 
provided supporting explanations of the results of the quantitative findings. Open ended 
questions were used to provide an opportunity for interviewees to express their opinions 
about the survey results as well as provide insights into more specific organisation 
complexities that may not have emerged from the questionnaire. (Tucker and Parker, 
2013; Tucker, Thorne, and Gurd, 2008). Phase 3 provided the patterns, themes and 
elements that assisted in explaining some of the significant (and insignificant) 
relationship among variables identified in the quantitative stage. The results were 
described and discussed in line with the research questions along with the provision of 
empirical support on the impact of institutional isomorphism on the use of SAKIP and 
ILGs learning capabilities. 
1.6 Overview of underpinning theory 
Institutional theory has been widely used to understand the process of changes in 
organisations (Ashworth, Boyne, and Delbridge, 2009; Pilcher, 2011). The focus of the 
theory is on the process by which routines; norms, rules and structure become accepted 
guidelines for social behaviour (Scott, 2014). The contribution of external environment, 
such as social, political and cultural factors, in shaping organisational form and process 
is emphasised (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Ruef and Scott, 
1998; Scapens, 2006). Meyer and Rowan (1977) added that organisations can gain 
social legitimacy by maintaining good relationships with their external environment. 
This research observed the interaction between ILGs and their institutional environment 
by using institutional theory as a framework. The study will emphasise the new 
institutionalism concept that suggests the process of institutionalisation starts in the field 
level that leads organisations to become similar to others located within the same field. 
At the same time, the study will include the OIE concept by recognizing organisational 
actors who take a role as institutional entrepreneurs as their reaction to the ongoing 
institutionalisation process. Institutional theory was used to identify and explain the 
source of isomorphism; the interplay between institutional and technical environment; 
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and the response from organisational actors such as ILGs or the MSAEBR. Finally, the 
theory was used to describe factors that led ILGs to partly used SAKIP as their 
appropriate response to achieve legitimacy and to meet the conflicting demands of 
stakeholders.  
1.7 Significance and Contribution of Research 
This research provides an important contribution at practical and theoretical levels. 
Firstly, this study investigates the complexity surrounding the local government 
environment in an emerging economic and political system, including the structural 
constraints that create challenges for ILGs in respect to organisational learning and 
innovation. Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world and it operated 
under a centralised government system for almost 53 years. In the reform era, Indonesia 
changed the governmental system from centralised to decentralised structures as part of 
the effort to have more accountable and transparent sector entities. On the other hand, 
the implementation of a centralistic management control system in ILGs is still mainly 
driven by central government pressures. The findings can be used to the complexity and 
the dynamic process of adopting NPM-style control systems by highly bureaucratic 
local governments and improve an innovative culture that emphasises dialogue and 
discussion in an emerging economic and political system, 
Secondly, in light of the limited research on a centralistic MCS in the Indonesian public 
sector (or other developing countries), this study is one of the first known studies that 
has examined the diagnostic and interactive use of the mandatory MCS practices in a 
local government context using institutional theory.  
Prior research has not specified the way ILGs have utilised the performance information 
collected. The use of the diagnostic and interactive controls in the empirical model are 
important to explain the link between the utilisation of a control system and the impact 
on organisational learning capabilities. Findings will contribute to the growing literature 
on MCSs by focusing on the adoption and use of MCSs as a means to achieve 
organisational learning capabilities at provincial and municipal levels of government in 
Indonesia. For example, the results of the interviews indicate there were only limited 
numbers of ILGs that diagnostically used SAKIP on a regular basis. These were ILGs 
with a good SAKIP implementation score. The leaders of these ILGs used information 
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from SAKIP to monitor all departments’ achievement, evaluate the head of 
departments’ performance and to link the reward and punishment policy to the 
managers’ performance. In addition, the interviews indicated that most ILGs 
diagnostically used SAKIP only during the preparation and the submission of the ILG’s 
consolidated performance report (i.e. LAKIP). For a majority of the year, ILGs relied 
mostly on internal budget versus actual performance reports.  
Thirdly, this study investigates the process of adopting a NPM-style control system in 
the highly bureaucratic local government in Indonesia. This in turn, offers an 
opportunity to reveal the complexity and the dynamic process of change. The study, 
which views SAKIP as an integrated control system, provides insights into how 
performance measurement practices become accepted, resisted, or modified by local 
governments in Indonesia. 
Fourthly, the thesis contributes to management accounting research by studying the 
relationship between adoption factors and the use of a new MCS in the public sector. As 
outlined in Chapter Three, these factors include: (1) external pressures, (2) internal 
pressures, (3) facilitators of change and (4) barriers to change. Despite the increasing 
attention received by MCS studies in the last two decades, most of the research is 
focused on the for-profit sector, where the respondents have some degree of flexibility 
in designing the MCS. Since SAKIP was designed and initiated by MSAEBR, this 
thesis investigates the impact of adopting and implementing a centralistic control 
system by local government organisations. Prior research in Indonesia that has linked 
the use of MCS to Upping and Oliver (2011) adoption model, particularly in a local 
government setting, has not been undertaken. This study developed a model combining 
research concepts from Upping and Oliver (2011) and (Widener, 2007). The model 
identified antecedent factors that drive the adoption of control systems by using Upping 
and Oliver (2011) adoption model. However, the study did not stop in the adoption 
stage. It continued to investigate and observe the relationship between the diagnostic 
and interactive use of the adopted control systems and how those factors influenced 
ILGs organizational learning capabilities by using the research concept from Widener 
(2007). 
Fifthly, this research investigates the view of control systems as tools contributing to the 
implementation of the intended strategy and stimulating the emergence of new 
 Page 16 of 255 
 
strategies. In this study, combining diagnostic or interactive use of SAKIP to manage 
tensions between freedom to innovate and achieving pre-determined target in ILGs was 
observed. Finally, the positive or negative effects of the use of SAKIP on learning was 
investigated to expose the distinctive potential of SAKIP for ILGs. This will add a 
significant methodological contribution to the literature. 
This research also provides insight into how the MSAEBR assesses or scores each local 
government agencies SAKIP’s implementation. Following a comprehensive assessment 
process, each agency is given a score and then grouped into one of seven categories. 
The evaluation results from 2011 and 2016 assessments did not show any notable 
improvement in which most ILGs were still classified in the “Bad” category. Besides 
indicating poor SAKIP implementation and use, the poor assessment results also signal 
conflict in the demands to adopt SAKIP and other precedence taking institutionalised 
elements that require further investigation. This has not been explored in prior research 
but was examined in this study. 
Findings from this study have practical significance as results will equip ILGs managers 
with a better understanding of the pressures and factors surrounding the implementation 
of SAKIP and allow them to identify areas that will improve the use of SAKIP in their 
ILGs. The empirical findings of this thesis are potentially important for regulatory 
bodies, local governments, central governments, and the users of local government 
performance reports. The findings can be used to develop and improve public sector 
governance and ILGs organisational learning capabilities. 
From a theoretical perspective, there is evidence to support the use of isomorphic 
institutional theory as a productive framework for explaining the adoption and use of 
MCSs as a means to achieve organisational learning capabilities at provincial and 
municipal levels of government in Indonesia. Institutional theory describes the factors 
that drive organisations to fully or symbolically utilise new innovations in order to meet 
demands from different stakeholders. Internal and external stakeholders are identified as 
playing important roles in shaping the power in an organisation. This study improved 
our understanding by including actors that actively managed the competing institutional 
demands embedded in the field of ILGs. Besides simply accepting environmental 
pressures, ILGs were found capable of modifying an existing institutional prescription. 
In addition, the result of this study revealed how performance measurement practices 
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became accepted and actively modified by local governments in Indonesia. Overall, the 
results of this study generate important insights about the implementation of a 
centralistic management control system in Indonesian local governments. 
1.8 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters: 
Chapter One introduces the research, by providing a concise background to the study, 
an outline of the research objectives and research questions, along with a summary of 
the overall research methodology and theoretical framework applied. Importantly the 
significance and contribution of the research and research scope is elaborated.  
Chapter Two provides a summary of the existing literature, divided into four main 
themes relevant to this research. Firstly, the origin and the implementation of SAKIP as 
a centralistic MCS in ILGs is outlined. Secondly, the factors that help explain the ILGs 
decision to adopt SAKIP is examined. Thirdly, a critical review of past literature 
emphasising the concept of management control systems is described. Diagnostic and 
interactive use of a management control system and accountability in an organisation is 
highlighted. Finally, the concept of organisational learning that assisted managers in 
responding to organisational change is deliberated. 
Chapter Three outlines the conceptual model variables and hypotheses developed and 
tested in this research. The conceptual model illustrates the relationship between the 
factors in adopting SAKIP; the associations between diagnostic and interactive use of 
SAKIP; and ILGs’ organisational learning capabilities. Finally, the reason for using 
institutional theory as the theoretical base for this study is provided. 
Chapter Four details the research approach, design and methodology applied in this 
research. The chapter describes the quantitative and qualitative research methods 
employed to analyse the collected data. 
Chapter Five presents the methods and results of the quantitative research. The data 
obtained from the survey is analysed by using statistical descriptive analysis. Partial 
least squares (PLS-SEM) regression, using the SmartPLS 2.0 statistic computer 
program, was also used to test the hypotheses outlined in the conceptual model.  
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Chapter Six provides the results from the qualitative study. This chapter examines the 
evidence collected from the face-to-face in-depth interviews with managers in the ILG. 
The underlying themes and elements that explain the significant relationship among 
variables identified in the quantitative stage are outlined. Finally, the results were 
described and discussed in line with the research questions of this thesis. 
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis by providing a summary of the results and key 
findings of the research. Secondly, the important contributions of this research are 
outlined. Thirdly, the managerial and policy implications of the research is highlighted. 
Finally, limitations and suggestions for future research are provided along with 
concluding remarks. 
1.9 Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of the structure of the thesis. The research objectives 
and questions are outlined. The primary objective of the research is to develop a 
conceptual model that identifies the factors that link the adoption and use of SAKIP in 
ILG with ILGs’ organisational learning capabilities. The significance and contribution 
of the research are also observed.  
The next chapter discusses the literature related to the use of SAKIP and ILGs’ 
organisational learning capabilities. 
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 Literature Review Chapter 2:
2.1 Introduction 
The present study examines the ILGs ability to utilise a centralised MCS and the 
organisational learning capabilities derived from the introduction of the MCS SAKIP. 
This literature review will focus on three central themes. These themes are the 
Indonesian bureaucratic system and performance management system SAKIP with an 
emphasis on ILG, MCSs and organisational learning (OL). These are all aligned with 
the research schema introduced in Chapter One and shown in Figure 1.1. With this in 
mind, prior Indonesian research is emphasised to highlight gaps in prior research while 
reputable studies from an international spectrum provide the opportunity to critically 
evaluate and highlight the relevance and contribution of the present study.   Further, 
studies within the public sector are elaborated as the present study is undertaken within 
this sector.  
This chapter commences with a description of the Indonesian public sector environment 
to set the scene and provide background information into the history of the introduction 
and adoption of SAKIP in Indonesia.  This is followed by a detailed overview of 
research into MCSs.  Finally OL research is examined with a view to illustrating the 
contribution of OL to problem resolution and ongoing organisational development and 
improvement within a local government framework. 
2.2 Background to Indonesian Public Sector and Accountability 
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world and the largest island 
archipelago in the world with 922 out of 13,466 islands inhabited by a total of 258.3 
million people.  The island of Java accommodates 60% of the Indonesian population 
and is one of the most densely populated places in the world.  Despite possessing the 
world’s third largest area of tropical forest and abundant natural resources, Indonesia 
still struggles with corruption, poverty, unemployment, inadequate infrastructure and 
inequitable resource distribution among its regions (World Factbook, 2017).  Through 
more effective government infrastructure, and enhancements in policy and procedures 
and areas of accountability across the different levels of government, Indonesia is 
attempting to improve outcomes for citizens.   
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Accountability in the public sector can be defined as efforts to maintain public trust by 
being answerable for behaviour and decisions made (Quinn and Schlenker, 2002; B. 
Romzek, 1987; B. S. Romzek, 2000). By objectively measuring the performance of 
government actions, accountability is expected to provide assurance to citizens that any 
individual given the mandate to act on their behalf is doing their best to carry out the 
tasks (Hughes, 2003).  
Prior to 1999, Indonesia operated under a centralised government system for almost 32 
years. Indonesia’s government administrative structure was divided into the central 
government, provincial government, cities and districts. Provinces, cities and districts 
were considered as part of the larger group called local governments, and they were led 
by a governor (Gubernur), a mayor (Walikota), and a regent (Bupati) respectively.  
The local parliament was less powerful than the heads of the local governments. 
Members of local parliament represented their political party than the citizens because 
they were not directly elected by popular vote. The citizens voted for a political party 
and the head of the political party appointed someone from the political party to be the 
member of a parliament. There were only three political parties i.e. PPP, Golkar and 
PDIP. Golkar always won an overwhelming majority votes in each election. Under 
Soeharto, Golkar was the government sponsored political party and civil servants were 
affiliated to and obligated to vote the party (Hadiz, 2004).  
The central government had control of the local governments’ budget and financial 
decisions. During this period, all local government leaders were the President’s 
subordinate. Mayors and regents were appointed by a governor who was appointed by 
the President. Therefore, the mayors and regents were only accountable to their 
governor and governors were accountable to the President. Under this system, local 
governments were considered as one of the many tools used by the President to 
implement his programs.  
The Asian financial crisis started in Thailand in July 1997. The crisis started with 
widened current account deficit and followed by the devaluation of Thai baht that led to 
the loss in investor confidence, rapid foreign private capital outflows and striking 
economic downturns (ADB, 2017). The crisis spread to the neighbouring countries in 
the region, including Indonesia, Malaysia and the Republic of Korea, and its impact 
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propagated throughout the global economy. In general, the crisis was caused by a 
combination of banking crisis and the affected countries’ weak attention to good 
governance especially in establishing adequate legal framework to guide dynamic 
economic transactions. Weak and poorly enforced regulations had permitted excessive 
risk taking practices, rent-seeking behaviours and increased corruption.  
As one of the worst crisis-affected countries, Indonesia requested assistance from 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to acquire financial support and to restore 
confidence. IMF took a lead in coordinating the multilateral assistance to stabilise the 
spreading crisis. Other major donors that involved in providing the financial support 
were the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The main purposes of 
the financial assistance were to provide liquidity for crisis-affected countries, encourage 
structural reforms to restore confidence, and to repair the country’s relationship with its 
external creditors.  
IMF required recipient countries to implement tighter monetary policy and conducted 
substantial structural reform such as banking system reform, improving corporate 
transparency and removing barriers to trade and monopolies. The IMF-led international 
assistance implemented broad strategies for dealing with the financial sector crisis that 
were similar across crisis countries. The strategies involved: (1) providing a credible 
macroeconomic stabilisation program to restore depositor and creditor confidence; (2) 
allowing the central banks in crisis countries to provide liquidity to financial institutions 
that were subject to withdrawals both from domestic depositors and creditors; (3) 
introducing blanket guarantees that protect depositors and creditors claim; (4) 
stabilising foreign funding and reversing the capital outflows through temporary capital 
control measures and foreign debt rescheduling; and (5) immediate closing of insolvent 
financial institutions (ADB, 2017; IMF, 1999). Crisis countries, such as Indonesia, 
Thailand, The Republic of Korea, or Malaysia adopted the strategies with some 
adjustment to meet with their national circumstances and preferences.  While the IMF 
took the lead in designing the overall restructuring program, other international donors 
also took charge in specific program implementation. The ADB viewed good 
governance was a central theme of the government reform in Indonesia. Poor and weak 
governance caused the loss of trust of the community in their public institutions and it 
was exposed during the crisis. As part of implementing the governance reform agenda, 
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the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme, ADB, Indonesia’s 
government agencies and civil societies launched the Partnership to Support 
Governance Reforms in Indonesia in April 2000 that intended to coordinate donor 
activities to formulate and promote the governance reform agenda (ADB, 2000). 
Following the financial and political crisis that occurred in 1998, Indonesia embraced 
the concept of the NPM  to reform the public sector (Harun and Robinson, 2010). The 
reform aimed for greater transparency in government transactions and clearer 
accountability to the public. This was achieved by incorporating various performance 
reports (Rhodes et al., 2012).  This represented a major shift from a centralised to a 
decentralised government system. All governors, mayors, regents, and members of the 
local parliament are directly elected by popular vote. Mayors and regents are no longer 
under a governor. They are all considered equal and responsible mainly to their local 
parliament. Mayors and regents are required to seek their local parliaments’ approval 
for local government regulation and budget proposals. 
As outlined in Figure 2.1, Indonesia’s government administrative structure is divided 
into three main areas. These include: the central government; provincial government; 
and local government that includes cities and districts.  In Indonesia, each level of 
government has two branches of government: (1) the executive branch (i.e. elected 
mayors and regents) and (2) the legislative branch to oversee the conduct of executives. 
The central government administration is located in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. 
Provinces, cities and districts are considered as part of the larger group called local 
governments, and they are led by a governor (Gubernur), a mayor (Walikota), and a 
regent (Bupati) respectively. 
 
 Page 23 of 255 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Indonesian government administrative structure 
 
Following decentralisation, the central government transferred functions to local 
governments. For example local governments became responsible to provide public 
services such as health, education and building infrastructure. The central government 
retained functions related to national security, defence, foreign affairs, religious affairs 
and fiscal affairs. In addition to providing services to their local constituent, governors 
have an additional role as the coordinator for certain central government’s programs 
that require collaboration from more than one municipality or district.  
The shift to a decentralised system created a block funding system from the central 
government to local governments and has facilitated more autonomous decision making 
related to resource distribution.  However, the freedom to manage their localities 
increased the demands from the central government to improve transparency and 
accountability through performance report requirements. Local governments are 
required to submit performance information to their local parliament. This performance 
system is termed Sistem Akuntabilitas Kinerja Pemerintah (SAKIP) and is outlined in 
the next section.  
 
2.2.1 Development of SAKIP as a performance reporting and measurement 
system 
As detailed earlier the 1998 Asian financial crisis gave rise to government reforms in 
Indonesia, comprising the adoption of more democratic principles, “underpinned by a 
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process of decentralisation as the centrepiece of a wide-ranging programme of 
institutional reforms” (Harris and Foresti, 2010, p. 1). Subsequently, the government 
issued a series of laws with an emphasis on reforming a legal framework for the 
management and accountability of public funds. At a localised level this related to 
budgeting and performance measurement. Some of the laws specified general principles 
and authorities for the management and accountability of public funds. This has now 
evolved into a performance reporting and management system termed SAKIP. An 
outline of the development of the SAKIP system and regulation updates and changes 
can be reviewed in the timeline in Table 2.1.   
In 1999, the President issued Presidential Instruction3 PI 7/1999 which required all tiers 
of government to submit an annual accountability and performance report.  This report 
was termed LAKIP4. The regulation required all government agencies to prepare an 
annual performance report in the hope that ultimately it would promote efficiency, 
effectiveness, transparency, and accountability within the Indonesian public sector. 
During LAKIP’s introduction and deployment stage, the President issued additional 
regulations to emphasise the role of LAKIP within the government control system, as 
well as to assist agencies in preparing and using LAKIP as a monitoring and evaluation 
tool. The central agency that leads and administers the implementation of LAKIP is the 
MSAEBR5. The MSAEBR’s role is to publish additional guidelines for agencies in 
preparing their LAKIP as well as to evaluate and grade6 every submitted LAKIP report. 
The intention of regulation PI 7/1999 was to compel all local and central government 
agencies to report their performance to the President in a hierarchical manner (Solikin, 
2006). Every department of every government agency was required to prepare and 
submit the LAKIP report to the head of the agency. Later, the head of the agencies 
prepared and submitted their consolidated LAKIP to the MSAEBR, who would compile 
them and submit the final fully consolidated LAKIP to the President. Despite calling for 
all government agencies to implement the policy, PI 7/1999 failed to clearly define any 
form of performance measurement system needed to produce the LAKIP report. There 
was only a further indication that another Presidential Instruction would be provided to 
                                                            
3  Instruksi Presiden = PI 
4  Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja Pemerintah = LAKIP 
5  Minister of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucracy Reform = MSAEBR 
6  Before the concept of SAKIP was introduced, the MSAEBR assessed the performance of all agencies 
through LAKIP.  
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regulate and describe the required system. Consequently, the level of adoption and 
compliance to the requirements of LAKIP were low and information that was reported 
lacked consistency that made consolidation difficult and relevance negligible.   
 
In 1999, a central government agency, the Public Administration Agency (PAA), was 
appointed to provide the necessary guidelines to improve the interpretation of the 
LAKIP regulation. The PAA issued a guideline in decree number 589/IX/6/Y/1999 in 
1999 that set the framework for preparing LAKIP in order to clarify PI 7/1999, and to 
provide an operational explanation for government agencies on how to report their 
performance. In 2003, the guideline was updated in decree number 239/IX/6/8/2003  
All government agencies were required to develop a performance measurement and 
accountability system, namely SAKIP and to integrate performance measurement into 
their management process and to disclose relevant information in the required format in 
their required report namely, LAKIP.  
The appendix section of the PAA decree, 239/IX/6/8/2003, included detailed 
instructions regarding guidelines to develop the SAKIP system. Government agencies 
were required to establish SAKIP prior to producing their LAKIP report. Therefore, it 
was made clear that LAKIP was a performance report that was part of the SAKIP 
system. Agencies were also required to establish a mission, a vision, strategic 
objectives, and key performance indicators (KPIs) as part of the SAKIP system. 
However, the decree did not explain the linkage between the SAKIP system and the 
existing financial and operational systems because the main focus of the decree was to 
produce a LAKIP report and submit it at the end of the budget year. Solikin (2006) 
noted that the implementation of PI 7/1999 and PAA 239/IX/6/8/2003 still focused on 
the accountability reporting process rather than on a performance improvement strategy. 
As a result, there was still ambiguity among government agencies regarding the 
intention of SAKIP and LAKIP.  
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Table 2.1: Timeline and description of LAKIP and SAKIP regulations and 
guidelines 
Year 
introduced 
Name of regulation or 
guideline Description 
Date annulled 
or updated? 
1999 PI 7/ 1999 Performance 
Accountability Reporting 
(LAKIP) 
Required all tiers of government to 
submit an annual performance 
accountability report.  Mentioned the 
need to set up a performance 
measurement system 
Revoked in 
2014 
Replaced with 
PR 29/2014 
PAA Decree No. 
589/IX/6/1999  Guideline 
in developing LAKIP 
Guideline in Preparing Performance 
Accountability Reporting LAKIP. 
Revoked in 
2003 
Replaced with 
PAA 239 
2003 PAA Decree No. 
239/IX/6/8/2003 Revision 
on Guideline in developing 
LAKIP 
Guidelines to develop the SAKIP 
system and for preparing the LAKIP. 
Information on strategic planning, and 
development of KPIs. 
Revoked in 
2014 
2004 PI  5/2004 Corruption 
Eradication Acceleration 
Initiative 
Performance agreement requirement.  
Law No.25/2004   National 
Development Planning Law 
Requires all agencies to prepare 5 year 
strategic plans and annual plan. 
 
2006 GR 8/2006 Government 
Financial and Performance 
Reporting 
Required the government agencies to 
prepare, audit and submit the financial 
and performance reports.   
 
2007 MSAEBR.9/2007  General Guideline on developing KPI Updated in 
2008 
2008 GR 8/2008 Procedures in 
Developing, Controlling 
and Evaluating the 
implementation of Local 
Development  Planning 
 
Guidelines to monitoring and evaluation 
of the regional development plan. 
 
MSAEBR.20/2008 General Guideline on developing KPI Updated in 
2010 
2010 MOHA 54/2010 on 
Guidelines to implement 
GR 8/2008 
Require local governments to align the 
medium term plan with the strategic 
plan. 
 
MSAEBR 29/2010   Revised  Guideline on developing KPI  
2014 PR  29/ 2014  Performance 
Accountability System 
(SAKIP) 
SAKIP Guidelines  
MSAEBR 53/2014  Technical Guideline for developing 
performance agreements, performance 
reporting and reviewing performance 
report. 
 
2015 MSAEBR 12/2015  Guidelines to review the implementation 
of SAKIP 
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2.2.2 Integrating SAKIP with other control systems 
In addition to developing a performance measurement framework, the Indonesian 
government also engaged in comprehensive financial reform to deal with changes from 
a centralised into a decentralised system. Three major acts were issued and became the 
foundation of the financial accountability reform in the public sector.  These acts were 
(1) Law 17/ 2003 on state finances that included the planning and budgeting system, (2) 
Law 1/2004 on state treasury, and (3) Law 15/2004 on state financial management 
audit. The acts marked the transformation from a focus on administration to a system 
that centred on the financial management. Prior to the introduction of these acts, the 
broad Indonesian financial system allocated resources based on a traditional line item 
budgeting system.  The new regulations introduced performance-based budgeting that 
linked the funding with output and/or outcome indicators (KPIs) related to an activity or 
program. In 2005, the government also issued Government Regulation GR 24/2005 on 
Government Accounting Standards. This required all government agencies to change 
from the cash basis to the modified accrual basis accounting system. The regulation was 
later revised by GR 71/2010 on Government Accounting Standards that required all 
government agencies to gradually implement the full accrual basis by 2015.  
 
In order to integrate SAKIP with planning, budgeting, treasury, and government 
accounting systems, the government issued Government Regulation GR 8/2006 related 
to Financial and Performance Reporting for Government Agencies. The aim of the 
regulation was to have more transparent an integrated financial and performance 
information in combined government agency reports (Mimba, Helden, and Tillema, 
2007). Despite the intention to bridge government financial and performance reports, 
GR 8/2006 placed more attention on the establishment of financial reports. The 
regulation required audits to be conducted on financial reports to provide a certain level 
of assurance.  However, no audit was required on performance reports. Moreover, the 
regulation also allowed the MOF7 to apply administrative or financial penalties for 
government agencies that fail to follow the regulation. The MOF could delay the 
transfer of block grants to ILGs for late submission or failing to submit financial 
reports. On the other hand, there was no penalty applied for failing to provide a 
performance report. Jurnali and Siti-Nabiha (2015a) linked the lack of punishment to 
                                                            
7  Ministry of Finance = MOF 
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provide a performance report to the ILGs’ lack of motivation to perform well.  
GR 8/2006 clarified SAKIP as a performance measurement system connected with the 
planning system and government accounting system. ILGs are required to prepare and 
provide both financial and performance reports to local parliament, and submit only a 
performance report to the MSAEBR. However, the performance report format provided 
in the regulation was significantly different to the one in previous regulations, such as in 
the guideline PAA 239/IX/6/8/2003. This difference meant public agencies had to 
prepare two different performance reports with similar content. It also created 
ambiguities regarding the use of terminology. The term SAKIP (the system) and LAKIP 
(the report) were used interchangeably by government agencies.   
The government intention to issue another regulation to further explain the 
implementation of SAKIP and how SAKIP would integrate with the planning, 
budgeting, treasury and accounting system was also highlighted in GR 8/2006.  
Integration efforts prior to the introduction of the new specific regulation about SAKIP 
are also demonstrated with GR 8/2008 and the MOHA8 Regulation 54/2010 that 
required local governments to align the medium term plan with the strategic plan.   
SAKIP’s position as the Indonesian Government’s control system became more 
important when the President launched The Bureaucracy Reform Initiative in 2010 
(Dwiyanto, 2011). The aim was to implement a more transparent and ethical 
government, provide fast and responsive public services, increase government 
programs’ visibility, and modernize all agencies’ management systems. The initiative 
used the implementation of SAKIP in government agencies as one of the reform 
milestones. The number of agencies that adopted SAKIP had also grown markedly. In 
2011, there were 290 out of 612 (47%) agencies that failed to fulfil the mandate to 
submit LAKIP to the MSAEBR. All of these were ILG, comprising 3 provinces and 287 
municipalities (Kompas, 2012). However in 2014, all ILGs claimed that they had 
implemented the SAKIP system and submitted the LAKIP report to the MSAEBR. 
After 15 years of LAKIP implementation, the government finally issued PR9 29/2014 
on the 21st of April 2014.  The Presidential Regulation comprehensively explained the 
                                                            
8  Ministry of Home Affairs 
9  Presidential Regulation 
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SAKIP system for government agencies as required by the previous regulations. The 
Presidential Regulation also replaced and annulled PI 7/1999 and PAA 
239/IX/6/8/2003, and changed the LAKIP terminology to a performance report. The 
regulation clearly uses the term ‘SAKIP’ as the management control system for 
government agencies and provides a comprehensive description about SAKIP as a 
system that plans, measures and reports government entities’ performance. The 
integration of SAKIP as the performance measurement system with existing accounting 
and treasury systems was also clarified.  
PR 29/2014 requires agencies to describe their mission and vision, to prepare their 
strategic objectives and key performance indicators (KPIs), and to integrate KPIs with 
their annual budget. In the following year, the MSAEBR issued regulation MSAEBR 
12/2015 that clearly provided guidelines for the MSAEBR and the government internal 
auditor (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan dan Pembangunan = BPKP) to review the 
implementation of SAKIP (the system) in government agencies. These two regulations 
removed the ambiguity by emphasizing the position of the performance report as a part 
of the SAKIP system.  
The absence of a clear definition and complete description regarding the centralistic 
management control system resulted in the inconsistent use of the terms ‘LAKIP’ and 
‘SAKIP’. Prior to the issuance of PR 29/2014, the LAKIP and SAKIP acronyms were 
used interchangeably among government agencies during the implementation process 
and often they were used to refer to the same items. For example, when the MSAEBR 
evaluated the agencies’ LAKIP report, they focused not only on the content of the 
report, but also on the quality of the management system instruments utilised to produce 
the report. The MSAEBR reviewed the quality of the KPIs used, the alignment between 
mission, vision and objectives, and the KPI measurement mechanism.  
The inconsistent use of the acronyms is also reflected in some of the previous literature. 
Akbar et al. (2012) and Jurnali and Siti-Nabiha (2015a) only mentioned LAKIP when 
they referred to government performance accountability reporting and fail to mention 
SAKIP as the system that produced the report. In his research on the Indonesian 
Ministry of Finance’s management control system, Budiarso (2014) viewed SAKIP as a 
different system than the balanced scorecard system used by the Indonesian Ministry of 
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Finance.  
The prolonged gap in the regulations may have created confusion among ILGs; 
however, it did not prevent them from participating in SAKIP in order to gain 
legitimacy. Md. Mostaque and Zahirul (2002) argued that an organisation considers the 
interplay among political position, and institutional and technical environment prior to 
adopting a new system. The regulation gap in the SAKIP system may also have had an 
impact on the accuracy, validity and quality of performance indicators. Following the 
direction provided by PR 29/2014, this thesis will use SAKIP as the terminology when 
the management control system in ILGs is discussed. 
2.2.3 Annual assessment on SAKIP implementation 
The last two stages of the SAKIP cycle are the reporting and assessment phases. In the 
reporting phase, all government agencies are required to prepare a performance report 
within two months after the end of the financial year 31 December (Akbar, Pilcher, and 
Perrin, 2015; Jurnali and Siti-Nabiha, 2013)(Akbar et al., 2015; Jurnalis & Nabiha, 
2013). In the assessment phase, Minister of State Apparatus Empowerment and 
Bureaucracy Reform (MSAEBR) and Government Internal Auditor (BPKP) are two 
government agencies that conduct annual review on the implementation of SAKIP in all 
government agencies. Based on the MSAEBR 12/2015, the SAKIP implementation is 
assessed based on five major components of the performance measurement system, with 
each given an importance rating: 
(1)  performance planning (30 per cent); 
(2)  performance measurement (25 per cent); 
(3) performance reporting (15 per cent); 
(4)  performance evaluation (10 per cent); and 
(5)  performance achievement (20 per cent) 
The first component is the performance planning score, which contributes 30% of the 
total score. The evaluation process for this component is mainly the reviewing of 
information in strategic and annual plan documents. Under the SAKIP system, a 
strategic plan is a five-year planning document that should have an ILG’s vision, 
mission statement, and a set of key elements that are objectives, goals, programs, and 
activities. The second component is the performance measurement score, which 
contributes 25% of the total score. The evaluation process for this component is mainly 
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reviewing the process of measuring performance in an ILG. The third component is the 
performance reporting score, which contributes 15% of the total score. The evaluation 
process for this component is mainly reviewing the process of reporting on performance 
in ILGs. The fourth component is the internal evaluation assessment, which contributes 
10% of the total score. The evaluation process for this component is mainly reviewing 
the performance evaluation process in an ILG. The final component is the performance 
achievement score, which contributes 20% of the total score. The evaluation process for 
this component is mainly reviewing the performance of the ILG’s outcome and output 
performance indicators and by assessing the reliability of the performance 
information.10 
During the evaluation process, the assessors from MSAEBR or BPKP visit and assess 
the SAKIP implementation in the agencies. The assessment process includes collecting 
SAKIP-related documents, sending out questionnaires, conducting interviews and 
observing the level of SAKIP implementation.  
The evaluation analyses the SAKIP system being used and provides recommendations 
for improvement. The evaluation focuses on the agency’s abilities in (MSAEBR 
12/2015, p. 11): 
(1)  planning strategic performance;  
(2)  developing a performance information collection system; 
(3)  disclosing performance achievement; 
(4)  monitoring and evaluating strategic performance achievement; 
(5)  connecting elements of performance planning with budgeting and budget 
executions; 
(6)  SAKIP’s implementation in the departmental level of an agency; and  
(7)  setting up action plans to follow up the assessment’s recommendations. 
 
Table 2.2: SAKIP evaluation scoring system 
Score Rating Description 
91-100 AA Excellent 
81-90 A Great 
71-80 BB Very Good 
61-70 B Good
51-60 CC Fair 
31-50 C Bad 
0-30 D Very Bad 
 
                                                            
10 The detail of the SAKIP scoring elements is further discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Following a comprehensive evaluation process, each performance report is given a 
score from 0 to 100. The score is then grouped into the seven rating categories shown in 
Table 2.2. At the end of the evaluation phase, the MSAEBR creates a list of all agencies 
and publishes11 a list of the best or the worst in SAKIP performance. The results of the 
assessment of the 2016 SAKIP implementation showed that ILGs’ ability to use LAKIP 
is not improving. The majority of ILGs still fell into the C category or were lower than 
50 (Jajeli, 2017). The results were relatively similar to the research on ILGs 
accountability in 2011 by Akbar et al. (2015). The results also indicated major 
institutional factors that impede the majority of ILGs from fully implementing SAKIP, 
despite a series of guidelines issued by central government agencies.  
In their study on performance measurement regimes in the US Government, Mahler and 
Posner (2014) noted the assumption behind such evaluation is that agencies will 
naturally learn from observing the connection between budget and strategic plans, and 
from providing the general public with the evaluation results. They argued that the 
“shame and fame” mechanism that follows after a coercive evaluation may discourage 
government agencies from learning and change.  
2.2.4 Prior research in ILG on performance measurement systems 
A number of prior studies have been conducted within the Indonesia local government 
that have emphasised the usefulness of performance measurement systems. A summary 
of selected studies is presented in Tables 2.3 to 2.5. Studies have been found to examine 
a number of variables such as culture, commitment, accountability, corruption, and 
fraud (Jurnali and Siti-Nabiha, 2015a; Kasim, 2013; Manafe and Akbar, 2014; 
Primarisanti and Akbar, 2015; Surjandari and Martaningtyas, 2015). More recently 
exploratory research on how performance measurement systems influence 
organisational learning has emerged (Ahyaruddin and Akbar, 2016; Wijaya and Akbar, 
2013). Organisational learning studies are elaborated later under section 2.4. An 
examination of the literature has also shown that a variety of theories have been applied 
when examining performance measurement systems. The present study will apply 
institutional theory. This is consistent with studies by (Ahyaruddin and Akbar, 2016; 
Akbar, 2011; Akbar et al., 2012; Akbar et al., 2015; Harun, Van Peursem, and Eggleton, 
                                                            
11  In the newspaper and other media. 
 Page 33 of 255 
 
2012; Jurnali and Siti-Nabiha, 2015a); Manafe and Akbar (2014); (Mimba et al., 2007; 
Primarisanti and Akbar, 2015; Wijaya and Akbar, 2013).  Institutional theory has been 
found to be the most relevant in public sector research given the pressures imposed by 
the central governments.  A thorough examination of prior research and the relevance of 
institution theory is provided in Chapter Three that explores the theoretical framework 
of the present study. The following section emphasises prior research that has examined 
external and internal organisational factors that affect the use of performance 
information in ILGs. 
2.2.4.1 External and internal factors antecedents to the use of performance 
information and to organisational performance  
The majority of previous studies have identified external and internal organisational 
factors that affect the use of performance information in Indonesia public sector. Table 
2.3 summarizes past ILG studies, and the following section examines the literature on 
external and internal factors affecting the use of performance measurement systems.  
 
Table 2.3: Summary of ILG studies that have examined external and internal 
factors affecting the use of performance measurement systems. 
Author(s) Methods Key Findings 
Mimba et al. (2007) Literature review Public sector organisations in developing countries face 
disequilibrium between the demand for and supply of 
performance information. The reforms lead to an increasing 
demand for performance information but it is not always 
followed by a sufficient supply of performance information 
because of the low-institutional capacity and the high level of 
corruption within the organisations. 
Akbar et al. (2012) Survey 457 ILGs 
officers 
The paper investigated relationships between technical and 
organisational factors and the development and use of 
performance indicators and accountability practices. The study 
found that ILGs developed performance indicators to fulfil 
regulatory requirements and not for organisational effective and 
efficient purposes. Coercive and normative pressures play roles 
in the development performance measures. 
Harun, An, and Kahar 
(2013) 
Literature review The success of the implementation of NPM and accrual 
accounting reform in ILGs is hampered due to the lack of co-
ordination between government at the central and local levels 
and the central government’s reluctance to modernize the 
human resource management system used in local government.  
Jurnali and Siti-Nabiha 
(2013) 
Regulation and 
guideline reviews 
The paper reviewed the regulation, guidelines and examined 
the issues and consequences of implementing a performance 
measurement system in ILGs. The PMS regulation was found 
to be quite comprehensive except there were no punishment 
and reward system at an organisational or individual level. In 
order to improve the quality of PMS implementation, the 
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central government should regulate the coordination between 
ministries, provide the monitoring and supervisory system, and 
improve the local staff’s capacity. 
Kasim (2013)  Discussion paper The current government’s bureaucratic problems in Indonesia 
are multi-dimensional in nature. The paper identifies the need 
of more comprehensive strategies including four major areas 
that are: political leadership, public policy harmonization 
(including rules and regulations), the application of a merit 
system in all government agencies, and anti-corruption 
initiatives. 
Mimba, Helden, and 
Tillema (2013) 
Interview 20 
managers from 2 
ILGs 
When facing two opposing forces i.e. corruptions and public 
sector reforms, ILGs managers focus more on fulfilling the 
formal requirements regarding the format of these reports and 
on their timely submission than on their contents, which are all 
symptoms of a symbolic rather than functional use of 
performance information. 
McLeod and Harun 
(2014) 
Interview 24 ILGs 
senior officers 
and local 
parliament 
members 
The success of implementing accrual accounting as part of 
public sector reform in Indonesia is hindered by lack of staff 
with adequate accounting skills and the use cash-based 
accounting reports alongside the accrual-accounting. As a 
consequence, the level of compliance with the new accounting 
standard are low, little use has been made of accrual-based 
reports for decision making purposes, or for holding 
governments to account for their financial performance. 
Author(s) Methods Key Findings 
Manafe and Akbar 
(2014) 
Survey 201/ 
Interviewed 3 
ILGs 
The conflict in the accountability requirement has significant 
impact on the work context with negative perception at 
different levels, but does not have any significant impact on the 
work performance of the accountability actors. 
Afiah and Azwari 
(2015) 
ILG/Path 
Analysis 
Through financial reporting quality, internal control gives 
better results, and has significant and positive influence on 
good governance. 
Harun, Van-Peursem, 
and Eggleton (2015) 
Interview 29 
Indonesian 
government 
officials 
The accounting reform has still not enabled local citizens to 
voice their concerns in a free and open manner. There is limited 
opportunity to question the elements of these reforms, and the 
study has also found that centralizing forces remain to serve 
vested interests. A conflicting set of goals, priorities, deadlines, 
and accountabilities from external parties including central 
governments have resulted in confusion amongst members of 
our LG. Through a combination of confusion and resistance, 
incompetence and self-service, local participants had no more 
real basis to express their “voice” over these events than they 
had before. 
Jurnali and Siti-Nabiha 
(2015b) 
Explanatory case 
study 1 ILG 
A successful PMS implementation in a ILG depends on 
directions and supervisory monitoring from senior management 
and adequate staff training regarding PMS. The Mayor played a 
major role in institutionalising the PMS. 
Jurnali and Siti-Nabiha 
(2015a) 
Literature review PMS regulation is quite comprehensive, except it lacks a 
punishment and reward system. Some evidence demonstrates 
implementation issues such as lack of compliance, lack of 
integration between planning and budgeting, and inaccurate 
indicators and data reporting 
Surjandari and 
Martaningtyas (2015)  
Survey 48 central 
government 
Performance incentive does not have any impact on fraud 
activities. This is because the incentive is given based on an 
employee’s grade and not on an employee’s performance. 
Primarisanti and Akbar 
(2015) 
Survey 214 ILGs 
officers  
Interviewed 5 
(1) Training, incentives and authority in decision-making had 
significant impacts on the development of the measurement of 
the performance, performance accountability and the use of the 
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respondents performance information;  
(2) Top management commitment had a positive impact on 
performance accountability and the use of performance 
information;  
(3) Innovation had a positive impact on the development of 
performance measurement systems and the use of performance 
information;  
(4) Information system limitations had a negative impact on 
performance accountability and the use of performance 
information. 
Ahyaruddin and Akbar 
(2016) 
Survey 137 ILGs 
officers 
(1) Management commitment had a positive association with 
accountability and organisational performance;  
(2) There is a positive association between the legislative 
mandate and accountability;  
(3) No significant association between the use of PMS with 
performance;  
(4) Accountability is not associated with organisational 
performance. 
Author(s) Methods Key Findings 
Fahmi, Prawira, 
Hudalah, and Firman 
(2016) 
Interview Leadership plays a vital role in collaborative planning 
processes by overcoming conflicts, imagining vision, 
structuring knowledge and resources, nurturing trust, 
persuading stakeholders to collaboratively perform tasks and 
build a learning framework. 
Hayat (2016)  Survey 217 public 
sector managers 
Participation in budgeting is the central variable in shaping 
organisational commitment, while organisational commitment 
turns out to be the most dominant variable affecting managerial 
performance. Commitment becomes the bridge of managerial 
performance achievement when distributive justice has no 
significant effect on managerial performance 
Simon, Mas'Ud, 
Mahfudnurnajamuddin, 
and Su'Un (2016) 
Survey 189 
central agencies 
(1) The competence of the apparatus and internal control 
systems has a positive and significant effect on good 
governance.  
(2) The competence of the apparatus has a positive and 
significant effect on the quality of financial statement 
information.  
(3) Internal control and good governance has a negative and 
insignificant effect on the quality of financial reporting 
information. 
Kewo (2017) Survey 345 staff Internal control and managerial performance have a significant 
influence on Financial Accountability 
 
External factor - Regulation  
Regulations have been the main external factor impacting the use of a performance 
measurement system as evidenced by the demands of Indonesian government agencies 
to adopt and use performance information. Manafe and Akbar (2014), surveyed 201 
ILG officers in East Nusa Tenggara and examined the impact of the external and 
internal accountability requirements on the perceived workloads and work performance. 
Central government was described as the external party with the capability to regulate 
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ILGs. One of the central government regulations included in the study was the 
requirement to prepare LAKIP (the report). The study argued that ILGs have to 
implement the regulation despite their lack of skills or knowledge about it. Findings 
revealed that the requirement to comply with the central government agencies has 
impacted the ILG officials’ perceived workload and work performance.   
In their study examining the impact of the use of performance measurement systems on 
organisational accountability and performance, Ahyaruddin and Akbar (2016) also 
revealed that an external factor such as the requirement to prepare LAKIP is positively 
associated with the accountability in ILGs. Accountability variable was referred to: (1) 
formal reporting requirement from subordinates to their superiors and (2) ILG’s 
reporting requirement to bodies outside the organisation, such as the MSAEBR.  
External factor - Coordination within central government agencies 
Harun et al. (2013) also argued that the implementation of accrual accounting reform in 
ILGs is hampered by the inconsistent accounting regulations and the lack of 
coordination between central and local governments. Following up their own research, 
Harun et al. (2015) found that the conflicting goals and priorities from central 
government agencies caused confusion and triggered resistance among ILGs.  
Kasim (2013) further identified the need to have a more consistent and comprehensive 
approach to improve the impact of bureaucratic reform in the Indonesian government.  
This included four major areas; (1) political leadership; (2) public policy harmonization 
(including rules and regulations); (3) the application of a merit system in all government 
agencies; (4) and an anti-corruption policy. He argued that these four areas were the 
main causes of government reform failure in Indonesia.  
External factor - Reward and punishment 
Jurnali and Siti-Nabiha (2013) noted that the lack of punishment and reward system for 
the current performance measurement system discouraged compliance to the new 
system by ILGs and therefore did not encourage improved performance. Similar to 
Kasim (2013), Jurnali and Siti-Nabiha (2015a) proposed a reward and penalty 
mechanism to improve the implementation of SAKIP.   However, later research found 
some contradictory results to these suggestions. 
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Following a survey of 48 central government agencies, Surjandari and Martaningtyas 
(2015), found that additional financial reward, such as individual and performance 
incentives, did not have any impact on fraud activities. Reasons provided were related 
to the incentives being awarded based on an employees’ rank and not on their 
performance. This finding provides some support that for a merit system to work 
effectively and reduce fraud activities then alternatives need to be explored to determine 
those measures that are most appropriate within a government setting. 
 
Internal factor - Management commitment 
In their study on the implementation of performance measurement system in ILGs, 
Akbar et al. (2012) found that the development of performance indicators was affected 
by management commitment to support the implementation of the new system, 
legislative requirements, and technical knowledge regarding the measurability of the 
performance indicators. They also found that the use of performance indicators was 
affected by the extent of technical knowledge and management commitment. 
Institutional theory was used to explain the relationship between observed variables. 
The study found the strongest pressure came from coercive isomorphism in the form of 
regulations from the central government. Normative isomorphism came from formal 
training and interactions with professional groups. 
Ahyaruddin and Akbar (2016) also found the internal factor, management commitment, 
to use performance information is substantially associated with organisational 
performance. However, the study did not find any significant association between the 
operational and exploratory use of a performance report such as LAKIP and 
organisational performance12. Further, no association between accountability and 
organisational performance was found.  
Primarisanti and Akbar (2015) also found the level of management commitment 
influences the use of performance information and LAKIP in ILGs. For example, top 
management commitment was found to have positive impact on performance 
                                                            
12  The organisational performance variable was measured by using a five-point Likert score. 
Respondents were asked to indicate a score of their unit on every performance dimension. 
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accountability and the use of performance information. In addition, training, incentives 
and authority in decision-making were found to impact the development of performance 
indicators and the use of the performance information itself.  
Jurnali and Siti-Nabiha (2015b) in their case study found the importance of management 
commitment to improve ILGs’ participation in implementing SAKIP. The Mayor 
played an active role in developing the new system, improving the SAKIP knowledge of 
his staff, and incorporating the local values into the new system. The crucial role of 
leadership from the local leaders was also identified by Fahmi et al. (2016) in his study 
on the collaborative planning in ILGs. Hayat (2016) in his research found that the level 
of managers’ involvement in the budget drafting process and the percentage of budget 
approved are associated with the managers’ commitment to the organisation. Managers’ 
commitment became the major factor for managerial performance. Managerial 
performance is measured by asking the opinion of the managers’ supervisors.  
Internal factor - Innovation 
Primarisanti and Akbar (2015) also found that innovation had a positive impact, while 
limitations of information systems were found to have a negative impact on the 
development of performance measurement systems and the use of performance 
information. The study also identified some of the difficulties that ILGs have 
encountered in developing the performance measurement system, such as data 
availability and accuracy. However, the reasons behind such difficulties and their 
impact on the use of performance information were not explored.  
Internal factors - Organisational capacity, resources and human resource skills 
Mimba et al. (2007) in their research argued that the lack of ILGs’ institutional capacity 
to constantly operate and improve their performance, a high level of corruption and 
insufficient resources were barriers to provide adequate performance information. Later, 
she found that the lack of institutional capacity in ILGs has led the managers to focus on 
submitting LAKIP to ILGs’ leaders on time and in the correct format, which indicated a 
symbolic use of performance information (Mimba et al., 2013). In her research, she 
positioned an ILG leader as the dominant stakeholder and not as part of the ILG. Other 
ILGs’ stakeholders were members of the local parliament and the central government 
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auditor. By viewing ILGs’ leaders as a separate entity from ILGs’ managers, Mimba et 
al. (2013) viewed the different use of performance indicators between ILGs’ leaders and 
managers as the evident symbolic use of LAKIP. Further, Mimba et al. (2013) did not 
include other important central agencies such as the MSAEBR and BPKP in her 
discussion. As a result, she only viewed that the main obstacle for the design of high-
quality performance measurement systems came from the lack of ILGs institutional 
capacity. 
The lack of institutional capacity has also been found in a study that examined the 
implementation of accrual accounting in ILGs. McLeod and Harun (2014) found the 
lack of staff with adequate skills and the parallel use of the old and new system 
discouraged ILGs from fully complying with the new accounting system and to use it 
for management purpose. On the other hand, ILGs have to go through a very difficult 
process to recruit skilled staff from different government agencies. The problem is 
exacerbated by the lack of coordination between MOHA, MOF, and BPKP, the central 
agencies in charge of the implementation of the new accounting system.  
Similar to McLeod and Harun (2014), Simon et al. (2016) found that the transparency 
and quality of information in the financial report is notably affected by the knowledge 
and skills of the ILG’s staff. The establishment of an internal control system also 
improved the financial information transparency and accountability. Kewo (2017) also 
found a positive impact of internal control on the accountability. 
Internal factor - Data accuracy and the integration of different systems 
Findings of a thorough literature review, Jurnali and Siti-Nabiha (2015a)  acknowledged 
that despite the highly regulated environment (including SAKIP), there was a lack of 
data accuracy, a lack of compliance, and lack of integration between planning and 
budgeting during the implementation of SAKIP.  
2.3 Management Control System (MCS) 
The term “management control” was first used by Robert Anthony in 1965 (Anthony, 
1968). He defined management control as “the process by which managers assure that 
resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of 
the organisation’s objectives” (Anthony, 1968, p. 17). In 2004, Anthony reemphasised 
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a MCS as the process to influence other members of the organisation to implement 
organisation strategies (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007). Simons (1995, p. 5) defined 
MCSs as “formal, information-based routines and procedures managers use to 
maintain or alter patterns in organisational activities”. Similar to Simons (1995), 
Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998) defined MCSs as practices and formal 
procedures used by managers to maintain and align the organisation’s members’ 
behaviour within the organisation’s activities. MCSs can be described as formal tools, 
procedures and techniques used by managers to acquire and provide information that 
help them to make decisions that add value to customers and shareholders (Langfield-
Smith, Thorne, Smith, and Hilton, 2015; Nuhu et al., 2017; Wijethilake, Munir, and 
Appuhami, 2016). Malmi and Brown (2008, p. 290) defined MCSs as “all the devices 
and systems managers use to ensure that the behaviours and decisions of their 
employees are consistent with the organisation’s objectives and strategies”. 
The purpose of the MCS is to enable organisations to monitor their performance by 
providing information that will assist managers in planning, decision-making, and 
evaluation (Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015; Henri, 2006; Widener, 2007). The central 
focus of a MCS is strategy implementation (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007) and to 
guide managers to reach organisational objectives (Marginson, 2002). Accounting-
based controls of planning, monitoring activities, and measuring performance are an 
important part of a MCS (Langfield-Smith, 2007), however, a MCS also provides a 
coordinating role. For example, harmonising the activities of different sections within 
an organisation, communicating and evaluating information, deciding which actions 
should be taken, and influencing behavioural change (Anthony and Govindarajan, 
2007). Therefore, it also contributes to managing the behaviour of employees through 
rules, practices, values, and other activities (Chenhall, 2003; Marginson, 2002). While 
implementing strategies and accomplishing objectives, managers also ensure that 
resources are acquired and utilised effectively and efficiently (Langfield-Smith, 2007).  
Previous research has classified many types of controls, such as formal and informal 
controls; technical and social controls; and diagnostic and interactive controls 
(Langfield-Smith, 2007; Tessier and Otley, 2012). Formal controls such as rules, 
standard operating procedures, and budgeting systems, are more visible than informal 
controls, which include unwritten policies of the organisation derived from 
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organisational culture (Langfield-Smith, 2007). Informal controls are described as 
sharing activities and performance-related information through discussions and 
consultations. Clan controls or social controls are usually part of informal controls 
(Langfield-Smith, 2007).  Tessier and Otley (2012) recapped social controls as controls 
that are represented by core values, beliefs, and norms; that appeal to the emotional 
elements within employees and represent the manageable aspects of organisational 
culture.  Technical controls are rules, procedures, and standards to organise individuals 
to perform tasks (Langfield-Smith, 2007). Tessier and Otley (2012) considered written 
procedures, such as goal setting, output controls and cybernetic controls as part of 
technical controls.  
Malmi and Brown (2008, p. 291) proposed a conceptual typology of a MCS as a 
package. They prefer the term package to system because “the strength of the typology 
lies in the broad scope of the controls in a MCS as a package, rather than the depth of 
its discussion of individual systems”. By considering a MCS as a broader package, the 
impact of implementing a new MCS element needs “to be considered in the context of 
the other components being used at the same time” (Otley, 2016, p. 53). Figure 2.2 
provides the typology of the MCS package  
 
Figure 2.2: Management control systems package 
Source: Malmi and Brown (2008, p. 291). 
 
Otley (2016) noted that the Malmi and Brown’s typology is still used because most 
articles only study one component of an overall system. There are very few studies that 
have tried to capture the “totality of an overall system” and replace (Malmi and Brown, 
2008) categorization; but their result failed to convey a major contribution (Otley, 
2016, p. 53). 
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Martyn, Sweeney, and Curtis (2016) noted that an MCS as a package received greater 
attention in the MCS qualitative studies. On the other hand, budget and performance 
measurement systems are the two control systems that appear most frequently in prior 
MCS quantitative studies. Bobe (2012) stated that different organisations may use 
different element of MCSs. Daft and Macintosh (1984)included a long list the elements 
of a MCS. They involve budget, policy and procedures, performance appraisal system, 
statistical reports, strategic planning, long-range planning, strategic formulation, 
annual budget, performance appraisal, and policies and procedures for strategy 
implementation by mid-level managers. The role of globalization and technology have 
flattened the organisational structure, increased the importance of out-sourcing and 
paid more attention to non-financial measures. These trends lead to a simpler definition 
of a MCS. Bisbe and Otley (2004) viewed a MCS as a system with the elements of 
budgets, balanced scorecards and project management systems. Henri (2006) viewed 
MCS as planning systems, reporting systems, and monitoring procedures. Anthony and 
Govindarajan (2007) considered a MCS as a system that comprised of strategic 
planning, budgeting, resource allocation, performance measurement, evaluation and 
reward, responsibility centre allocation and transfer pricing.  
2.3.1 Levers of Control 
The role of a MCS in addressing intended or emergent aspects of strategy development 
and multiple definitions of strategy is further explored under Simons’ levers of control 
framework (Simons, Dávila, and Kaplan, 2000; Tuomela, 2005). Simons’ framework 
is based on four levers of control: belief, boundary, interactive, and diagnostic. In 
simplistic terms, boundary systems establish strategic limits and a business code of 
conduct; diagnostic controls are used to review current achievements with external and 
internal targets; belief systems are for enabling employees to be committed to targets; 
and interactive controls are used to challenge emergent strategies and encourage 
innovation (Arjaliès and Mundy, 2013).   The following section outlines the four levers 
of control in more detail by examining findings in prior literature.  
In line with Simons’ levers, belief systems are used by managers to enhance core 
values, inspire, and direct the search for new opportunities (Henri, 2006; Langfield-
Smith, 2007; Simons, 1994; Tuomela, 2005). Further a belief system could be very 
general and may be embedded through mission statements or overall corporate policies 
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and can contribute to the overall culture and ethos of the organisation (Merchant and 
Otley, 2007).  
Boundary systems on the other hand are designed to reduce and avoid risks by setting 
limits to an area of activity, and may be designed to avoid inappropriate behaviour 
(Merchant and Otley, 2007). Some examples of boundary systems are enforcing a code 
of business conduct for employees and setting strategic boundaries for innovation 
(Tuomela, 2005).  
Tuomela (2005) described interactive controls as systems used to discuss strategic 
uncertainties, to learn novel strategic responses to a changing environment and to 
promote and provoke discussion. These control levers work simultaneously and 
balance tensions between the organisational need for innovation and the organisational 
need for achievement of pre-established objectives (Simons et al., 2000) .  
Diagnostic systems are concerned with executing the strategic plan and monitoring its 
implementation (Kruis, Speklé, and Widener, 2015). According to Simons et al. (2000, 
p. 209), diagnostic control systems are “the formal information systems that managers 
use to measure the outputs of a process, compare predetermined standards against 
actual results, and correct deviations from pre-set standards of performance”. 
Diagnostic control systems represent the normal type of management by exception 
reporting, where the organisation’s critical success factors are communicated and 
monitored (Simons, 1994). On the other hand, interactive control systems are used to 
develop opportunity-seeking and further learning (Simons, 1994). They enable the 
organisation to identify obsolete strategies and to learn innovative responses to a 
changing environment (Merchant and Otley, 2007).  
Naranjo-Gil (2016) studied the use of levers of control in hospitals in Spain by 
conducting a survey and found that diagnostic and interactive controls have a positive 
impact on hospital strategy. Boundary and diagnostic controls are found to have a 
positive impact on the execution of the current strategies, while belief and interactive 
controls positively affect emergent strategies.  
Mundy (2010) and Tuomela (2005) observed how interactive systems play a role in the 
learning process when managers allow new ideas to be challenged and debated prior to 
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the implementation of new strategies. After new plans are discussed, belief systems are 
used to internally communicate the organisation’s new direction or purpose, and 
diagnostic and boundary systems are re-adjusted to be in line with the new direction 
(Tuomela, 2005).  
The diagnostic control is employed when the organisation distributes scorecard reports 
to members of management groups, allowing an immediate check on notable variances 
in the organisation’s performance over time. The interactive control is employed when 
top managers discuss assumed cause-and-effect relationships and uncertainties 
underlying a few selected measures in order to find out the meaning and consequences 
of the measures. Simons et al. (2000) argued that new strategies usually emerge from 
bottom up when top managers learn about changing patterns in the business from their 
subordinates. Managers need to use performance measurement and control systems to 
encourage employees to innovate and communicate. Such feedback mechanisms will 
help managers to fine tune or changing their business strategy.  
Previous literature also grouped Simons’ levers of control into two categories; namely, 
strategic domain and strategy implementation. The levers used to cope with the 
strategic domain of an organisation are belief and boundary systems. The levers used 
to manage the implementation of a strategy, the measurement systems, and its 
feedbacks are interactive systems and diagnostic systems (Bisbe and Otley, 2004; 
Mundy, 2010; Simons et al., 2000). 
A MCS comprises two competing roles that creates tension in the implementation of 
the organisation’s strategy, ability to achieve goals, and gain competitive advantage 
(Henri, 2006). Mundy (2010) and (Widener, 2007) described the two roles of MCSs as 
controlling and enabling roles. According to Mundy (2010, p. 500): 
“The controlling role of a MCS is associated with predictability, efficiency, 
formality, and the importance of meeting short-term targets while enabling 
the use of a MCS relates to spontaneity, transparency, adaptation, 
information sharing, enterprise, and adaptability. Controlling use aims to 
mitigate problems of information asymmetry, whereas enabling use seeks 
to reduce uncertainty and improve decision-making.” 
 
Failure to balance the different roles of MCSs is associated with “slower decision-
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making, wasted resources, and lower performance” (Mundy, 2010, p. 500). The 
enabling role is represented by the belief system and interactive controls (Mundy, 
2010). The controlling role is represented by the boundary system and diagnostic 
controls (Mundy, 2010).  
Diagnostic and interactive systems are considered to be the instruments for interpreting 
strategy and providing feedback to managers based on an organisation’s performance 
(Henri, 2006; Simons, 1994; Simons et al., 2000; Tessier and Otley, 2012; Widener, 
2007). A strategic performance measurement system or a budget system can be used 
both diagnostically and interactively with implications for belief and boundary systems 
(Tuomela, 2005). Therefore, a performance measurement or budget process can play 
an interactive role, a diagnostic role, or both. Furthermore, interactive controls are 
considered to be more effective when joined with a formal management control 
system. A comparison of the utilisation of diagnostic and interactive controls is in 
Table 2.4. 
Widener (2007) described how diagnostic controls contributed to the effectiveness of 
interactive controls by signalling the organisation’s position in relation to its strategic 
plan. Managers also need to use the performance measurement and control systems to 
encourage employees to innovate and communicate. Mundy (2010) and Tuomela 
(2005) observed that the interactive use of MCSs takes place in the learning process 
when managers allow new ideas to be challenged and debated prior to the 
implementation of new strategies. According to Henri (2006, p. 533): 
“The interactive use of MCSs represents a positive force as MCSs are used 
to expand opportunity-seeking and learning throughout the organisation. 
The interactive use focuses attention and forces dialogue throughout the 
organisation by reflecting signals sent by top managers.” 
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Table 2.4: A comparison of diagnostic and interactive control form use 
 Diagnostic Use of Controls Interactive Use of Controls 
Purpose Provide motivation and 
direction to achieve 
Stimulate dialogue and 
organisational learning 
Goal Prevent surprise Creative search 
Analytic Reasoning Deductive Inductive 
System Complexity Simple Complex 
Time Frame Past and present Present and future 
Targets Fixed Constantly re-estimated 
Source: Thorén and Brown (2004, p. 3) 
 
A MCS can help managers to compose responses to changes by identifying problems 
at an operating level and finding solutions that allow the organisation to continue to 
operate at a steady pace (Kloot, 1995; Simons et al., 2000). In this case, the MCS is 
used in a single-loop learning where individuals, groups, or organisations modify their 
actions in a way that does not result in fundamental change (Bisbe and Otley, 2004; 
Kloot, 1995). On the other hand, an MCS can be used to detect and solve problems 
caused by environmental change at a fundamental level, which is equivalent to double-
loop13 learning. It is used in a pro-active manner to develop a new operating paradigm 
by questioning fundamental policies and assumptions (Kloot, 1995).  
2.3.2 The relationship between management control and performance 
measurement 
The terms “management control system” and “performance measurement” are often 
used together in the MCS research. Akbar et al. (2012) noted that performance 
measurement is an integral part of a MCS. Similarly, in her literature review study on 
MCSs and performance measurement, Siska (2015) reported that some research 
viewed performance measurement as a part of a larger MCS. In her conclusion, Siska 
(2015, p. 146) argued that on many occasions, performance measures and MCS are 
considered synonymously due to the significant similarities between the two concepts, 
leading to the overlapping use of the terms performance measurement and MCS.   In 
                                                            
13  Single and double loop learning are elaborated further in the organisational learning section.  
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other research, Ferreira and Otley (2009) proposed a performance management 
framework to explain MCSs. They viewed the performance management and 
measurement fields as providing a more general and holistic approach than a 
management control system. Considering the degree of similarity between the two 
concepts, this study will include significant performance measurement research in the 
literature review section regarding MCS use in the public sector. 
2.3.3 Previous studies on MCS and performance measurement use in the 
public sector 
The use of MCS in government has been explored in a number of studies. Most of these 
studies have been conducted overseas rather than in Indonesia. Table 2.5 provides a 
brief summary of a selection of these studies. The following section emphasises the 
external and internal factors affecting MCS adoption and use.  
2.3.3.1 External and internal factors affecting MCS adoption and use  
Yang and Hsieh (2007) studied the impact of the external political environment, 
technical training, organisational support, and external stakeholder participation on the 
managerial effectiveness use of performance measurement by conducting a survey of 
684 Taiwanese local governments. Relationships between all independent and 
dependent variables were found. Organisational support was found to be the most 
important predictor of the effective use of performance management. Other internal 
factors, such as top-management commitment, support from middle managers and 
successful subsystem collaboration were also found to be important factors in the 
utilisation of a new performance management system in the public sector.  
In their study that examined the development of high performance management in the 
Australian public service, Blackman, Buick, O'Donnell, O'Flynn, and West (2012) 
suggested the importance for a public sector performance management systems to 
recognise and incorporate high-performing characteristics and practices within 
individual, group, organisation, and governance levels in the organisation. The 
governance level refers to the inter-organisational environment, leadership, and 
stewardship that support public organisations to achieve their goals.  
In their study on municipalities in the Netherlands, Verbeeten and Spekle (2015) 
suggested that rules and procedures have a positive impact on performance. On the 
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other hand, providing autonomy to local managers can be counterproductive due to 
higher coordination costs, excessive opportunity-seeking behaviour, and failure to 
collect and organise best practices. 
Peignot, Peneranda, and Amabile (2012) identified that local government managers 
were reluctant to adopt a new system because it may threaten the balance of power 
among departments and reduce bargaining power with other departments because all 
information, including departmental information, was to be available in the new system. 
They also pointed out that a lack of interest from top officials and the lack of technical 
competencies and human resource are contributing factors in public organisations’ 
failures to utilise MCS.  
Past research identified leaders’ commitment and motivation as a contributing internal 
factor in fostering the adoption and use of an MCS. Moynihan, Pandey, and Wright 
(2012) examined the impact of transformational leadership on performance information 
use in US local governments. They found that a series of organisational virtues, such as 
leadership commitment to results, learning routines led by supervisors, the nature of the 
task, and the ability to link measures to actions are positive predictors of performance 
information use. Kroll and Vogel (2014) surveyed 200 local governments in Germany 
and found that regular use of performance information was affected by public 
managers’ pro-social motivation. 
 
Table 2.5: External and internal factors affecting MCS adoption and use 
Author(s) Methods Key Findings 
Yang and 
Hsieh (2007) 
Public  
agencies 
(Taiwan) 
Survey/684 respondents MCS: Government Performance and Results Mandate  
Findings: Organisational support, reflecting both top-
management commitment and middle-manager support, and 
subsystem collaboration, is the most important predictor of 
performance measurement adoption and effectiveness. Lack of 
such support is a serious challenge in public sector performance 
measurement, as the adoption of performance measurement is 
often driven by external pressures and institutional isomorphism, 
not by internal management. 
Moynihan et 
al. (2012) 
(US) 
Survey/1538 
respondents/organisational 
learning theory 
MCS: Performance management routines 
Findings: Organisational factors: leadership commitment to 
results, learning routines led by supervisors, the motivational 
nature of the task, & the ability to link measures to actions are 
positive predictors of performance information use. 
Peignot, et al 
(2013) 
Local 
Government  
(France) 
Exploratory Survey/225 
CIO and French 
Executive/ 
Decision Theory 
MCS: Decision Support System (DSS) 
Findings: DSSs are important for local public managers in 
decision making, performance, and management control. In most 
cases, local government organisations do not need complex tools, 
and may overestimate their needs, driven by technology or 
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vendor discourse. Barriers to DSS adoption include resistance to 
change, lack of interest from top executives, lack of technical 
competencies, lack of human resources. 
Yetano 
(2013)  
Local 
Government   
(Australia) 
Longitudinal Case Study/ 
Structuration theory 
Findings: Performance Measurement and Management (PMM) 
PMM implementation benefits from incremental changes. 
Radical changes may provoke resistance and lead to 
abandonment of PMM.   The initial steps in implementing PMM 
are promoting PMM-related terminologies and concepts, and 
establishing the new planning and reporting routines. Changes 
that impact power relations and resource distribution lead to 
purposeful use of PMM. 
Barriers to PMM implementation included performance 
information was developed but not used in decision-making. 
Symbolic commitment by projecting an image of good 
governance on one hand but showing personal resistance on the 
other 
Rabovsky 
(2014) 
Universities 
(US) 
Survey/138 respondents MCS: Strategic planning and evaluation. 
Findings: Organisational use of performance data is strongly 
related to the political ideology of agency leaders. Performance 
management appears to be a vehicle through which personal 
preferences and predispositions of bureaucrats and organisational 
leaders can influence implementation. 
Verbeeten & 
Spekle (2015) 
Public sector  
(Netherlands) 
Survey of  96 
municipalities  
agency theory 
MCS: Performance measurement system. 
Findings: There is a positive effect of rules and procedures on 
both a results-oriented culture and on performance, and a 
negative effect of operational decentralization on performance. 
Internal deregulation (“letting the managers manage”) leads to 
higher coordination costs, excessive opportunity-seeking 
behaviour and a failure to codify “best practices”. 
There is no empirical support for NPM’s other key tenets either; 
i.e., that the use of performance information for purposes of 
accountability and incentives (“making the managers manage”) 
improves performance. Performance measurement matters if it is 
being used for focusing attention. 
Brusca and 
Montesinos, 
(2016) 
(17 European 
countries) 
International comparisons 
Institutional, agency & 
public choices theories 
MCS: Performance reporting system. 
Findings: There is no convergence in practice or results among 
17 countries. Institutional factors and administrative systems 
have an impact on the implementation of performance reporting, 
and the differences between countries are often a mirror of their 
governmental structures. Institutional factors influence the 
implementation of performance reporting. In many countries, it 
has been introduced by central and regional governments as a 
mechanism to control local government. 
 
Yetano (2013) also found the importance of internal collaboration in implementing 
performance management and measurement in a longitudinal case study in an 
Australian local government. She suggested that changes in such systems are more 
likely to gain acceptance when done incrementally by gradually altering routines, 
because radical change can cause opposition and may lead to the abandonment of the 
system.  
In his study on performance information use for strategic planning evaluation in US 
public universities, Rabovsky (2014) found that the use of performance data is 
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associated with leaders’ political ideology. The finding indicates that leaders are able 
use MCSs as a vehicle to address their personal preferences. 
Another empirical factor that impacts on MCS utilisation is culture. In studying factors 
that influenced the implementation of performance reporting, Brusca and Montesinos 
(2016) compared 17 Anglo Saxon, Nordic, and European countries and found that 
institutional factors and a cultural change were necessary for the adoption of new PM 
reform in public organisations that have a Neo-Weberian framework. 
In this section, the concept of management control system and its relation to 
performance measurement have been discussed. External and internal factors affecting 
MCS adoption and use have also been identified. External factors such as external 
political environment, external stakeholder participation, inter-organisational 
environment and the balance of power among departments were found to be important 
predictor of the MCS adoption. Internal factors such as public managers’ motivation, 
rules and procedures,  organisational support, top-management commitment, leadership, 
stewardship, technical competencies and internal collaboration were predictors of 
management control adoption and use. The following section examines prior research 
that has explored the inter-relationship of management control systems, performance 
management and organisational learning.  
 
2.4 Organisational Learning and Management Control Systems, 
Performance Management, and Accountability 
Organisational learning is viewed as a very important concept that links the ability of a 
public organisations’ managers to use knowledge and experience gained from 
performance information in order to make better decisions and improve their overall 
performance (Moynihan and Landuyt, 2009). The capability to learn becomes more 
important in the public sector due to the many interests involved in their policy-making 
process.  
There has been a growing pressure for public organisations to achieve “value for 
money” in providing their services and to gain and maintain public trust from wider 
citizens (Burr, 2009). However, critics of government performance continue to be 
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vocal due to the many failed programs, indicating governments’ failure to learn from 
their own past experiences or those of others. Organisational learning is an important 
outcome that can be used to explain the utilisation of data-driven decisions made by 
managers in order to improve program implementation or the policy-making process. 
The following sections highlight the various topics related to organisational learning.  
Firstly key definitions are outlined followed by a review of organisational learning 
research in the ILG. The cultural and structural approaches to organisational learning 
are described, along with single and double-loop learning.  Finally research that has 
examined the association of accountability and organisational learning is provided.  
2.4.1 Prior organisational learning research 
Organisational learning has been defined as an organisation’s ability to monitor 
environmental changes and adjust its processes, products, and services to capitalize on 
those changes (Simons et al., 2000). Organisational learning can also be defined as the 
process of detecting and correcting errors in order to maintain the characteristics of an 
organisation (Argyris and Schon, 1996). The process of learning from experience is 
also viewed as an organisation’s mechanism to adapt to the dynamics of change in its 
environment (Argyris, 1977). Burr (2009); Garvin, Edmondson, and Gino (2008) 
argued that learning continuously from an organisation’s internal and external 
environment is the key to survival and achieving improvement. Learning from within 
an organisation involves experimentation and previous success or failures. Learning 
from outside an organisation involves observing other organisations or agencies.  
Barrados and Mayne (2003) suggested that organisations intentionally change their 
structure, culture, and behaviour over a sustained period of time. The ability for 
organisations to learn is reflected in their ability to change their structure, systems, or 
processes. In order to be able to learn properly, an organisation needs to possess the 
capability to acquire, share, interpret, and recall knowledge (Huber, 1991). MCSs help 
organisations to learn by prompting managers with the discrepancy between actual 
performance and baseline standards. New knowledge can be gained when an 
organisation relates its performance information to its current problems, and uses this 
to influence behaviour and change routines (Moynihan and Landuyt, 2009). In the 
public sector, such feedback can be used to change the organisations’ structure and 
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activities in order to develop better policy and deliver better policy implementation 
(Common, 2004).  
The majority of previous literature agrees that organisational learning is driven by 
individuals in an organisation (Barker Scott, 2011). Organisational learning occurs 
through the inclusion of individual learning and organisational inquiry into 
organisations’ memories (Argyris and Schon, 1996). Individual learning alone cannot 
be classified as organisational learning. It has to be transferred into organisational 
systems.  
Knowledge is acquired by members of an organisation from experimentation, training, 
reports, databases, or from their interaction with others during job assignments. 
Individuals within the organisation need to contribute to group knowledge by sharing 
new schemas and skills with other members. The group keeps the new knowledge 
through cognitive and behavioural mechanisms.  
At the organisational level, learning is managed by taking and embedding new 
knowledge into organisational strategy, structure, process, systems and norms that will 
be the foundation of future learning (Barker Scott, 2011). As organisations change and 
adapt over time, new knowledge gained by individuals can become part of 
organisational learning when it is included into the organisation’s practices, procedures, 
routines, norms, strategies and values (Argyris and Schon, 1996; Barrados and Mayne, 
2003).  
Garnering and utilising experience to drive change is a crucial part of the concept of 
organisational learning. Learning involves generating knowledge from previous 
shortfalls, and using this knowledge to change organisational routines and ensure 
behavioural change (Ebrahim, 2005). Baldersheim, Bucek, and Swianiewicz (2002) 
argued that actual learning happens when an organisation “makes a relatively permanent 
change in its behaviour on the basis of experience”. Moynihan and Landuyt (2009) 
suggested learning as the process of developing accepted and applicable experiences 
held by organisational members.  
Organisational learning develops knowledge from past actions to deliver more effective 
future actions. It also accelerates the information-processing activities that facilitate an 
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organisation gaining competitive advantage Henri (2006). Relevant acquired knowledge 
will be codified and combined to create new insight. At this stage, an organisation plays 
an important role in converting individual knowledge into learning by providing a 
conducive organisational structure for individual knowledge to be tested and applied 
among members of the organisation. Organisations that have a supportive context, 
culture, and structure for learning are able to convert individual knowledge into group 
knowledge. They do so by encouraging professionals within the organisation to discover 
and share new abilities (Neo, 2007). Over time, group knowledge can become a culture 
and institutionalised into routines that eventually shape individual learning. This feed-
forward and feedback interplay has enabled learning flow among individual, group, and 
organisational learning (Barker Scott, 2011; Gilson et al., 2009) 
The concept of organisational learning has also been described from a cognitive 
perspective that views that an organisation gains new knowledge through individual 
learning and organisational structure in order to be able to adapt and survive. Research 
that follows a cognitive perspective has described organisational learning as the process 
of developing new insights by revising cognitive understanding (Barker Scott, 2011; 
Rashman et al., 2009). However, the cognitive approach fails to bring new awareness or 
understanding, as it does not involve changing the behaviour of the members of an 
organisation. 
A cognitive-behavioural perspective describes the internal environment of an 
organisation that encourages learning by promoting a new behaviour or altering existing 
values and structures after developing new insights and interpretations (Barker Scott, 
2011). Implementing new strategies or employing new actions is required in the 
cognitive-behaviour perspective in order to complete the learning cycle of an 
organisation. Cognitive mechanisms store knowledge, group norms, mindset and 
schemas in the learner’s mind. Behavioural mechanisms maintain new knowledge 
through routines, protocol and practice standards (Barker Scott, 2011).  
The context for learning is also described through social practices and shaped by the 
organisation’s norms, rules and resources (Moynihan and Landuyt, 2009). Barker Scott 
(2011) and Rashman et al. (2009) reported that cognitive insight and behavioural 
applications actually work together during the ongoing social interaction among 
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professionals in an organisation. Such interaction improves the organisation’s ability to 
acquire, disseminate and use knowledge. The social construct approach views that the 
state of knowing occurs from the interactions between members of an organisation 
when they look for solutions to the organisation’s challenges. Instead of acquiring and 
holding knowledge, the social construct approach encourages professionals to bring, 
share, and refine their ideas to resolve a specific scenario (Barker Scott, 2011; Rashman 
et al., 2009).  
By continually transforming their activities, public servants use their personal and 
organisational experiences to find feasible and legitimate solutions (Moynihan and 
Landuyt, 2009). Within the realm of government, the absence of a systematic learning 
approach in an environment will expose it to bureaucratic politics. Rashman et al. 
(2009) suggested the social construct approach is relevant in explaining organisational 
learning in the public sector since the majority of government organisations are filled 
with professionals, and the interactions among them can allow individuals to take 
lessons from their professional judgement and experiences. This study uses the social 
construct approach to investigate factors that influence organisational learning in ILGs. 
The approach will be useful in understanding various facilitating factors affecting 
government organisations’ learning ability in their effort to improve services, and to 
achieve better productivity and accountability. 
2.4.1.1 Organisational learning research in the ILG 
Prior organisational learning research has tended to focus on the for-profit sectors, 
highlighting a current gap in the literature. Despite the substantial reform in the public 
sector, relatively little attention has been given to developing organisational learning 
concepts in the public sector (Gilson et al., 2009; Rashman et al., 2009). The concept 
of organisational learning in the government sector is differentiated from the private 
sector.  This is due to the bureaucratic nature of government organisations’, their 
different goals that are service oriented as opposed to profit orientated, along with the 
nature of the relationships among the different government agencies that regularly 
interact to achieve common goals. Importantly the current study has identified a 
noteworthy gap in the literature (as suggested by Rashman et al. (2009)) and will 
investigate ILGs’ learning capabilities in the context of the adoption and 
implementation of SAKIP, which has been underway for almost 17 years.  
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There is limited prior research that has examined ILGs’ organisational learning 
capabilities as a result of utilizing SAKIP. Two studies examine the association between 
exploratory use of performance information and performance with mixed results. 
Exploratory use of performance information is seen as supporting organisational 
learning abilities by providing a double-loop14 learning mechanism when an 
organisation uses their performance measures for decision-making. Wijaya and Akbar 
(2013) found that external pressures had a positive impact on the use of performance 
information for exploratory purposes. On the other hand, Ahyaruddin and Akbar (2016) 
did not find a significant association between exploratory use of performance 
information and organisational performance.  
2.4.2 Cultural and structural approaches to organisational learning  
There are two major approaches in the organisational learning research: cultural and 
structural approaches. A cultural approach suggests organisational learning needs to be 
viewed as a cultural process. The approach argues that learning is facilitated through 
shared norms or meaning that affect the organisational learning capacity (Moynihan 
and Landuyt, 2009). A strong learning culture promotes inquiry, employee 
empowerment, participation and organisational openness (Argyris and Schon, 1996; 
Moynihan, 2005; Moynihan and Landuyt, 2009). On the contrary, a weak learning 
culture is indicated by the existence of taboo subjects that discourage employees from 
exploring new approaches, and defensive norms where errors are used for punitive 
purposes (Moynihan and Landuyt, 2009).  
Structural approaches on the other hand, emphasise the significance of organisational 
structures and formal mechanisms that enable organisations to learn. The approach 
views structural procedures as playing an important role in encouraging individual 
learning, capturing new knowledge from the members of the organisation and utilizing 
the knowledge for organisational purposes. In their study regarding organisational 
learning models in Texas State agencies, Moynihan and Landuyt (2009) suggested that 
structural and cultural approaches complement one another in explaining 
organisational learning.  
                                                            
14 Double-loop and single loop learning are described in more detail in the next section.  
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2.4.3 Single-loop and double-loop learning 
Organisational learning can be categorised into two types of learning: single-loop and 
double-loop learning (Argyris and Schon, 1996; Kloot, 1995; Simons et al., 2000). 
Single-loop learning refers to the learning process where organisations develop and use 
performance information to detect errors and propose modifications to current 
practices without changing organisational objectives and core assumptions (Argyris 
and Schon, 1996; Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Kloot, 1995). Within single-loop learning, 
adjustments such as process refinement or performing a more efficient task are made 
within the existing routines.  For example, procedures, strategies and rules (Levinthal 
and March, 1993). Since single-loop learning focuses on tracking the achievement of 
organisational goals, it does not help organisations to identify changes that question the 
validity of the organisation’s assumptions, goals, strategies or policies (Moynihan, 
2005). 
Double-loop learning is described as a type of learning that allows organisations to 
answer such challenges that require organisations to revisit their fundamental policies 
or goals in order to achieve long-term organisational success (Argyris and Schon, 
1996; Kloot, 1995; Moynihan, 2005). When organisations face a crisis triggered by 
their external or internal environment, their existing goals, practices or strategies may 
no longer be useful, and a search for a new belief system or organisational paradigm 
may be required. During such crises, double-loop learning allows organisations to 
explore alternative solutions by re-examining organisational values and norms, 
investigating new routines and taking risks to innovate with new policies.  
Public organisations ideally need to have a balanced use between the two types of 
learning. Both types of learning require information to be managed prior to a decision-
making process. Single-loop learning is required to improve organisations’ current 
routines to achieve their goals in a more efficient way. Gilson et al. (2009) noted that 
single-loop learning in government agencies focuses on maximizing inputsoutputs 
productivity. However, being highly reliant on single-loop learning may prevent 
organisations from adopting new strategies that anticipate environmental change. 
Therefore, organisations also need to have double-loop learning capabilities that allow 
them to change their strategies and maintain long-term organisational effectiveness. 
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Under the NPM reform, performance information is the most important resource used 
to gain previous knowledge and to improve actions and performance. A failure to use 
the available performance information will lead to a failure of learning (Moynihan and 
Landuyt, 2009). Moynihan and Landuyt (2009); Moynihan and Lavertu (2012) 
suggested that a passive approach to performance information use and limited learning 
routines can contribute to such failure. The term ‘passive approach’ refers to, for 
example, public organisation officers using the performance information passively by 
complying with the minimum procedural requirement but not using the data generated 
by the systems to improve performance. Limited learning routines refer to reforms that 
encourage learning routines only for high-level managers. This also can limit the 
organisational ability to learn. In analysing the relationship between results-based 
reforms and managerial use of performance data in the U.S. federal government, 
Moynihan and Lavertu (2012) argued that the reforms did not fulfil their potential 
because they only managed to encourage passive forms of performance information 
use. They suggested that top-down reforms may have a better opportunity for success 
when they have the capacity to link and alter the organisation’s existing routines. 
Gilson et al. (2009) noted that double-loop learning was often triggered by 
interventions from government ministers to improve the agencies outputoutcome 
effectiveness.  
Some authors argued that learning in the public sector is still focused on single-loop 
learning because of socio-political obstacles Gilson et al. (2009). Government 
successions due to general election cycles hamper public agencies from conducting 
double-loop learning by trying out new policies. As a part of the experimental process, 
some new policies can fail. However, leaders of government organisations want to 
avoid being seen as making mistakes. As politicians, these leaders want to be seen as 
successful. They prefer to conduct incremental patterns of single-loop learning and 
avoid more ambitious learning in the form of innovations that require regular policy 
reviews. They are also discouraged from preparing long-term learning responses based 
on thorough analyses of market forces, theoretical, and empirical evidence. Gilson et 
al. (2009) suggested that government organisations have an obligation to explain the 
ideology and reason behind their policy to public inquiries. Tuomela (2005) also 
showed the diagnostic and interactive use of a strategic performance measurement 
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system and suggested single and double feedback loop learning.  
2.4.3.1 Diagnostic use, interactive use and organisational learning 
Previous management accounting research also identified the importance of goals 
clarity, consultation, and learning in order to have successful PM reform. Selected 
previous MCS and performance measurement studies, including the most current ones, 
have been included in this study. Table 2.6 provides a summary of past studies that are 
related to commitment, culture, internal collaboration, and new routines. 
Poister, Pasha, and Edwards (2013) identified that the utilisation of strategic planning 
and performance measurement is positively related to small and medium-sized transit 
system industries in the United States. They also found industries have a better 
performance when they implement a strategy driven by experimentation and learning.  
In their study on 101 organisational units within the Dutch public sector, Speklé and 
Verbeeten (2014) suggested that the positive effects of a PM system on organisational 
performance can be achieved when the organisational goals are clear and measurable. 
They also identified that the exploratory use of a PM system that enables learning, 
mutual consultation, and adaptation also has a positive effect on performance. On the 
other hand, the use of performance information for motivating and controlling 
employees has a strong negative effect on performance signalling that the emphasis on 
incentive may bring contradictory results. 
Kroll (2014) examined the use or non-use of performance information in German cities 
and proposed that the use of performance information can be explained by a high level 
of data ownership, creative learning preferences, the absence of cynicism, and public 
service motivation. On the other hand, managers’ socio-demographic characteristics, 
identity, and emotional intelligence were not associated with the use of performance 
information. 
2.4.4 Accountability and organisational learning   
Prior research has also attempted to link accountability and transparency to 
organisational learning capabilities. Governments are encouraged to learn from external 
feedback received, and delivers more effective and efficient services. Greiling and 
Halachmi (2013b) argued that accountability results in better performance when 
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improving long-term performance and learning from past experiences are the focus. 
Baxter, Colledge, and Turner (2017)  found that accountability can promote effective 
organisational learning if: (1) learning objectives align with senior leaders’ objectives, 
(2) failures are used to promote learning, and (3) failures are not used for damaging 
people’s reputation. 
Despite performance measurement regimes being well established and institutionalised 
in the United States and European Union countries, Mahler and Posner (2014) argue 
that some features of such performance regimes can impede organisational learning. 
The design of a centralised performance measurement initiative that links performance 
scores to budget allocation, such as the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) or the 
president’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the United States, can inhibit 
learning because such initiatives encourage the agencies to defensively conform to the 
assessment process (Mahler and Posner, 2014). Baxter et al. (2017) suggest such 
assessment process can develop the sense of insecurity resulting from being punished 
and humiliated. Greiling and Halachmi (2013b) assert that the blame culture that 
appears from accountability arrangements can trigger defensive routines that obstruct 
organisational learning in the public sector. 
Table 2.6: Diagnostic and interactive use, and organisational learning 
Author(s) Methods Key Findings 
Poister et al. 
(2013)  
Public 
Transit 
Industry 
(US) 
Survey/88 
respondents 
Extensive use of performance management practices 
contribute to increased effectiveness in this segment of the 
transit industry. These results provide limited evidence that 
both strategic planning and performance measurement, the 
principal components of performance management in public 
organisations, do contribute to improved performance in 
small and medium-sized transit systems in the United 
States. 
Spekle and 
Verbeeten 
(2014) 
Public sector 
(Netherlands) 
Survey/101 
respondents 
There is a strong direct negative effect of an incentive-
oriented use of organisational performance. However, this 
effect is less severe when contractibility is high. An 
exploratory use of the performance measurement system 
tends to enhance performance; this positive effect is 
independent of the level of contractibility. 
Kroll (2014) 
Cities  
(Germany) 
Survey/284 
respondents/manager-
related theories 
Performance information use is explained by a high level of 
data ownership, creative cognitive learning preferences, the 
absence of cynicism, and a distinct public service 
motivation. Identity and emotional intelligence were found 
to be insignificant along with the managers’ socio-
demographic characteristics. 
Hajnal and 
Ugrosdy 
(2015) 
Local 
Comparative case 
study/2 entities/ 
Even though performance management is not known in 
Hungary as defined in the academic literature, there are 
signs on the ground that PM ideology and actual use are 
gaining traction in every field of public service, both in 
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Government  
(Hungary) 
central and local governments. Development of PM is not 
restricted per se by the administrative tradition, but can 
overcome historical and administrative barriers to shape and 
modernise public institutions. 
Elbanna et al. 
(2015) 
Public sector 
(Canada) 
Online survey/180 
respondents 
Formal strategic planning has a strong positive relationship 
with the success of strategy implementation. 
Naranjo-Gil 
(2016) 
Hospitals  
(Spain) 
Survey/116 
respondents 
Boundary and diagnostic control systems have primarily a 
positive impact on the realization of deliberate strategies, 
whereas belief and interactive control systems positively 
affect emergent strategies. Managers should focus on both 
the design and the use of management control systems to 
implement strategies successfully. 
Nuhu et al 
(2017) 
Public sector 
( Australia) 
Survey/127 
respondents/ 
contingency theory 
The interactive and diagnostic use of MCS influences the 
use of contemporary management accounting practice. Both 
the interactive and diagnostic approaches exhibit a positive 
association with the adoption of contemporary management 
accounting practices. In addition, while the level of success 
of contemporary management accounting practices was 
moderate, it was found that the extent of adoption of the 
practices enhanced their success. 
2.5 Research gaps addressed in the present study 
This study will make a number of contributions to the growing literature on MCSs by 
focusing on the adoption and use of MCSs as a means to achieve organisational learning 
capabilities within ILGs. Moynihan (2005) suggested that adoption may be driven from 
external pressures and implementation can be driven from managers’ reactions toward 
the pressures. This study will use the diagnostic and interactive use of SAKIP in order 
to empirically test the impact of SAKIP utilisation on the ILGs’ organisational learning 
capacities.  
Despite the increasing attention received by MCS studies in the last two decades, most 
of the research is focused on the for-profit sector, where the respondents have some 
degree of flexibility in designing the MCS or on the public sector in developing 
countries. Since SAKIP was designed and initiated by the MSAEBR, this study 
investigates the impact of adopting and implementing a centralistic control system by 
local government.   Further the present study provides insights into how performance 
measurement practices become accepted, resisted, or modified by local governments in 
Indonesia. 
Building on the work of Simons, this thesis will investigate the use of one important 
aspect of a MCS, namely the performance measurement system in the ILG. The 
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implementation of SAKIP in ILG aims to improve performance-related information for 
decision-making, performance measurement and benchmarking. The thesis will 
emphasise the interaction between diagnostic and interactive controls by focusing on 
the process of elaborating and implementing strategies. The diagnostic and interactive 
use of SAKIP will provide feedback about the implemented strategy to ILG managers. 
SAKIP contains performance measures linked to the budget that can be used 
diagnostically by internal management to ensure that the selected strategy leads to the 
achievement of the organisation’s goals. Belief and boundary systems are not the 
primary concern of this study because they focus more on the strategic domain and the 
design of the MCS, while diagnostic and interactive controls are very much related to 
the use of MCS and its feedback (Naranjo-Gil, 2016; Nuhu et al., 2017). The current 
study focuses on the diagnostic and interactive use of MCSs, and their impact on the 
operating activities within the ILGs (Nuhu et al., 2017). Therefore, the belief system 
and boundary system are not explored despite their importance in Simons’ levers of 
control framework.  
This study will further investigate the basic assumptions behind the implementation of 
NPM style control systems at ILGs. Taylor (2011) argued that the major assumptions 
behind performance measurement initiatives are that the information generated from 
such systems will be used by decision-makers to learn about the area that is being 
measured, and therefore will be used to improve their decision making. Other scholars 
stated that the countries that adopt the systems do so in the hope that policy and 
decision making can be based on performance information that will lead to more 
effective management and better strategy implementation (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 
2004). The concept is so logical and captivating that public managers across the world 
apply NPM reform with striking similarity from one country to another, which is by 
forming strategic goals followed by setting up performance measures. Such reforms 
have been institutionalised in all tiers of government from both developed and 
developing countries. Mahler and Posner (2014) argued that to a certain degree, these 
performance measurement regimes may actually impede public agencies from learning 
from performance information. Features such as submitting performance reports to or 
performance assessment by central government may send the message that failures in 
program execution may bring public humiliation and lost resources, instead of being 
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seen as a process of learning (Mahler and Posner, 2014). McCurdy and Casamayou 
(2011) described learning as a process to acknowledge failures and solve the 
underlying problems that cause failures by using experience or performance 
information. 
This study fills a gap in the literature by investigating the impact on ILGs’ 
organisational learning capabilities of implementing a centralistic MCS through formal 
rules and procedures. The study utilises diagnostic and interactive concepts from 
Simon’s levers of control framework to analyse the use of SAKIP and its impact on 
ILGs’ organisational learning capabilities. While most studies have examined the use 
of SAKIP on ILG performance, this study uses organisational learning as its final 
dependent variable. Organisational learning has been viewed as the key concept of 
public management reform. It views that the organisations’ ability to improve, relies 
on the actors’ capacity to use performance information to identify organisational 
weakness and arrange remedial actions (Moynihan and Lavertu, 2012).  
Previous MCS studies in the public sector used performance as their dependent 
variable. Utilizing performance as the final dependent variable can be problematic 
because measuring and comparing performance for some programs can be more 
difficult than for others. Gao (2015) argued that the connection between implementing 
an improved performance measurement system in a public organisation and the 
performance itself is not a direct link. There are other significant factors that need to be 
included in the equation prior to determining the performance of a public organisation. 
Therefore, this study is unique in bringing the management control system and 
organisational learning streams of literature together through empirical investigation in 
the Indonesian public sector.  
2.6 Summary  
This review was organised under three key themes.  Firstly a comprehensive 
background to the Indonesian public sector and the regulations and guidelines relevant 
to this study related to LAKIP and SAKIP was provided.   Further, prior literature that 
has examined performance measurement systems in the ILG were elaborated.  
Secondly important literature that has explored the facets of MCSs was provided. This 
included prior research into the levers of control, the relationship of MCS and 
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performance measurement and specifically identifies public sector research pertinent to 
the current study. The final main theme emphasised aspects related to organisational 
learning that is the dependent variable for the present thesis. The important research 
gaps and contribution of the present study were identified in section 2.5.   
This thesis will contribute to management accounting research by studying the 
relationship between adoption factors and the use of SAKIP. Since SAKIP was 
designed and initiated by the MSAEBR, the thesis will investigate the impact of 
adopting and implementing a centralistic control system by local government. The 
study will investigate the view of SAKIP as tools to contributing to the implementation 
of the intended strategy and stimulating the emergence of new strategies. The way 
ILGs combine diagnostic and interactive use of SAKIP to manage tensions between 
freedom to innovate and achieving pre-determined targets in ILGs will be observed. 
Finally, the positive or negative effects of the use of SAKIP on organisational learning 
will be investigated to disclose the distinctive potential of SAKIP for ILGs. This will 
add a significant methodological contribution to the pool of literature. 
In order to investigate the impact of the adoption and utilisation of MCSs, this thesis 
applies institutional theory as the theoretical framework of the study. Detailed 
explanations about the theoretical framework are presented in Chapter Three. 
 Theoretical Framework and Research Design Chapter 3:
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter identified key issues after critically analysing research considering 
the adoption and use of SAKIP in ILGs using academic journals. The purpose of this 
chapter is to develop a theoretical context that can accommodate these issues. 
Reflecting from institutional theory, this chapter develops a theoretical model of the 
adoption of SAKIP in ILGs and the relationship between the use of SAKIP and ILGs’ 
organisational learning capabilities. The first section explains the conceptual model and 
hypotheses of the thesis. It will develop a conceptual model mapping the relationship 
between the factors in adopting SAKIP; the associations between diagnostic and 
interactive use of SAKIP; and ILGs’ organisational learning capabilities. Hypotheses 
will be drawn from the model and tested using statistical analysis. The second section 
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explains why institutional theory is selected as the theoretical backbone of the study. 
The next four sections describe the definitions of various terminologies used in 
institutional theory, including isomorphism and how organisations strategically respond 
to institutional pressures. Finally, section 3.16 will provide a summary of the chapter. 
3.2 Conceptual Model and Hypotheses Development 
Previous studies on MCSs have identified antecedent factors that drive the utilisation of 
control systems and affect an organisation’s ability to learn and achieve its performance 
(Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007; Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Henri, 2006; Kloot, 1995). 
Factors surrounding adoption of SAKIP by ILGs and how those factors influence 
SAKIP’s utilisation and ILGs’ organisational learning capabilities will be observed. The 
model shown in Figure 3.1 was developed by combining research concepts from 
Upping and Oliver (2011) and (Widener, 2007). In this model, the relationship between 
the factors in adopting a control system and the associations between diagnostic and 
interactive controls will be investigated. The hypotheses development is now explained 
in detail.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Schema 
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3.3 Adoption Factors 
An adaptation of Luder’s model, as modified by Upping and Oliver (2011), will be 
employed for this thesis. The adapted model will be used to identify internal and 
external factors that act as catalysts for, and influence the implementation of, accounting 
change in organisations. It incorporates motivators, barriers, and facilitators of change 
to better understand the likelihood and the purpose of change. Upping and Oliver (2011) 
re-classified the variables into: (1) external pressures, (2) internal pressures, (3) 
facilitators of change, and (4) barriers to change. 
3.3.1 External pressures 
External pressures refer to organisational factors that can shape the process of change. It 
creates a demand for an organisation to gain social legitimacy by maintaining a good 
relationship with the external environment (Meyer and Rowawn, 1977). New 
institutional sociology suggests that organisations opt to accommodate external 
pressures in order to manage their legitimacy, provide stability and minimise 
disturbance in achieving their organisational goals15. External pressures can occur from 
(1) the external organisational environment, such as economic crises, new regulations, 
new technology, and political competition (Upping and Oliver, 2012); (2) external users 
of information, such as politicians, parliamentary committees or Auditors-General. 
Political actors, including ministers, opposition members and political advisors may use 
public sector accountability reports in an attempt to satisfy voters’ needs and to remain 
politically competitive (Christensen, 2002; Upping and Oliver, 2011). Administrative 
actors, such as the MSAEBR or the Auditor-General, may also refer to accountability 
reports when performing their accountability roles (Christensen, 2002). After 16 years 
of implementation, SAKIP has been viewed as a sign of improved accountability and 
professionalism. While MSAEBR evaluates SAKIP and publishes the results every 
year, local politicians may use an improved SAKIP score to demonstrate their 
competencies in public management in order to increase their prospect of re-election. 
Since the generic nature of external pressures for implementing SAKIP is the emphasis 
to comply with associated regulations, the first proposed hypothesis is: 
                                                            
15 New institutional sociology (NIS) is a type of institutional theory that views organisations are 
influenced by the institutions in their environment. NIS was further elaborated in section 3.9 
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H1:  There is a positive relationship between external pressures and the adoption 
of SAKIP. 
3.3.2 Internal pressures 
Internal pressures are described as factors from within organisations that can lead to and 
motivate a change in the organisation (Upping and Oliver, 2011, 2012). It can occur 
from (1) the internal organisational environment, such as attitudes toward change, 
consistency, system openness, budgetary pressures, change in the key leadership 
positions, change in top management policy, or change in the power dynamics of the 
organisation (Upping and Oliver, 2012); (2) internal users of information, such as the 
mayor or the governor of a local government. Internal pressures are also described as 
mandated policies and legislation which can target the reporting system directly 
(Yamamoto, 1999). Besides instructing ILGs to prepare and submit SAKIP, MSAEBR 
also instructed ILGs to prepare the SAKIP report at operational levels. Such direction 
may necessitate ILGs hiring more consultants with particular skills to perform the task. 
New institutional sociology also suggests that organisations may obtain perceived 
legitimacy from adopting new management practices through normative pressure.  
While regulations can create coercive pressures, professionals and consultants working 
in ILGs may exert normative isomorphism and bring a different paradigm that shapes 
the adoption and utilisation of SAKIP. As expressed by Norhayati and Siti Nabiha 
(2009, p. 260) “the experience of a specialised education, and the involvement in 
professional networks, influence how professional personnel undertake their activities 
within an organisation”. Hence, the second proposed hypothesis is: 
H2:  There is a positive relationship between internal pressures and the adoption 
of SAKIP. 
3.4 Facilitators of Change 
Facilitators of change are factors that bring direct influence on a successful change or 
reform. Upping and Oliver (2011) identify three actors that facilitate a change to 
process. They are promoters of change, producers of information, and communicators of 
change. Promoters of change are people or organisations that foster the adoption of a 
new technique because they have a special interest in the targeted organisation. They 
raise the problem, recognise the need to change and promulgate the solution 
(Christensen, 2002). Previous research found that the roles of promoters of change 
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contribute to the success of change (Christensen, 2002). In order to understand the 
response from organisational actors toward the adoption of a new management 
technique, this study will include the old institution economics view from institutional 
theory. Old institution economics is used to recognize organisational actors who take a 
role as institutional entrepreneurs.16 With respect to the adoption of SAKIP, the 
MSAEBR has become a prominent promoter of change throughout the introduction and 
mobilization process of SAKIP. Other possible promoters of change in the public sector 
are international aid agencies. These agencies can directly or indirectly stimulate change 
by requiring an agency to implement an innovation prior to providing assistance. 
Producers of information are bureaucratic actors responsible for providing accounting 
information to users such as central agencies, politicians, and auditors (Christensen, 
2002; Upping and Oliver, 2011). In SAKIP’s case, this responsibility is exerted by the 
MSAEBR as well as by ILG senior officials who have the responsibility of preparing 
the performance report. Lastly, communication is also an essential part in facilitating 
change through knowledge transfer. In their research, Upping and Oliver (2012) 
included training, seminars, publications, technology and allocated staff resources as 
elements of communicators for change. This leads to the third hypothesis:  
H3: There is a positive relationship between facilitators of change and the 
adoption of SAKIP. 
3.5 Barriers to Change 
Barriers to change are described as features of the public sector that hinder, delay or 
prevent change (Upping and Oliver, 2011). Some examples of barriers of change are: 
differences in value systems, insufficient commitment, lack of necessary knowledge and 
skills, or a conflicting ethos (Upping and Oliver, 2011). Harun and Robinson (2010) 
defined barriers as features of political and bureaucratic environments that impede an 
initiative. Christensen (2002) stated that barriers of change restrict the option for 
innovation by increasing the cost or time required to implement the change. Old 
institutional economics suggests that human actions and routines may shape institutions 
and vary practices from one organisation to another (Delmas and Toffel, 2004). 
Organisations may fully or symbolically use new innovations as their response to 
different demands from different groups of stakeholders. Internal stakeholders are 
                                                            
16 The concept of OIE was further elaborated in section 3.9 
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important in determining the status within an organisation that may not be consistent 
with external demands. Previous research highlighted low institutional capacity due to a 
lack of qualified staff, changing priorities, inadequate information systems, staff 
attitudes, the uncertain role of the proposed change in the organisation, limited 
involvement of stakeholders, high levels of corruption, and high levels of informality as 
barriers to change that threaten the successful adoption of reform in the public sector 
(Christensen, 2002; Harun and Robinson, 2010; Upping and Oliver, 2011, 2012; 
Yamamoto, 1999). Hence, the fourth hypothesis is: 
H4: There is a negative relationship between barriers to change and the adoption 
of SAKIP. 
3.6 Adoption of SAKIP  
SAKIP is intended to be a more informative control system in the public sector. In 
addition, the implementation of SAKIP in ILGs is aimed at improving not only 
performance measurement but also decision-making and benchmarking in ILG 
programs. The adoption of SAKIP involves measuring program activities and results. 
The MSAEBR has issued a series of SAKIP guidelines that help ILG managers to not 
only clarify the purpose and intended results of a program but also to assess a program’s 
intention and to communicate its achievement (Akbar et al., 2012).  
On the other hand, the strong emphasis on coercive pressures by the MSAEBR on ILGs 
may lead some portion of SAKIP adopters to decouple their internal activities from 
SAKIP. Agostino and Arnaboldi (2011) suggested that implementation problems may 
arise when a new MCS is applied to an organisational context. Many of the potential 
applications of the new system are overlooked because of a lack of clarity regarding the 
objective of changing over to the new system. As a result, managers may have little or 
no commitment to the outcome of the MCS change (Walley, Blenkinsop, and Duberley, 
1994). Davila, Foster, and Li (2009) argued that adoption of a new MCS will lead to 
better performance when managers have prior knowledge about how the new MCS will 
respond to a particular emerging need, such as improving communication or increasing 
organisational efficiency. These managers recognise a new MCS as the tool required to 
respond to the organisation’s environmental change and facilitate growth. Davila et al. 
(2009) also found that a new MCS seems to fail to improve performance when the 
system is adopted as reaction to external pressures, crises or problems. They argued that 
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this failure can be due to managers’ inability to utilise the new MCS to access essential 
knowledge from the organisation, thus failing to bring the required structure to improve 
performance. Therefore, this thesis will investigate the impact of SAKIP adoption on 
the styles of use of SAKIP in ILG. Factors in SAKIP adoption can refer to the 
diagnostic and interactive use of SAKIP by ILG officials. While external pressures may 
not encourage ILGs to fully utilise SAKIP, the pressures from within ILGs can 
encourage the diagnostic and interactive use of SAKIP to provide an adequate and 
satisfactory basis for planning, decision-making, and evaluation. Hoque and Alam 
(1999) suggested that even though the organisation’s reason to initiate a new MCS 
practice is to promote institutional culture rather than for technical reasons, a new MCS 
may still change the organisation’s internal control mechanism.  
With this the fifth hypotheses are: 
H5a: There is a positive relationship between the adoption of SAKIP and its use 
in a diagnostic control system. 
 
H5b: There is a positive relationship between the adoption of SAKIP and its use 
in an interactive control system. 
3.7 SAKIP Utilisation 
Diagnostic and interactive systems are considered to be the instruments for interpreting 
strategy and providing feedback to managers based on an organisation’s performance 
(Henri, 2006; Simons, 1994; Simons et al., 2000; Tessier and Otley, 2012; Widener, 
2007). A strategic performance measurement system or a budget system can be used 
both diagnostically and interactively with implications for belief and boundary systems 
(Tuomela, 2005). The diagnostic and interactive use of SAKIP will provide feedback 
about the implemented strategy to ILG managers. SAKIP contains performance 
measures linked to the budget that can be used diagnostically by internal management to 
ensure that the selected strategy leads to the achievement of the organisation’s goals. 
Further, SAKIP results can be used interactively during the end-of-year review by 
MSAEBR and other related agencies. 
3.8 Control Variables 
Although not shown in the model, the control variables in the study are “type” of local 
governments, ILG “size”, and ILG “location”. Past research in ILG has used these 
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control variables to describe the relationship between core variables and ILG 
characteristics (Akbar et al., 2012). The thesis will examine any differences between 
different sized ILGs (using revenue as the proxy) in the use of SAKIP. Finally, possible 
differences between ILG location (e.g. Java or non-Java) and the use of SAKIP will also 
be examined.  
3.8.1 Diagnostic controls 
According to Simons et al. (2000, p. 209), diagnostic control systems are “the formal 
information systems that managers use to measure the outputs of a process, compare 
predetermined standards against actual results, and correct deviations from pre-set 
standards of performance”. They represent the normal type of management by exception 
reporting, where the organisation’s critical success factors are communicated and 
monitored (Simons, 1994). Diagnostic controls signal, communicate, and monitor the 
achievement of ILGs’ critical success factors. They help managers to compose 
responses to changes by identifying problems at an operating level and finding 
solutions. These solutions then allow the organisation to continue operating in a steady 
state (Kloot, 1995; Simons et al., 2000). In this case, SAKIP is used in a single-loop 
learning where managers modify their actions in a way that does not result in 
fundamental change (Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Kloot, 1995).  
3.8.2 Interactive controls 
Interactive control systems are used to develop opportunity-seeking and learning 
(Simons, 1994). They enable the organisation to identify obsolete strategy and to learn 
innovative responses to a changing environment (Merchant and Otley, 2007). Tuomela 
(2005) described interactive controls as systems used to discuss strategic uncertainties, 
to learn novel strategic responses to a changing environment and to promote and 
provoke discussion. Interactive controls are employed when top managers focus on 
selected measures in order to find out the strategic meaning and consequences of the 
measures (Tuomela, 2005). Simons et al. (2000) argued that new strategies usually 
emerge from the bottom up when top managers learn about changing patterns in the 
business from their subordinates. SAKIP is intended to be used interactively to improve 
the quality of strategic management and to increase commitment to strategic targets. 
According to Widener (2007, p. 762): 
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“The interactive use of performance measures influences the 
diagnostic use of performance measures since the latter provides the 
necessary structure that enables the interactive control system to be 
effective. As the organisation adjusts to the strategy that emerges 
through the interactive system, the diagnostic PM system must also 
adjust in order to reflect the firm’s new strategic position and critical 
success factors.” 
Therefore, the interactive use of SAKIP can influence the diagnostic use of performance 
measures embedded in SAKIP in communicating the strategy and making timely 
adjustments that reflect new critical success factors (Widener, 2007).  
3.8.3 Organisational learning 
The organisation’s ability to detect problems and determine the solution is considered to 
be an important element for its growth and survival in a changing environment (Henri, 
2006; Kloot, 1995). As one important aspect of an MCS, a performance measurement 
system can create consistency between strategic decisions and action by providing the 
organisation with a basis to collectively learn, challenge ideas, and improve 
performance (Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Srimai, 2011). Previous studies have shown the 
impact of the diagnostic and interactive use of strategic performance measurement 
systems in a timely manner to generate organisational learning (Henri, 2006; Kloot, 
1995; Kruis et al., 2015; Tuomela, 2005). Such feedback mechanisms can help 
managers in fine tuning or changing their business strategy. 
Based on the above discussion, it is argued that diagnostic and interactive control 
systems will facilitate ILGs’ orientation to organisational learning. Therefore, the 
hypotheses designed to test these assertions are formally stated as: 
H6a: The emphasis ILGs place on the use of SAKIP in a diagnostic control system 
is positively associated with an organisation’s orientation to learning. 
H6b: The emphasis ILGs place on the use of SAKIP in an interactive control 
system is positively associated with an organisation’s orientation to 
learning. 
H6c: The emphasis ILGs place on the use of SAKIP in an interactive control 
system is positively associated with the emphasis they place on the use of 
SAKIP in a diagnostic control system. 
3.9 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory has been widely used to understand the process of change in 
organisations (Ashworth et al., 2009; Pilcher, 2011). It focuses on the process by which 
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routines, norms, rules, and structure become accepted guidelines for social behaviour 
(Scott, 2014). It is concerned with the contribution of the external environment, such as 
social, political and cultural factors, to shaping organisational form and process 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Ruef and Scott, 1998; Scapens, 
2006). Meyer and Rowan (1977) added that organisations can gain social legitimacy by 
maintaining a good relationship with the external environment. Social legitimacy can be 
secured by accepting taken-for-granted practices and structures and thus conforming to 
the environment’s cognitive and normative demands. Conformance to institutional 
demands in the organisations’ environment is believed to drive structure and practice 
similarities among organisations operating in the same organisational field, known as 
institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
 
The development of institutional theory has led to a distinction between old institutional 
economics (OIE) and new institutional sociology (NIS). New institutional sociology 
proposes that organisations within the same field face competing institutional demands. 
At the same time, institutions surrounding organisations provide and encourage 
stability. Such institutional forces are reflected in the prevailing ideas, beliefs, and 
values within the organisational field. Therefore, organisations choose to appear similar 
to others in order to maintain their legitimacy and to avoid disruption to their main 
focus of achieving their goals (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
The adoption of SAKIP by almost all ILGs can be investigated across Indonesian local 
governments. On the other hand, the original institutional economics (OIE) proposes 
that the institutions’ interpretation of the institutional pressures surrounding the 
organisation and transformation into organisational practices will be different from one 
organisation to another (Delmas and Toffel, 2004). Human actions and routines are one 
major factor that shape institutions. At the same time, the rational choices and patterns 
of action adopted by groups of individuals can be influenced by the prevailing 
institutions which govern organisational activity (Scapens and Burns, 2000).  
 
Despite the distinction between the NIS and OIE, this study will combine characteristics 
from both theories (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Munir and Phillips, 2005). Brignall and Modell (2000); Tsamenyi, 
Cullen, and González (2006) argued that the process of conforming to institutional 
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pressures is not always passive. Organisations may actively resist through the 
interaction between broader environmental dynamics and intra-organisational processes 
(Tsamenyi et al., 2006). Brignall and Modell (2000) determined that organisations are 
able to provide a balanced and integrated multidimensional performance measurement 
system to manage conflicting stakeholder interests. Arnaboldi, Azzone, and Palermo 
(2010) suggested that it is important to mobilise various dimensions of power during a 
managerial innovation. It is also essential for organisational actors and key individuals 
to be able to understand the meaning of the proposed system and to communicate it 
throughout the organisation. Therefore, the process of conforming to institutional 
pressures will depend on the context of an organisation, including the informal 
structure, network of actors, internal powers operating within the organisation, and the 
actions of individuals within the field (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Johnson, Melin, and Whittington, 2003; Oliver, 1991; Scapens, 2006; 
Scapens and Burns, 2000).  
 
The study will emphasise the new institutionalism concept that suggests the process of 
institutionalisation starts in the field level that leads organisations to become similar to 
others located within the same field. At the same time, the study will include the OIE 
concept by recognizing organisational actors who take a role as institutional 
entrepreneurs as their reaction to the ongoing institutionalisation process. Therefore, 
institutional theory is considered to be an ideal theory to understand change processes as 
ILGs implement SAKIP as their new management control system. The research 
questions will explore (1) how SAKIP can be a common MCS practice in ILG at this 
time; (2) the different motivations and scenarios behind the adoption; and (3) how 
regulations are being utilised and ILG managers are involved to support the SAKIP 
adoption. Institutional theory is also drawn on to make case-specific contributions to the 
literature17.  
                                                            
17 Another social theory that also has been used to study management accounting change is structuration 
theory (Giddens, 1984). The theory provides a conceptual linkage between action and institutions 
(Scapens and Varoutsa, 2010). Structuration theory views that structure (institution) is “a product of and a 
constraint on human action”(Barley and Tolbert, 1997, p. 5). Similar with OIE, structuration theory 
argues that institutions influenced actor behaviour through an internalisation process of prevailing norms 
and regulations (Scapens and Varoutsa, 2010). When an actor behaves according to a patterned 
behaviour, institutions are reproduced (Bjorck, 2004). Both theories acknowledge that institutions may 
occur through recurred interactions within organisations. Despite some similarities, this research utilises 
institutional theory because it is more difficult to develop an empirical model using structuration theory 
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3.10 Institutions 
There have been several definitions of institutions. Some scholars emphasise the 
functionality of institutions in the process of institutionalisation, while others focus on 
the main attribute of institutions as quasi-rules within the field. This section will focus 
on key definitions of institutions in order to set a context for subsequent discussion.  
 
Institutions are defined as “shared rules and typification that identify categories of social 
actors and their appropriate activities or relationships” (Barley and Tolbert, 1997, p. 96). 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) described institutions as templates for organisations to 
endeavour to secure legitimacy. Institutions are created and maintained through 
interactions between organisations and their surrounding environment. Furthermore, 
Meyer and Scott (1983, p. 84) referred to institutions as the “rules, norms and ideologies 
of the wider society”. Zucker (1987) argued that institutions can bring common 
understandings of appropriate and meaningful behaviour. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) 
defined them as rules, laws, customs, procedures, norms, culture, and ethics that 
synchronise organisational actors’ actions. On the other hand, institutions are also 
viewed as social structures with rule-like factors that drive the process of isomorphism 
and provide stability. Scott (2014, p. 33) described institutions as “social structures that 
have attained a high degree of resilience. Institutions are composed of cultural-
cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together with associated activities 
and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life”. 
 
Since institutions govern and shape the behaviour of individuals, they also influence the 
process and structure of an organisation as a response to the dynamic within the 
institutional environment (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001). Furthermore, organisational 
behaviour is affected by intra-institutional pressures and external environmental 
pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2014). 
Individuals and organisations can respond to environmental pressures by conforming to 
norms in order to earn the legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities necessary for 
their operation (Scott, 2014).  
                                                                                                                                                                              
(Whittington, 2015). On the other hand, institutional theory has been empirically used in observing the 
isomorphic pressures in the diffusion of new practices or programs among organisations (Aurini, 2006; 
Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004; Pilcher, 2011). Institutional theory also has had a major impact on different 
research fields within the social sciences. 
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3.11 Rationalised Myths and Legitimacy 
In the context of institutional theory, rationalised myths can be described as 
institutionalised products, services, techniques, norms, or standards that are transmitted 
and shared without question by organisational actors (Pettersen, 1995; Svejvig, 2013). 
Organisations conform to rationalised myths in order to be considered as proper and 
rational organisations that conduct meaningful behaviour (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 
2008). Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that many elements of formal structure in 
bureaucracies function as myths that operate to display responsibility and avoid claims 
of negligence. The main characteristics of rationalised myths are that they specify 
numerous social purposes as impersonal technical matters and work in some measure 
beyond the discretion of any individual participant or organisation. Through complex 
interaction among organisations, rationalised myths can be codified into formal 
regulations, law, organisational structures and process. They are taken for granted as 
legitimate regardless of their real impact on work outcomes (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
When organisations conform to rationalised myths, they appear to be rational and signal 
their ability to conduct their business appropriately; thus they gain legitimacy from their 
constituents (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Svejvig, 2013).  
 
Legitimacy refers to the extent to which an organisation has to conform to requirements 
from various internal and external stakeholders in order to gain approval from society 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Kostova, Roth, and Dacin, 2008; Sonpar, Pazzaglia, 
and Kornijenko, 2010). Scott (2010) describes legitimacy as a symbolic value to be 
displayed to external stakeholders. At the same time, it shows the level of cultural 
support for an organisation (Meyer and Scott, 1983). 
 
By accepting rationalised myths of generally accepted structures or procedures, 
organisations retain a defence against the perception of irrationality, avoid social 
criticism, minimise demands for external scrutiny, and thus improve the survival 
capabilities for their operations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2013). Meyer and 
Rowan (1977, p. 358) proposed that “the more an organisation’s structure is derived 
from institutionalised myths, the more it maintains elaborate displays of confidence, 
satisfaction and good faith, internally and externally”. The interaction occurring in the 
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process of accepting rationalised myths provides organisations with legitimacy among 
others within the organisational field. Suchman (1995, p. 574) defined legitimacy as: 
“a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” 
Legitimacy provides organisations with opportunities to maintain their status and 
reputation through their visibility, credibility, and mobility (Deephouse and Suchman, 
2008). Modell (2001) postulated legitimacy is affected by coercive and normative 
institutional pressures. Besides legitimacy-seeking, institutional theory also views 
organisational responses as also embedded in the prevailing values and beliefs from the 
organisations’ environment. This process of the environment affecting and pressuring 
organisations to comply with its demands is an ongoing political process. 
3.12 Embedded Agency 
Embedded agency is a concept in institutional theory that views individuals’ and 
organisations’ decisions and actions as highly influenced by their surrounding 
environment. They are framed within and have become part of a web of socially 
constructed, taken-for-granted prescriptions of appropriate conduct (Scott, 2013). They 
are shaped by prevailing cultural elements, such as norms, values, beliefs and taken-for 
granted assumptions. These cultural elements also take on a rule-like status to define 
appropriate organisational form and behaviour (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001; Garud, 
Hardy, and Maguire, 2007). They define and guide actors’ position in social 
relationships (Barley and Tolbert, 1997).  
 
In the case of SAKIP adoption and implementation, ILGs are also not free from the 
influences of their surrounding environment and embedded cultural elements. Even 
though decentralization and autonomy have significantly changed the Indonesian 
governmental system, the cultural elements from the centralised era are still strongly 
present in government agencies in Indonesia. As a result of long-standing traditions and 
strong cultural norms from 32 years of a “command and control” regime, Indonesian 
local government agencies still suffer from classic bureaucracy pathology such as slow 
responses due to passively waiting for more directions from central governments, and 
high levels of corruption, inefficiency, and informality (Dwiyanto, 2011; Mimba et al., 
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2007). Mimba et al. (2007) described informality in public organisations as a gap 
between the formal and actual activities of the organisations. These environmental and 
embedded cultural elements may become important isomorphic factors in the 
implementation of NPM-like management innovation such as SAKIP in ILGs.  
3.13 Isomorphism 
Institutional theory examines the isomorphic process that leads organisations to become 
similar in structure and procedures to other organisations (Oates, 2013). Organisations 
tend to adapt to meet society’s expectations by following institutional norms specific to 
an organisational field (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Oates, 2013). Arnold, Kozinets, and Handelman (2001) described institutional norms as 
family, community, religion, and other complex cultural systems that shape 
organisational action by deciding appropriate and taken-for-granted social conducts. 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Scott (2013) claimed that regulations imposed by 
governing agencies are much stronger institutions than belief systems, practices, and 
norms, since failing to conform to their demands can bring serious consequences to an 
organisation. Since organisations situated within the same organisational field also 
interact in a similar environment, they gradually adopt similar techniques and become 
isomorphic in order to secure legitimacy and be perceived as more successful 
(Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Kostova et al., 2008; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Oates, 2013). By adopting socially accepted structures or 
procedures, organisations that belong to an organisational field accommodate pressures 
from their institutional environments in order to be viewed as making appropriate 
organisational choices (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001).  
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 148) described an organisational field as consisting of 
“organisations that, in aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institutional life”. 
Organisations are more inclined to copy similar organisations within the field that they 
perceive to be more legitimate or successful. The term isomorphism refers to the 
institutional ability to exercise a constraining influence over organisations. Isomorphism 
drives organisations in the same population to resemble other organisations facing 
similar environmental conditions without necessarily making the organisations more 
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efficient, thus leading to the process of institutionalisation (Ashworth et al., 2009; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) described three major types of institutional isomorphism: 
coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive isomorphism usually derives from political 
influence with both formal and informal pressures coming from other organisations 
(Akbar et al., 2012; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hawley, 1944; Kanter, 1972; 
Tsamenyi et al., 2006). At the organisational level, coercive pressures may come from 
governing organisations such as regulatory bodies and central government agencies (Shi 
et al., 2008). Such external organisations are able to establish rules, monitor 
compliance, provide recognition, and apply sanctions (Darnall, 2006; Trevino, Thomas, 
and Cullen, 2008). Coercive isomorphism can also be imposed by cultural expectations 
of the larger society (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tsamenyi et al., 2006).  
 
In the context of SAKIP, regulations issued by central governments have been the 
source of coercive pressures. Even though ILGs have been given greater autonomy in 
managing their affairs under the decentralization regime, multiple central government 
agencies are still able to inflict strong coercive pressures, especially for monitoring and 
controlling purposes. The central agencies often use the cross-departmental regulatory 
framework to bring their agenda and influence ILG behaviour. This approach is very 
effective since most ILGs are still dependent on central government funding, known as 
an allocation fund. For example, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), MOHA and the 
Agency for National Development and Planning (Kementrian PPN/Bappenas) issued a 
series of regulations that require ILGs to provide them with budgets figures, operational 
outcomes, and annual performance reports on a timely basis for monitoring purposes. 
By adhering to the regulations, ILGs maintain their legitimacy and build their image as 
organisations that properly plan and allocate their resources. In the case of SAKIP, the 
MSAEBR constantly issues regulations and guidelines that are intended to encourage 
the use of SAKIP.  
 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs when an organisation seeks some degree of 
acknowledgment by imitating best practices from organisations perceived to be more 
legitimate or successful (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tsamenyi et al., 2006). The 
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pressure drives the mimicking organisations to view practices or structure exercises in 
high-status organisations as best practices and to copy them. Two factors that drive 
mimetic isomorphism are uncertainty within the environment and a lack of leaders’ 
ability to provide guidance (Kasperskaya, 2008; Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
 
By consciously copying the practices of leading organisations, an organisation is 
associating itself with culturally accepted activities and practices; and hoping to attain 
similar successful outcomes (Scott, 2013; Trevino et al., 2008). Mimetic isomorphism 
reflects the cognitive structures, perceptions or symbolic systems shared among 
organisations within the same field (Scott, 2013). These cognitive structures also 
influence organisations’ ability to identify and categorise events in their environment 
and to decide what actions are expected to respond to them (Kostova, 1999). Every year 
the MSAEBR publishes the results of SAKIP evaluation and gives awards to agencies, 
including local governments, that reach the highest grade. This mechanism provides 
opportunity for ILGs to imitate others perceived as having successfully implemented 
SAKIP. 
 
Normative isomorphism occurs mainly from professional groups through formal and 
informal communication (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Professional groups such as 
educational or professional networks have been acknowledged as the major area where 
values are instilled, thus generating normative pressures. They can foster organisations 
to apply some pattern of structure considered appropriate in the environment (Kostova 
and Roth, 2002).  
 
The process of normative institutionalisation is derived from values, beliefs, social 
expectations and norms practiced by professional members of the society (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991; Kostova, 1997, 1999; Scott, 2013). Social actors rooted in a 
professional association tend to unconsciously imitate new structure and process when 
the new practices have been widely used by many actors in the field. When some 
activities are seen as professional best practices, organisations will voluntarily adopt and 
view them as normative expectations and guiding behaviour (Shi, Narcissus, and Jian, 
2008). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that a workforce with university degree 
qualifications may lead to isomorphism among organisations within the same field. 
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Akbar et al. (2012) stated that the growing number of ILG employees and officials with 
higher degrees from universities has contributed to the wider use of key performance 
indicators in ILGs.  
 
The institutionalisation process typologies can help the thesis in developing a theoretical 
case regarding simultaneous isomorphism behind the adoption of SAKIP in ILGs. In 
order to describe the process of an institution in shaping organisations’ behaviour, 
previous research generally groups the process of isomorphism in an institutional 
environment into three main categories: (1) coercive isomorphism, as reflected in 
governmental policies and regulation; (2) mimetic isomorphism, as reflected in widely 
shared social knowledge; and (3) normative isomorphism, as reflected through 
developed value systems within the society (Kostova, 1997; Trevino et al., 2008).  
3.14 Organisational Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures 
As entities deeply entangled with institutional requirements, public organisations face 
multiple pressures and institutional demands from diverse stakeholders. These 
stakeholders can suggest diverse and possibly conflicting prescriptions of legitimate 
behaviour and beliefs (Lounsbury, 2007; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Scott (2013) 
argued that in order to maintain their legitimacy, public organisations have to meet 
pressures from the environment by meeting all the requirements and focusing on 
performing socially accepted attitudes.  
The pressure to be viewed as accountable and proper have driven public organisations 
to: (1) provide additional explanations in order to justify their actions to the public, (2) 
exercise additional practices in order to win public opinion, and (3) use socially driven 
criteria of performance. For example, the current president of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, 
had to ask a perceived “clean” organisation – the corruption eradication committee’s 
(KPK) – to perform background checks on candidates for his new cabinet member. A 
background check by an independent institute institution such as KPK is intended to 
give the impression of clean government, to win the public’s confidence and gain 
legitimacy from the general public.  
Secondary to conforming to environmental pressures, public organisations also face 
pressures to be effective and efficient. Indonesian government agencies respond to these 
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pressures by incorporating various performance reports in their activities. Since 1999, 
Indonesia has embraced the concept of NPM to reform the public sector (Harun and 
Robinson, 2010). Organisations that were considered authoritarian with a lack of good 
governance systems are now required to provide greater transparency in government 
transactions and clearer accountability for program results (Rhodes et al., 2012). Akbar 
et al. (2012) view accountability and performance measurement as two essential 
elements of NPM in public sector reform.  
When facing multiple and sometimes conflicting demands from diverse stakeholders, 
public organisations are required to be able to respond strategically. Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) argued that besides managing internal demands, organisations working in an 
institutionalised environment, such as government agencies, also have to manage the 
ceremonial demand from the environment. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claimed that 
organisations are aware of this situation when they follow prevailing institutional scripts 
and cognitive frames. However, the lack of tangible motive in public organisations’ 
evaluation methods, such as profit in their private counterparts, may hinder them from 
achieving the intended goals of such reforms. In their research about management and 
accounting system changes in a Malaysian public utility, Siti Nabiha and Scapens 
(2005) argued that new systems and reports do not necessarily lead to better user 
behaviour and performance. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) suggested that public 
organisations are more willing to focus on gaining legitimacy and good social fit than 
achieving the technical and economic efficiency required by their environment. The 
drive to gain legitimacy over efficiency has led to opacity in public organisations’ 
expected actions and outputs. The focus on institutional compliance can also weaken 
management’s ability to track causal relationships between budgets, processes, goals, 
standards, and technologies used (Fernández-Alles and Llamas-Sánchez, 2008). Even 
though adopting such myths may bring organisations better survival possibilities, it will 
not necessarily turn a public organisation into an effective and efficient unit (Aurini, 
2006; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Rhodes et al., 2012).  
When organisations find institutional demands that are not compatible with other 
prevailing institutions or are conflicting with organisational internal objectives, Oliver 
(1991) suggested five institutional factors that affect organisational strategic responses 
to such demands: 
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a. Cause 
Cause refers to factors driving an organisation to conform to institutional 
expectations. Such factors can be a rational motive  i.e., to be effective and 
efficient organisations  or a legitimation motive  i.e. to submit to rules and 
stakeholder expectations. The implementation of SAKIP is intended to oversee the 
achievement of all levels of government agencies (Rhodes et al., 2012). However, 
Akbar et al. (2012) found that performance indicators in SAKIP are developed more 
to submit to regulatory requirements.  
b. Constituents 
Constituents refer to various actors such as state, professions and other interest 
groups that create institutional pressures. ILGs have diverse constituents, including 
central government agencies, parliament, media, users of services, and the general 
public. The most influential constituent for ILGs is the MSAEBR. The MSAEBR 
has been playing an active role in promoting, regulating, and evaluating SAKIP 
implementation in ILGs. 
c. Contents 
Contents refer to the nature of the norms or requirements to which organisations are 
required to conform. Similar to public organisations’ content characteristics 
described by Fernández-Alles and Llamas-Sánchez (2008), there are not many 
opportunities to dispute the regulation from the central government agencies in 
Indonesian bureaucracy. As a result, ILGs are under pressure to comply with SAKIP 
regulations issued by the MSAEBR. 
d. Control 
Control refers to mechanisms used to exert institutional pressures. SAKIP is 
implemented by strong coercive pressures through a series of regulations and 
guidelines issued by the MSAEBR. By evaluating SAKIP reports yearly and 
publishing their grades, the MSAEBR creates a sense of attestation to the 
implementation of SAKIP.  
e. Context 
Context refers to the environmental uncertainty and inter-relationships among actors 
in the organisational field where institutional pressures are being exercised. Some of 
the institutional contexts that can shape ILGs’ response to the pressures to adopt 
SAKIP are as follows:   
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e.1. A dominant paternalistic culture in Indonesian bureaucracy. Indonesia has 
moved dramatically from three decades of totalitarian and highly centralised 
government under Suharto into democratic and decentralised government. 
During Suharto’s reign, a strong paternalistic culture and excessive rigid 
procedures were well-cultivated in the Indonesia bureaucracy (Dwiyanto, 2011). 
The agencies’ self-initiatives were not the main feature within the bureaucracy. 
On the other hand, the culture of “waiting for further directions from higher level 
organisations” – in most cases central government agencies – was common. 
Such cultural traits still prevail in ILGs despite the deeply decentralised system 
that is now in place.  
e.2. Strong central government influences and control on local government 
operations. In addition to cultural factors, several areas in ILGs are still 
controlled and monitored by central government. For example, all government 
employee recruitment is controlled by two central government agencies: the 
MSAEBR and the State Civil Servant Administration Agency. Indonesian Local 
Governments also still rely on allocation funding from the central government to 
finance their operations. Rhodes et al. (2012) and Pepinsky and Wihardja (2011) 
reported that the overlapping authority and lack of coordination among several 
Indonesian central agencies in imposing monitoring and control on ILG 
performance have created confusion among ILGs. The requirement to report 
similar things in a different format may create confusion and shape ILGs’ 
response to the accountability demands.  
Scott (2013) argued that organisations possess a greater opportunity to comply with the 
demands in an ambiguous institutional environment. Gutierrez Rincon (2014) noted that 
organisational conformity to certain institutional demands may create inconsistencies 
with other institutional arrangements.  
When facing multiple institutional demands, some organisations may respond by 
meeting the demands and changing their behaviour, while others only perform 
ceremonial conformance and at the same time still pursue their original technical 
objectives (Fernández-Alles and Llamas-Sánchez, 2008). Since organisations are 
subjected to conflicting demands, they can only conform to some of them and have to 
ignore others. Institutional theory argues that the conflicting nature of institutional 
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demands and the limited capacity of organisations to respond tend to reduce diversity in 
organisational policy and management practice (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; 
Fernández-Alles and Llamas-Sánchez, 2008).  
Besides conforming to or resisting environmental pressures, organisations are also 
capable of strategically responding by modifying institutional scripts to align with their 
organisational characteristics (Aurini, 2006). Innovation in public organisations often 
borrows techniques from different countries. Meyer (2008) stated that rationalised 
myths can travel and be implemented in countries that have diverse and sometimes 
contradictory environments to where the myth originated. Aurini (2006, p. 83) found 
that organisations can actively shape legitimation by “engaging in strategic 
isomorphism and responding to new pressures in the technical environment”. 
Organisations are able to collect, align with, and adopt myths into their structure in 
order to bring benefits for themselves. By complying with existing institutional scripts, 
public organisations gain confidence and space to operate with minimal organisational 
oversight. In their research that studied the implementation of accrual accounting 
systems in Indonesia’s public sector, Harun et al. (2012) emphasised the importance of 
understanding the organisational and social context in analysing the adoption of a new 
managerial innovation.  
The Indonesian decision to join the growing trend of developing countries that embrace 
managerial control into a bureaucratic environment under the jargon of “reform” shows 
the development of NPM as the new rationalised myth in public organisations. After the 
political and financial crisis in 1998, adopting a new managerial control, such as 
SAKIP, is seen as bringing legitimacy to its adopters. In order to diffuse SAKIP 
practices, the central government issues regulations that require all governmental 
agencies, including ILGs, to adopt and implement SAKIP in their activities. These 
coercive pressures establish institutional scripts that shape ILGs’ organisational 
structure and actions in order to gain confidence from their environment. The adoption 
of SAKIP may improve the ILGs’ chance of survival by presenting the image of a 
competent organisation and reducing the justification for central government agencies to 
conduct additional scrutiny. At the same time, the central government uses the adoption 
and implementation of SAKIP as one major factor in evaluating ILG performance.  
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3.15 Utilising Institutional Theory 
This study employs a deductive reasoning approach to investigate the relationship 
between pressures surrounding the adoption of SAKIP; the use of SAKIP; and SAKIP’s 
impact on ILGs’ organisational learning capabilities. Smith (2011) stated that deductive 
reasoning begins by employing a theory, followed by observations, and ends by 
proposing predictions to be verified by subsequent observation. The study employs 
institutional theory as a framework of concepts that are enriched through the collection 
of empirical data. It is used to understand the relationship between “organisational 
structures and the wider social environment” (Tsamenyi et al., 2006, p. 412). 
Institutional theory is suited to explain the powers that influence individuals and 
organisational behaviours within social structures (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005). It 
further holds that organisations attempt to accommodate internal and external pressures 
to build their image in accordance with a set of society’s rules and expectations 
(Kasperskaya, 2008). Institutional theory is used in this study because it has been used 
in empirically observing the isomorphic pressures in the diffusion of new practices or 
programs among organisations (Aurini, 2006; Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004; Pilcher, 
2011). Previous research in the implementation of new accounting and management 
systems has brought diverse institutional analysis concepts, such as stability, 
conformity, isomorphism, or power that enrich research perspectives in exploring and 
explaining a process of change (Arnaboldi et al., 2010). Institutional theory has been 
used to identify and explain the source of isomorphism; the interplay between 
institutional and technical environment; and the response from organisational actors. 
Institutional theory was also developed to understand norms, rules, and symbols to 
which organisational actors need to conform to legitimise their existence (Brignall and 
Modell, 2000; Tsamenyi et al., 2006). 
Institutional theory will be used to explore the interaction between ILGs and their 
institutional environment. Despite multiple and possibly conflicting pressures emerging 
from the environment, an organisation is still driven to become similar to other 
organisations in its field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Modell (2012a) showed that 
institutional theory is useful in seeing how coercive pressures from regulation can create 
new agendas and objectives that can influence organisational process and structure. By 
observing the institutional environment, institutional theory can explain the 
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institutionalisation of new managerial innovation, such as SAKIP, at the organisational 
field level. When new managerial innovations meet the expectations of acceptable 
practices where organisations need to conform to them, institutional theory argues that 
these organisations will include the new innovations in the institutional prescription and, 
over time, accept them as normal and expected in everyday society (Ma and Tayles, 
2009; Norhayati and Siti Nabiha, 2009). Institutional theory allows for analysing the 
dynamics of power and politics in the implementation of innovations. Ma and Tayles 
(2009) explored the different factors of intra-organisational dynamics in the 
transformation process of strategic management accounting operations in a 
pharmaceutical company.  
Institutional theory is also useful in describing factors that lead organisations to fully or 
symbolically use new managerial innovations as their response to meeting demands 
from various groups of stakeholders (Tillema, Mimba, and Van Helden, 2010). Ma and 
Tayles (2009) noted that internal stakeholders are also instrumental in shaping the 
power and status within an organisation that may not be consistent with external 
demands. By including the interests and power of different stakeholders in the analysis, 
institutional theory offers some perspectives that are typically lacking in the rationally 
based research on management accounting innovation (Ma and Tayles, 2009). The 
theory also includes legitimacy in the observation and views it as the result of 
organisational activities in fulfilling rationalised myths by delivering appropriate 
responses. 
Within public sector accounting and management research, institutional perspectives 
have been successfully used to explore the socially constructed process of adopting a 
new system (Furusten, 2013). The development of institutional research confirms that 
the adoption of new management practices is not solely dependent on economic 
efficiency. It also depends on cultural and political processes to maintain and achieve 
legitimacy (Pilcher, 2011). The concepts discussed in this chapter will be used to 
develop the research instruments and explain the research findings. The findings will be 
applied in the discussion chapter to construct specific contributions to the literature. The 
objective is to examine the adoption of SAKIP in ILGs, and the relationship between 
the use of SAKIP and ILGs’ organisational learning capabilities, by employing a 
framework driven by institutional theory. In summary, institutional theory is suitable 
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and justified to explain phenomena of Indonesian local government management 
accounting reform, where ILGs need to conform to expectations of acceptable practices. 
3.15.1 Prior studies on institutional theory and management control systems 
There has been a significant body of literature that explores the adoption of new MCSs 
through the lens of institutional theory. Arnaboldi et al. (2010) studied the adoption of 
managerial innovations in the Italian public sector. Institutional theory is used in their 
case study to understand factors influencing the use of new managerial innovations. 
They found the importance of mobilizing various dimension of power during a 
managerial innovation. It is also essential for organisational actors and key individuals 
to be able to understand the meaning of the proposed system and to communicate it 
throughout the organisation. Failure to make sense of new managerial practices may 
lead to technical shortcomings, such as inadequate information systems, confused 
planning, and lack of commitment and shared objectives. It may also lead a managerial 
innovation to fail or evolve into another form of formality. 
Modell (2008) examined the evolutional process of the interaction between strategic 
management accounting and management control practices in shaping strategy 
formation in a Swedish central government agency. That study is mainly based on 
empirical research and archival data related to governance reforms in the Swedish 
government. Institutional theory is employed to explain the contribution of external and 
political regulations to cultivate consequences and impacts on organisational practices. 
Modell (2012b) found that government agencies tend to comply with institutional 
pressures exercised by dominant constituents. Changing institutional pressures and 
actions from diverse organisational actors have caused agencies to closely link their 
strategy with government regulations. As a result, the meaning of the agencies’ strategy 
has been narrowed.  
Kasperskaya (2008) conducted a comparative study in the implementation of a new 
managerial model in two Spanish city councils. Kasperkaya (2008) found that new 
managerial innovations have a greater chance of getting managerial acceptance when 
the innovations are flexible and linked with the organisation’s current practices. When 
experiencing pressure to change, organisations may use different tactics even though 
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they are facing similar stimuli. Kasperskaya (2008) concluded that efficiency and 
legitimacy were the main reasons for the city councils to adopt the new model. 
Ma and Tayles (2009) conducted a case study to explore the process of management 
accounting change and the adoption of strategic management accounting in a medical 
technology company. The study employed institutional theory to investigate the 
relationship between organisational contexts and organisational actions during the 
process of management accounting change. It found that strong external pressures from 
the organisation’s environment did not necessarily create similar management 
accounting changes across similar organisations. Institutional theory suggests that 
diverse interests within an organisation and repositioning key actors are also important 
factors in the successful adoption of new strategic management accounting.  
3.16 Summary 
Institutional theory is the foundation of the theoretical framework in this study. The 
factors that can influence the adoption and utilisation of SAKIP by ILGs and how it 
may impact ILGs’ ability to learn are demonstrated in a theoretical schema. The factors 
hypothesised as predictors of the adoption of SAKIP are external pressure, internal 
pressure, facilitator, and barriers. The size and location of ILG that could also impact 
the adoption and utilisation of SAKIP are considered as control variables. The 
hypotheses that will be investigated in the survey and interviews stages are presented in 
this chapter.  
The theoretical framework discussed in this chapter guides the subsequent research 
processes: research methodology (Chapter Four), quantitative result and analysis 
(Chapter Five), qualitative results and analysis (Chapter Six), and discussion of the 
results (Chapter Seven). 
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 Research Methodology Chapter 4:
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research approaches, design and 
methodology used to collect and analyse the data in this study. The chapter is organised 
into six sections. The next section 4.2 briefly explains the research design adopted in 
this study. It also describes the justification for selecting local government senior 
officers (SO) and other senior executives as the questionnaire survey respondents and 
semi-structured interview participants. Section 4.3 discusses the different stages of 
questionnaire development and distribution. The section also describes the statistical 
methods used to analyse the quantitative data. Section 4.4 discusses the qualitative part 
of the research, including the procedures used to determine interview participants, the 
design of the interview, and the evaluation of the results. Section 4.5 presents ethical 
considerations taken into account in both quantitative and qualitative data collection. 
Finally, section 4.6 summarises the chapter. 
4.2 Research Method 
This thesis is conducted under the pragmatist research paradigm. A paradigm affects the 
study and interpretation of knowledge gained from a research (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994). The pragmatist research paradigm combined features from the two most 
prevalent research paradigms in accounting research, the positivist and interpretivist 
research paradigm. Ontologically, the proponents of positivism view a phenomenon as a 
reality that should be independent from the researcher. At the same time, the proponents 
of interpretism underline the construction of social reality through human interactions 
that bring multiple perspectives. Epistemologically, positivist gains knowledge by 
applying a deductive approach to measure phenomena and generalise inferences whilst 
interpretivist acquires one by relating with the social interaction within a phenomenon. 
Methodoligically, positivist utilises a deductive approach to study the reality 
assumptions by: (1) analysing quantitative data; (2) formulating a hypothesis; and (3) 
testing its reliability and predictability (Bryman, 2012; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). 
Typicaly, positivist uses a survey as an instrument to collect data and deduce inferences. 
Interpretivism paradigm requires researchers to: (1) listen to research participants’ 
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perception obtained from interviews, (2) actively interpret a process within a social 
phenomenon and (3) continue open for different viewpoint (Leppäaho, Plakoyiannaki, & 
Dimitratos, 2015).    
The thesis adopted a mixed-methods approach by incorporating elements of both 
quantitative and qualitative research. Creswell, Plano Clark, Gutmann, and Hanson 
(2003, p. 212) described mixed-methods research as “the collection or analysis of both 
quantitative and/or qualitative data in a single study in which the data are collected 
concurrently or sequentially, are given priority, and involve the integration of the data at 
one or more stages in the process of research”. The quantitative element will be 
performed through a questionnaire to investigate the relationship among MCS adoption, 
utilisation and other variables; and to explain the extent and nature of relationships in 
research variables (Van der Stede, Mark Young, and Xiaoling Chen, 2006). The 
qualitative research will be used to examine inconclusive questionnaire findings and to 
validate the measurement of constructs (Bobe, 2012). 
The combined qualitative and quantitative approach, known as mixed-method research, 
is used because the quantitative research is able to expose causal relationships among 
events and observed variables but is not fully able to provide further insight  such as 
motivational aspects or institutional pressures  involved in the causal relationship 
(Plano Clark and Creswell, 2007).  
The mixed-method approach has gained increasing recognition in empirical 
management accounting research for the following reasons. First, combining both 
methods will provide a better understanding of a research issue (Creswell and Plano 
Clark, 2011). Second, employing the qualitative approach will provide a more holistic 
contextual understanding of the survey and explain inconsistencies raised from the 
survey results (Modell, 2005). The qualitative method can provide an insider’s 
perspective on the outcomes found by the quantitative method. Third, triangulating 
quantitative and qualitative methods can enhance the validity of the research and 
minimise the biases inherent to any single method (Modell, 2005). Therefore, the 
approach of establishing quantitative methods complemented with elements of 
qualitative methods can improve the credibility of results, since the strengths of one 
approach counterbalance the weaknesses of the other (Modell, 2005). In order to answer 
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the research questions (RQ 1 to RQ 4), this thesis used the quantitative data collected by 
a nation-wide survey. The quantitative findings were followed up through in-depth 
interviews with local government senior officials, senior officials from the MSAEBR, 
and government auditors. 
4.3 Phase 1: The quantitative stage 
This research initially used the term LAKIP in the research proposal and survey 
questionnaire to refer to both the performance report and the management control 
system in ILGs. The main reason was because the regulations and guidelines prior to PR 
No.29/2014 did not provide a clear distinction between the two. For example, when the 
MSAEBR evaluated the agencies’ LAKIP report, they focused both on the content of 
the report and on the implementation of the system. In the research proposal, the 
explanation regarding the use of LAKIP as the system was provided. In the 
questionnaire, the term LAKIP was used to describe the report (stating as = LAKIP 
report) and the system (stating as = LAKIP system) in the questions. In the pilot study 
of the survey instruments, the use of LAKIP that refer to the system was clarified. The 
survey was conducted in the beginning of 2014 before the PR No.29/2014 that clarifies 
the role and purpose of SAKIP system for government agencies was issued. The rest of 
this thesis will only use SAKIP when it refers to the management control system in 
ILGs. 
4.3.1 The questionnaire survey  
The main objectives of the survey were to: 
 Investigate the adoption of a centralistic management control system 
(LAKIP/SAKIP) by local governments in Indonesia (RQ1); 
 Examine the relationship between the diagnostic and interactive use of 
LAKIP/SAKIP and organisational learning in ILGs (RQ2); 
 Establish a framework for adopting and implementing a management control 
system (MCS) in the public sector to facilitate effective practice (RQ4); 
 Recruit voluntary participants from ILGs for a further data collection process 
(interview in phase two of the study). 
The questionnaire was comprised of the following three sections: 
1. Section A: Performance reports produced and used in ILGs. 
This section included seven questions relating to the type of performance reports 
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produced and used by ILGs. 
2. Section B: Independent and dependent variables. 
This section of the questionnaire consisted of 81 questions that were grouped into 
8 major constructs: 
Construct 1.  External Pressures  
Construct 2.  Internal Pressures 
Construct 3.  Facilitator 
Construct 4.  Barriers to Change 
Construct 5.  Adoption  
Construct 6.  Diagnostic Use of SAKIP 
Construct 7.  Interactive Use of SAKIP 
Construct 8.  Organisational Learning 
 
The questions for the constructs were developed from previous studies in the field of 
performance measurement and accountability in public sector organisations. The 
majority of the survey questions were adapted from questionnaires used by Upping 
and Oliver (2011) and Widener (2007). Some modifications to the original questions 
were made to adapt it to the context of this thesis. The questionnaire consisted of 
closed questions that measured responses on a five-point Likert scale.  
3. Section C: Demographics. 
This section included nine questions relating to demographic information about the 
ILG respondents. The purpose of section C was to provide information about: (1) 
the performance management preparer, (2) the type of the ILG, (3) Gender, (4) 
respondents study and training experiences, and (5) experience and length of service 
of the respondent. 
4.3.2 The translation of the survey instrument 
All the questions in the questionnaire were directly translated into Bahasa Indonesia. 
To ensure the accuracy of the translation, the questionnaire was reviewed by three 
Indonesian post-graduate students who studied at Curtin University prior to the pilot 
test. During the pilot testing, participants were also asked to verify the quality of the 
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translated questionnaire. 
4.3.3 Pilot study of the survey instrument 
The pilot study of the survey instrument was conducted with two accounting professors 
and five senior government audit officers for clarity, ambiguity, understand-ability, 
relevance and face validity. The survey instrument was tested to verify that the 
questions were valid, reliable and construed as planned. The pilot study also included 
discussion sessions. The information gained from the sessions is essential for obtaining 
valuable feedback and to ensure all necessary information for the survey would be 
captured. Minor changes in the expression of some items in order to correlate with ILGs’ 
context and terminology were made based on feedback during those processes.  
4.3.4 Distribution of the questionnaire 
The population of this research was all ILGs, consisting of 530 ILG officers. A package 
containing the questionnaire, a cover letter, a participant information sheet, a consent 
form, and an endorsement letter was distributed to 33 provincial, 399 district and 98 city 
offices at the beginning of April 2014. Respondents were given four weeks to complete 
and return the survey for the following reasons: 
1. The survey participants were located in a large and geographically dispersed area 
of 1,904,569 sq km with a population of 250 million.  
2. Indonesia had a general election on April 9, 2014. Due to heightened political 
tension, horizontal conflicts between political supporters were common, especially 
in rural areas. Therefore, ILGs required more time to complete the questionnaire 
because their main priority at the time of the survey’s distribution was to maintain 
the peace and security in their area of administration. 
3. PT. Pos Indonesia was the only mail courier company that could provide service 
network to more than 17,000 islands throughout Indonesia. Therefore, the 
researcher relied solely on PT. Pos Indonesia’s service for the distribution and 
return of the questionnaire. 
4.3.5 Independent variable constructs 
The main body of the survey comprised independent and dependent variable constructs. 
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Constructs 1 to 4 were independent variables adapted from Luder’s model, as modified 
by Upping and Oliver (2011). The adapted model was used to identify internal and 
external factors that act as catalysts for, and influence the implementation of, accounting 
change in organisations. It incorporated motivators, barriers, and facilitators of change 
to better understand the likelihood and purpose of change. Upping and Oliver (2011) re-
classified the variables into: (1) external pressures, (2) internal pressures, (3) facilitators 
of change, (4) barriers to change. 
4.3.5.1 Construct 1: external pressures 
The external pressures construct is a reflective construct. The construct was used to 
measure organisational factors that can shape the process of change. The construct 
consisted of six questions drawn from Upping and Oliver (2011) and modified to suit 
the local governments’ context and the specifics of SAKIP-related regulations. 
Questions 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2e asked respondents to identify pressures from the external 
organisational environment, such as economic crisis, new regulation and political 
competition. Questions 2d and 2e asked respondents to identify pressures from external 
users of information. Questions in the external pressures construct were designed to test 
the hypothesis H1, which investigated the positive relationship between external 
organisational factors on an ILGs’ decision to adopt SAKIP as tools to clarify, assess, 
and communicate program achievement. 
4.3.5.2 Construct 2: internal pressures 
The internal pressures construct is a reflective construct. The construct was designed to 
measure factors from within organisations that could lead to and motivate a change in 
the organisation (Upping and Oliver, 2011, 2012). Construct 2 of the questionnaire 
comprised 12 questions drawn from Upping and Oliver (2011) and modified to suit the 
ILG context and government-related regulations. Questions 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3f, 3i, 3j, 3k, 
and 3l asked respondents to identify pressures from their internal organisational 
environment, such as attitudes towards change, consistency, system openness, 
budgetary pressures, change in key leadership positions, change in top management 
policy, or change in the power dynamics of the organisation (Upping and Oliver, 2012). 
Questions 3e, 3g, and 3h asked respondents to identify pressures from internal users of 
information, such as the mayor or the regent of an Indonesian local government. 
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Questions in the internal pressures construct were designed to test the hypothesis H2, 
which investigated the positive relationship between internal pressures and the adoption 
of SAKIP. 
4.3.5.3 Construct 3: facilitators of change 
The facilitators of change construct is a reflective construct. The construct was used to 
measure factors that bring direct influence on a successful change or reform. Construct 
3 consisted of 13 questions drawn from Upping and Oliver (2011). All questions were 
designed to identify actors that allow the change to progress. Questions 4b and 4e asked 
respondents to identify people or organisations that foster the adoption of a new 
technique because they have a special interest in the targeted organisation. Questions 4a, 
4f, 4g, and 4m asked respondents to identify bureaucratic actors responsible for 
providing financial and performance-related information to the users (Christensen, 
2002; Upping and Oliver, 2011). Questions 4c, 4d, 4h, 4i, 4j, 4k, and 4l identified 
knowledge transfer elements that facilitate change, including training, seminars, 
publications, technology, and allocated staff resources. Questions in the facilitators of 
change construct were used in the testing of hypothesis H3. This hypothesis examined 
the positive relationship between facilitators of change and the adoption of SAKIP. 
4.3.5.4 Construct 4: barriers to change 
The barriers to change construct is a reflective construct. The construct was used to 
measure features of the public sector that hinder, delay, or prevent change (Upping and 
Oliver, 2011). Some examples of barriers of change are differences in value systems, 
insufficient commitment, lack of necessary knowledge and skills, or conflicting ethos 
(Upping and Oliver, 2011). Harun and Robinson (2010) defined barriers as features of 
political and bureaucratic environments that impede an initiative. Construct 4 consisted 
of 13 questions drawn from Upping and Oliver (2011). The questions in construct 4 
were the opposite of those in construct 3. The questions in the barriers of change 
construct were used in the testing of hypothesis H4. This hypothesis examined the 
negative relationship between barriers of changes and the adoption of SAKIPs. 
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4.3.6 Dependent variable constructs 
4.3.6.1 Construct 5: adoption of SAKIP 
The adoption of SAKIP is a formative construct. The construct was designed to measure 
the extent of SAKIP implementation in ILGs; including the use of SAKIP to measure 
ILGs’ programs and manage the results. The MSAEBR has issued a series of SAKIP 
guidelines that help ILG managers to not only clarify the purpose and intended results 
of a program but also to assess a program’s intention and to communicate its 
achievements (Akbar et al., 2012). Construct 5 consisted of six questions derived from 
previous literature to measure the extent to which managers use tools, methods, and 
techniques available in an MCS to measure and manage performance (Bouckaert and 
Halligan, 2008; Li, 2008; Oliveira and Martins, 2011; Teo, Wei, and Benbasat, 2003). 
The questions in the adoption of SAKIP construct were used in the testing of hypothesis 
H5. This hypothesis examined the relationship between the adoption of SAKIP and its 
diagnostic and interactive use. The questions in the adoption of SAKIP construct were 
used in the testing of the hypotheses H5a and H5b. These hypotheses examined the 
relationship between the adoption of SAKIP and the diagnostic and interactive use of 
SAKIP. 
4.3.6.2 Construct 6: diagnostic controls 
The diagnostic controls construct is a reflective construct. This construct was used to 
measure the use of SAKIP to signal, communicate, and monitor the achievement of an 
ILG’s critical success factors. Construct 6 consisted of 12 questions drawn from 
Widener (2007) and modified to suit Indonesia’s context and government-related 
regulations. All questions asked respondents to identify the use of SAKIP in a single-
loop learning where managers modify their actions in a way that does not result in 
fundamental change (Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Kloot, 1995).  
4.3.6.3 Construct 7: interactive controls 
The interactive controls construct is a reflective construct. The construct was designed to 
measure the use of selected measures in SAKIP by ILG managers in order to find out 
the strategic meaning and consequences of the measures (Tuomela, 2005). Construct 7 
consisted of seven questions drawn from Widener (2007) and modified into Indonesia’s 
context and government-related regulations. All questions asked respondents to identify 
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the use of SAKIP to improve the quality of strategic management and to increase 
commitment to strategic targets.  
The questions in the diagnostic and interactive constructs were used in the testing of the 
hypothesis H6. This hypothesis examined the relationship between: (1) the diagnostic 
use of SAKIP and the organisation’s orientation to learning; (2) the interactive use of 
SAKIP and the organisation’s orientation to learning; (3) the interactive and the 
diagnostic use of SAKIP. 
4.3.6.4 Construct 8: organisational learning 
The organisational learning construct is a reflective construct. The construct was used to 
measure organisational ability to detect problems and determine solutions in a changing 
environment (Henri, 2006; Kloot, 1995). Construct 8 consisted of 12 questions drawn 
from López, Peón, and Ordás (2004) and modified into Indonesia’s context and 
government-related regulations. Questions 9a, 9b, and 9c asked respondents to identify 
the ILGs’ orientation to acquiring knowledge. Questions 9d, 9e, and 9f identified the 
ILGs’ orientation to distributing knowledge. Questions 9g, 9h, and 9i asked respondents 
to identify the ILGs’ orientation to interpreting knowledge. Questions 9j, 9k, and 9l 
identified the ILGs’ ability to maintain organisational memory.  
The variables measured by the questionnaire and the source of instruments used to 
measure them are summarised in Appendix 2. 
4.3.7 Preliminary analysis of the questionnaire 
The thesis conducted preliminary analysis of the questionnaire data prior to analysing 
the measurement model in order to minimise any distortions due to missing data, 
unengaged responses, and non-response bias. The more detailed procedures are 
described further below. 
4.3.7.1 Data accuracy and missing data 
The accuracy of the questionnaire data were maintained throughout the process of 
entering questioner information into the data set. Any missing and extreme values were 
reviewed and corrected accordingly. Furthermore, the pattern of missing values was 
examined and any missing values from independent and dependent variables were 
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imputed with the median value of the corresponding construct. The review of the data 
found 14 missing data at random from four respondents. 
4.3.7.2 Unengaged response 
Unengaged response may occur when respondents give answers with the same values to 
all given questions. Since the thesis used Likert-type scales questions to measure the 
independent and dependent variables, an analysis of standard deviation of all latent 
variables was conducted to identify unengaged responses. An extremely low standard 
deviation value was used as an indicator to identify unengaged respondents. The review 
of the data found no unengaged responses from the respondents. 
4.3.8 Analysis of the quantitative data 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) was selected as the statistical tool used to analyse 
the sets of hypotheses associated with relationships between the use of SAKIP and the 
organisational capabilities in ILG, and the relationship between the adoption of SAKIP 
and its influence on how ILG managers use SAKIP. One major advantage of SEM is 
that it is able to model abstract constructs that are comprised of observed variables and 
at the same time able to analyse causal relationships among unobserved (latent) 
variables (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). SEM also allows the modelling and analysis of 
multiple relationships simultaneously and discloses the significance of each of the 
relationships between the variables (Baines and Langfield-Smith, 2003; Tucker et al., 
2008).  
This thesis particularly employed partially least square-structural equation modelling 
(PLS-SEM) to analyse both the measurement and structural model of the causal 
networks between independent and dependent variable constructs in the hypotheses. 
The strength and benefit of PLS technique have been acknowledged in management 
information system, strategic management, marketing and management research. Hair et 
al. (2011, p. 139) stated that “SEM has become a quasi-standard in marketing and 
management research” and PLS-SEM path modelling is very useful in “estimating 
causal models in many theoretical models and empirical data situations”. PLS-SEM is a 
causal modeling approach that aims at maximizing the explained variance of the 
dependent latent constructs. Lowry and Gaskins (2014, p. 123) stated that PLS-SEM 
“can provide much value for causal inquiry in communication-related and behavioral 
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research fields”. Akter, Fosso Wamba and Dewan (2017, p. 20) provided an empirical 
illustration showing the PLS-SEM suitability in estimating a complex model. Akter et 
al. (2017, p. 20) concluded that PLS-SEM technique is very useful in “developing and 
validating complex models”, “capturing reality”, or “reflecting the true parameters in 
the study”. The PLS-SEM was selected for the following reasons: 
1. The hypothesised structural model had a formative construct (i.e., adoption of 
SAKIP); 
2. PLS-SEM was able to simultaneously estimate parameters and path coefficient 
among constructs;   
3.  PLS-SEM could handle a complex structural model; 
4. It accepted non-normal data to some extent; 
5. It allowed a relatively low sample size; 
6. The latent variable scores would be used in subsequent analyses. 
 
Therefore, PLS–SEM was used as the main tool to achieve the research objectives, test 
the hypotheses, and provide answers to the research questions. This procedure included 
the use of SmartPLS 2.0 software in evaluating the hypothesised relationship between 
exogenous and endogenous variables, and in testing the significance of the path 
coefficients.  
4.3.8.1 Reliability 
Reliability refers to a measurement model that is able to reach consistent measurement 
results when the model is re-applied on the same subjects and under the same 
conditions. In order to avoid a measurement error on the reflective measurement model, 
the study conducted construct reliability and validity assessments for the measurement 
models. Reliability assessments consist of two elements: internal consistency reliability 
and indicator reliability. Internal consistency reliability refers to the consistency of the 
assigned indicators in measuring a construct (Hair, Ringle, and Sarstedt, 2011). It 
accumulatively assesses the strength of associated indicators within the same construct. 
The thesis used the value of 0.7 as the minimum acceptable threshold for composite 
reliability.  
Indicator reliability refers to the square root of the correlation between an indicator and 
its latent variables (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). The thesis used an indicator 
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reliability loading of 0.7 as the minimum acceptable threshold for indicator reliability. 
Items that did not meet the minimum reliability threshold would be removed from the 
measurement model. 
4.3.8.2 Validity 
Validity assessments for a reflective measurement model also consist of two tests, 
which are a convergent validity test and a discriminant validity test. Convergent validity 
refers to the degree a latent variable can explain its indicators’ variance (Hair et al., 
2011). Convergent validity is examined through the average variance extracted (AVE). 
An AVE score of 0.50 and higher ensures that the latent variable explains 50% of the 
indicator reflective variables variances. Therefore, this thesis used an AVE score of 0.5 
as the minimum acceptable threshold for convergent validity. Discriminant validity 
refers to the degree to which the latent variable of a construct is not related to other 
constructs (Hulland, 1999). Discriminant validity is examined by using two measures: 
(1) the Fornell-Larcker criterion and (2) cross loadings scores (Hair et al., 2011). 
4.4 Qualitative Stage 
This research exercised the mixed-methods sequential explanatory design that started 
with the quantitative method and was followed by the qualitative method. This design 
started with quantitative data collection and analysis. The statistical results and analysis 
from the quantitative phase were used to describe the characteristics of the data and 
provide a general understanding of the research problem. Following the quantitative 
phase, the qualitative method was conducted with 20 participants. The qualitative 
method explores participants’ thoughts and views in more depth, particularly regarding 
institutional pressures surrounding the relationship between the adoption and utilisation 
of SAKIP, and organisational learning. The qualitative data was collected by conducting 
semi-instructed interviews with ILG senior officials. The interview questions were 
developed to explain and interpret findings from the quantitative analysis. The results 
from the qualitative phase were used to refine and elaborate the statistical findings 
obtained from the quantitative phase. The findings from the combined methods provide 
corroborated and comprehensive research analysis. 
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4.4.1 Addressing reliability and validity 
Given the different natures of quantitative and qualitative studies, the approaches to 
address the issues of validity and reliability in the qualitative phase were adjusted and 
modified. Reliability in the qualitative phase refers to the consistency of the results. 
This was achieved through the utilisation of consistent data collection procedures, 
appropriate interview methodologies, and transparent reporting of findings. Validity in 
the qualitative phase refers to methodological efforts to provide an accurate picture of 
the participants’ view by organizing a credible inquiry process. The validity of the 
qualitative phase was addressed by (1) preparing interview questions that reflect the 
results of the quantitative analysis, (2) applying a consistent meaning for the concepts 
being studied with the concepts in the quantitative phase, such as organisational 
learning, diagnostic use, interactive use, and MCS, and (3) applying a purposive 
sampling that aimed to represent the diversity of ILG characteristics.   
4.4.2 Sample selection 
Most ILGs are located in the five major islands in Indonesia, namely Sumatera, Jawa, 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua, with fewer ILGs located in smaller islands, such as 
Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Timor, or Maluku islands. In the quantitative phase, the survey 
was distributed to 33 provincial, 399 district, and 98 city offices. From the 530 surveys 
mailed, 112 respondents indicated their willingness to participate in an interview. Since 
the main focus in the qualitative phase was to gain a deeper understanding regarding the 
utilisation of SAKIP and its impact on organisational learning, the selection of the 
interviewees considered the diversity of Indonesia’s population characteristics. A 
purposive sample was used to select 20 participants that represented the types of ILGs 
(Province, Districts, and Cities) and each major island in Indonesia.  
All interviewees were considered to be knowledgeable participants with sufficient 
working experience in local governments. By accommodating views from various 
locations and types of ILGs, the qualitative phase would capture the maximum variation 
of ILG views regarding SAKIP adoption and enhance the understanding of the impact 
of SAKIP on organisational learning. 
4.4.3 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to explore ILG senior officials’ 
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thoughts toward the adoption and use of SAKIP in their institutions. The questions in 
the interview were structured to meet the research objectives by exploring the pre-
determined research themes. At the same time, the semi-structured interviews allowed 
the researcher to further investigate variations in the respondents’ opinions and 
explanations that were still within the scope of the research objectives (Patton, 2002). 
By asking reflective, SAKIP-related questions, the respondents’ experiences regarding 
ILGs values and behaviour toward SAKIP could emerge and be interpreted.  
The interviews were used to explore and provide explanations of the results of the 
quantitative findings. The interview questions were guided by were developed based on 
what you find of the survey data. The model of the questions  the research of (Askim, 
2002; López et al., 2004; López, Peón, and Ordás, 2006). Qualitative data collection 
was accomplished by conducting face-to-face or phone interviews. Face-to-face 
interviews were conducted on the work premises of the interviewees. Phone interviews 
were conducted for ILGs located in areas where face-to-face interviewing would be 
very expensive and take too much time. All interviews were audiotaped with permission 
gained from every participant.  
Prior to the interviews, selected participants were contacted to arrange the interview 
appointments. The appointments were drawn to meet participants’ schedules and to 
allow them to provide information without any time pressures. During the interview, 
participants were provided with a copy of a participant information statement and 
consent form that emphasised the promise of complete confidentiality of the 
participant’s identity. They were also reminded about the voluntary nature of the 
interview session and that they would be informed about the results of the study. For the 
telephone interviews, verbal consent was recorded before the interview commenced.  
Participants were asked a set of prearranged questions about their experiences and 
perceptions toward the use of SAKIP. Some of the questions gave participants 
opportunity to explain in greater depth. By asking open-ended questions, the interviews 
would provide significant meaning and explanations of findings from the closed 
questions in the quantitative phase. On average, the interview was conducted for 5060 
minutes. Interview participants were asked to review any notes taken from the face-to-
face interviews to ensure the accuracy of reported findings. All interviews were 
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subsequently transcribed into text data. The data transcripts were coded into sub-
categories, categories, and finally themes. All transcript texts were directly translated 
into English. In order to ensure that the transcripts were accurately translated, the 
translations were reviewed by an English-speaking academic and a PhD student from 
Indonesia. 
Thematic content analysis was used to analyse and interpret the qualitative data. The 
interview transcripts were manually examined and patterns that emerged from the 
participants’ responses were categorised into several main concepts. Subsequently, the 
main concepts were developed and grouped into meaningful common themes. After 
analysing the interview transcripts, the responses of the ILG senior officers were 
organised and focused on the following common themes: 
1. Factors affecting the adoption of SAKIP; 
2. SAKIP as a source of information; 
3. SAKIP as a source of discussion; 
4. SAKIP as a tool to distribute information; 
5. SAKIP and organisational memory in ILGs. 
4.5 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical considerations were taken into account in both quantitative and qualitative data 
collections. The surveys and the semi-structured interviews used to collect data in order 
to address the research questions were subjected to ethics clearance by Curtin 
University. To ensure confidentiality, the signed agreement to participate in the 
interview was returned under a separate cover from the completed survey. The research 
 both survey and interview phase  were conducted according to ethical requirements 
stipulated by Curtin University. The application for ethical approval for a research 
project involving humans was completed as part of the ethics approval process and the 
approval was granted. At all times during and after the study, no identifiers will be used 
– again ensuring complete confidentiality. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented the research design used to test the hypotheses drawn in 
Chapter Three. In order to expose causal relationships among observed variables and to 
identify institutional pressures involved in the causal relationship, the study adopted a 
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mixed-methods approach by incorporating elements of both quantitative and qualitative 
research. In the quantitative phase, a survey was conducted with data analysed using 
statistical procedures. The quantitative element was performed through a questionnaire 
to investigate the relationships among MCS adoption, utilisation, and other variables. 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) was selected as the statistical tool used to analyse 
the sets of hypotheses associated with relationships between the use of SAKIP and the 
organisational capabilities in ILG, and the relationship between the adoption of SAKIP 
and its influence on how ILG managers use SAKIP. 
The quantitative phase was followed by the qualitative research, which examined 
inconclusive questionnaire findings and validated the measurement of constructs. The 
qualitative method explored participants’ thoughts and views in more depth, particularly 
regarding institutional pressures surrounding the relationship between the adoption and 
utilisation of SAKIP, and organisational learning. The qualitative data was collected by 
conducting semi-structured interviews with 20 ILG senior officials. A purposive sample 
was used to select participants that represented the types of ILGs (Provinces, Districts, 
and Cities) and that represented at least two ILGs in each major island in Indonesia. By 
accommodating views from various locations and types of ILG, the qualitative phase 
captured the maximum variation of ILG views regarding SAKIP adoption and enhanced 
the understanding of the impact of SAKIP on organisational learning. 
 
   
 Page 105 of 255 
 
 Quantitative Results and Analysis Chapter 5:
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the research methodology adopted in the current study. It 
defined the approaches and design used to collect and analyse the data in the study. It 
also described the justification for selecting the mail survey’s respondents and semi-
structured interview participants. This chapter presents a description and analysis of the 
data obtained from the mail questionnaire survey. It utilises partial least square – 
structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM) regression to test the hypotheses of the 
current study. The evaluation of the proposed structural model was conducted by using 
the SmartPLS 2.0 statistical computer program. SmartPLS is used to test the 
significance of the path coefficients from each hypothesised relationship.  
The chapter is organised into five sections. Section 5.2 provides preliminary analysis of 
the questionnaire, followed by the measurement model analysis in section 5.3. Analysis 
of the structural model will be presented in section 5.4, and section 5.5 will summarise 
the chapter. 
5.2 Preliminary Analysis of the Questionnaire 
5.2.1 Response rate 
The surveys were sent to ILG officials who are responsible for SAKIP reporting. From 
the 530 surveys mailed, a total of 175 were returned. This resulted in a response rate of 
33.02%. Table 5.1 presents the distribution of responses from the survey. The table 
shows that the response rates from provinces, districts, and cities were 7.43%, 68.57%, 
and 24% respectively, thus providing a good representation of the population. A 
comparison based on location also shows a good representation of the population. The 
response rate from in-Java and out-of-Java respondents was 25.71% and 74.29% 
respectively, also showing a similarity with the population proportion. 
Due to the low responses from non-SAKIP-adapter respondents, ten responses from 
ILGs identified as non-SAKIP-adapter were excluded. Therefore, 165 responses 
(31.13%) were used for further analysis. The response rate met the minimum accepted 
mail survey rate of 30% as suggested by Cooper and Schindler (2008). The response 
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rate also exceeded three suggested rules of thumb for PLS-Structural Equation 
Modelling (PLS-SEM) minimum sample size. First, the sample size exceeded the 
minimum sample size of 100 responses suggested by (Kline, 2005). Second, the sample 
size exceeded the ‘ten times the largest number of formative indicators used’ rules (Hair 
et al., 2011). Third, the sample size was also above ten times the largest number of 
structural paths of a particular latent construct in the structural model (Hair et al., 2011).  
Table 5.1: Distribution of responses 
 Sent (457) Received (175)  
Response RateFrequency % Frequency % 
Location  
118 
 
22.26 
 
45 
 
25.71 
 
38.14 In Java 
Out of Java 412 77.4 130 74.29 31.55 
Total 530 100 175 100  
  Type      
Province 33 
399 
6.23 
75.28 
13 
120 
7.43 
68.57 
39.39 
30.08 Districts 
Cities 98 18.49 42 24.00 43.86 
Total 530 100 175 100 33.02 
 
A chi-squared (goodness of fit) test was also conducted to determine whether the 
frequency of respondents to the survey was representative of the target population.  The 
chi-squared (goodness of fit) test results for the frequency distribution of actual 
compared to expected level of respondents by location (in Java and out of Java) and 
type (Province, Districts and Cities) are both below the recommended X² critical value 
of 3.841 and 5.991 and above the significance level of .05.  A chi-squared result of X² 
of 1.204 and p of 0.273 for location and X² of 4.323 and p of 0.116 for type would 
indicate that the sample is highly representative of the target population. 
5.2.2 Non-response bias 
Identifying and measuring non-response bias is important for a study to have a 
generalizable research result. The issue of non-response bias occurs when answers from 
a non-respondent group are systematically different than ones from respondent groups. 
Non-response bias can be investigated by comparing early and late respondents (see 
Table 5.2 for questionnaire return date). In order to assess non-response bias, this study 
compared 70 early returned questionnaires with 16 respondents returned in the fourth 
week after the deadline, using the Mann-Whitney test. Table 5.3 provides the results 
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from the test. 
Table 5.2: Questionnaires’ return date 
   Period of return Frequency Percentage of Responses 
Before 25th of April 2014 70 40% 
First week after the 25th  32 18% 
Second week after the 25th 49 28% 
Third week after the 25th  8 5% 
Fourth week after the 25th  16 9% 
 
Table 5.3: Mann-Whitney test results 
Variables Time of Response Mean Rank Sig. (2-tailed) 
External pressures 1 42.84 0.804 
2 41.25 
Internal pressures 1 42.02 0.729 
2 44.28 
Facilitator 1 41.42 0.437 
2 46.44 
Barriers 1 44.01 0.277 
2 36.97 
Adoption of SAKIP 1 41.70 0.880 
2 40.74 
Diagnostic use 1 42.61 0.939 
2 42.11 
Interactive use 1 43.55 0.450 
 2 38.67  
Learning 1 40.51 0.151 
2 49.81
Legend: 1= Before 25th April 2014, 2= After 17th May 2014 
 
Table 5.3 shows that there were no statistically significant differences between early 
and late respondents for all construct variables; i.e., external pressures, internal 
pressures, facilitator, barriers, adoption, diagnostic use, interactive use, and learning. 
The result, therefore, supports the absence of significant non-response bias of the study. 
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5.2.3 Demographic characteristics 
The demographic characteristics of the respondents are summarised in Table 5.4. As 
discussed in the previous section, the questionnaires were addressed to senior officials 
responsible for SAKIP reporting. The majority of respondents in this category (52.1%) 
have worked for more than 5 years in the division associated with SAKIP management; 
thus, they possess sufficient knowledge to provide suitable answers to the 
questionnaires. Overall, males were still the majority among the respondents (77.0% vs. 
18.2% for females). The respondents had diverse educational backgrounds, with most of 
the respondents holding a master’s degree (57.0%).  
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Table 5.4: Demographic information of respondents (N=165) 
Characteristic Frequency Percentage 
Government type - Province 13 7.9 
  - District 111 67.3 
  - City 41 24.8 
Location - Sumatera 48 29.1 
  - Jawa 46 27.9 
  - Kalimantan 21 12.7 
  - Sulawesi 25 15.2 
  - Bali NTB 20 12.1 
  - Papua 5 3.0 
Gender - Male 127 77.0 
  - Female 30 18.2 
  - Missing 8 4.8 
Age group - <30 2 1.2 
  - 3040 49 29.7 
  - 4150 67 40.6 
  - >50 38 23.0 
  - Missing 9 5.5 
Education level - Undergraduate 63 38.2 
  - Masters 94 57.0 
  - Phd 3 1.8 
  - Missing 5 3.0 
Field background - Accounting 10 6.1 
  - Management 53 32.1 
  - Public Admin 19 11.5 
  - Others 41 24.8 
  - Missing 42 25.5 
Work experience in 
the division (in 
years)  
- <2 41 24.8 
- 25 29 17.6 
  - 610 28 17.0 
  - 1115 17 10.3 
  - >15 41 24.8 
  - Missing 9 5.5 
Latest training in 
performance mgmt. 
  
  
  
- <2 74 44.8 
- 25 31 19.4 
- 610 17 10.3 
- >15 1 0.6 
- Missing 42 25.5 
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5.2.4 Missing values – construct variables 
The respondent data had 14 construct items that were not completed due to the non-
response of four respondents. The missing values identified from the construct variables 
were as follows: 
1. Adoption 6e had two missing values; 
2. Adoption 6f had one missing values; 
3. All items within the diagnostic construct had one missing value that came from the 
same respondent. 
4. Learning 9b had one missing value. 
 
Since all items in the construct variables were ordinal data measured using a Likert 
scale, this research treated construct variable missing data by imputing the median value 
of each item.  
 
5.2.5 Measurement variables profiles 
5.2.5.1 External pressures 
Based on the sample of 165 ILGs that completed the SAKIP adopter questionnaire, it 
can be seen in Table 5.5 below that that coercive pressures from regulations are the 
main external factors that influence an ILG to adopt SAKIP. On the other hand, public 
pressures from the historic political/economic crises in 1998 is no longer considered as 
the most important factor that drives the ILGs’ decision to adopt SAKIP. This result 
indicates the changing characteristic of coercive pressures in ILGs that is mainly driven 
by rule and regulation. 
Table 5.5: External pressures 
  Mean Median Mode Std. Dev 
Ext pressures from regulation2 4.56 5 5 0.53 
Ext pressures from regulation1 4.55 5 5 0.56 
Ext pressures from the Central Government Ministry 4.37 4 4 0.54 
Ext pressures from budget allocation 4.20 4 4 0.81 
Ext pressures from public 4.12 4 4 0.84 
Ext pressures from 1998 crises 3.71 4 4 0.92 
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5.2.5.2 Internal pressures 
The survey finds that one major internal factor for ILG to adopt SAKIP is to be able to 
provide improved financial and performance information for the purpose of preparing 
the local government strategic planning. Another internal factor that influences ILGs’ 
decision to adopt SAKIP is when top management (Governor or Mayor) is in favour of 
upgrading the control system.  
 
Table 5.6: Internal pressures 
  Mean Median Mode Std. Dev 
Provide improved financial and performance 
information for local government strategic 
planning. 
4.50 5 5 0.65 
Top management of local government 
wanted upgraded systems. 4.40 4 5 0.65 
To provide improved information for 
preparing ILG budgets. 4.35 4 4 0.69 
The need for cost information for 
performance measurement initiatives. 4.23 4 4 0.70 
Need for better performance information to 
anticipate less funding, i.e. from DAU, 
DAK, DBH. 
4.18 4 4 0.87 
Requirement for tighter control of 
expenditure. 4.18 4 4 0.71 
To enable top management to compare 
his/her achievements with other local 
government leaders. 
4.14 4 4 0.75 
To provide information for operational (day-
to-day) decision-making. 4.13 4 4 0.78 
Request from the head of the administrative 
department for cost information. 4.08 4 4 0.84 
Request from the head of each operational 
division (SKPD) for cost information. 4.02 4 4 0.79 
To update an existing system as it was not 
able to meet the information needs of 
external users. 
3.98 4 4 0.81 
Lack of decision-relevant cost information 
from the accounting and budget systems. 3.72 4 4 0.86 
 
On the other hand, ILGs view the existing accounting and budget systems as providing 
adequate cost-related information for decision-making purposes and that SAKIP is not 
the most important source of information for the day-to-day decision-making process. 
This finding may help in explaining the significant numbers of top and operating ILG 
managers who do not pay attention to SAKIP in their daily activities and still require 
specialists to interpret SAKIP. It also may indicate that ILGs’ decision to comply with 
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SAKIP and other centralised reporting requirements were made in order to be seen as 
submitting to central government programs. 
5.2.5.3 Facilitator of change 
The survey finds that ILGs view leaders’ commitment to adopt SAKIP, knowing data 
requirements to perform measurement, adequate resources committed to adopt SAKIP, 
and data collection techniques as major factors in supporting SAKIP adoption.  
The willingness to be perceived as a more accountable ILG by central agencies and 
local stakeholders (the sign of mimetic pressures) is still considered a reason for SAKIP 
adoption. The same applies for a culture and mindset within the ILG that supports 
change (the sign of institutional demand). On the other hand, the use of an external 
consultant (a sign of normative pressures), the level of priority for SAKIP 
implementation, and the clarity of SAKIP’s role in ILGs’ financial management systems 
are considered to be less important as supporting factors in the change process. 
Table 5.7: Facilitators of change 
  Mean Median Mode Std. Dev 
Commitment by top management of local 
government. 4.91 5 5 0.31 
Full understanding and knowledge of data 
requirements. 4.64 5 5 0.53 
Adequate resources committed to adopt SAKIP. 4.64 5 5 0.52 
Full understanding of how to collect data. 4.63 5 5 0.49 
Perceived as a more accountable ILG by central 
agencies and local stakeholders. 4.54 5 5 0.61 
Well-planned training program for employees. 4.53 5 5 0.56 
Necessary culture and mindset within the ILG to 
support change. 4.45 4 5 0.59 
High level of involvement by the MSABR. 4.36 4 4 0.63 
Adequate number of internal staff. 4.31 4 4 0.63 
Clarity of SAKIP’s role in the local government’s 
financial management system. 4.25 4 4 0.77 
High priority given to adopting SAKIP. 4.21 4 4 0.58 
No resistance to the adoption of SAKIP by 
employees. 3.94 4 4 0.84 
Employment of external consultant. 3.48 4 4 0.84 
 
5.2.5.4 Barriers to change 
Interestingly, ILGs also consider a lack of top management commitment and high cost 
of SAKIP implementation as the major barriers in SAKIP adoption. A lack of 
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understanding about data requirements and data collection has also become a barrier for 
ILGs to adopt SAKIP. 
On the other hand, employees’ resistance and culture are considered less important in 
obstructing SAKIP implementation in ILGs. One possible explanation is that SAKIP 
and the implementation of SAKIP are not directly related to an ILG’s technical 
operation  
Table 5.8: Barriers to change 
  Mean Median Mode Std. Dev 
Lack of commitment by top management of local 
governments. 4.21 5 5 1.22 
Lack of understanding and knowledge of data 
requirements. 4.07 4 4 1.04 
Lack of understanding of how to collect data. 4.01 4 4 1.04 
High cost of SAKIP implementation. 3.97 4 4 1.01 
Lack of internal staff to monitor the adoption process. 3.92 4 4 1.01 
Lack of a planned SAKIP training program for 
employees. 3.91 4 4 1.05 
Lack of involvement by the MSABR. 3.89 4 4 1.06 
The opaqueness of SAKIP’s role in the local 
government’s financial management system 3.87 4 4 1.07 
Not being perceived as a more accountable ILG by 
central agencies and local stakeholders. 3.85 4 4 1.13 
SAKIP was given lower priority than other LG 
initiatives. 3.83 4 4 1.07 
Inappropriate culture, custom and mind-set of LG 
employees working within the institution. 3.80 4 4 1.07 
Resistance to SAKIP implementation by employees. 3.52 4 4 1.08 
Lack of external consultant. 3.21 3 4 0.96 
5.2.5.5 Adoption of SAKIP 
Indonesia has also implemented performance-based budgeting in their public sector 
financial management. Under this approach, agencies’ performance is measured not 
only by their output attainment but also outcome achievement. SAKIP is employed with 
the same spirit, emphasizing the capturing and reporting of ILG outcome achievement. 
The jargon of outcome achievement is often used by the MSAEBR in disseminating 
SAKIP to ILGs. Prior to implementing performance-based budgeting, ILGs used the 
traditional incremental budgeting for a long period of time. Most ILGs are still 
practising the traditional budget mechanism while implementing the performance-based 
budget system (Dwiyanto, 2011).  
The survey shows that ILGs view outcomes as a very important aspect in determining 
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their coming year’s budget allocation. ILGs also see that they have some mechanisms 
for validating KPIs used in SAKIP. However, they agree that they have not fully 
implemented a set of criteria for determining good performance indicators. The 
independent review to evaluate the accuracy of information in SAKIP (this is done by 
the MSAEBR or BPKP) may not focus on the quality of KPIs used but by putting more 
emphasis on data and report format. These factors show that ILG  and legislators who 
review ILGs achievement  may not fully understand the concept of performance 
measurement in SAKIP. Therefore, the “outcome” and “output” indicators used in 
SAKIP may not be reliable or valid in measuring their actual achievement. 
Table 5.9: Adoption of SAKIP 
  Mean Median Mode Std. Dev 
The achievement of the current year’s outcome 
indicators is crucial in determining the next year’s 
appropriation level. 
4.48 5 5 0.75 
There is a mechanism to review the validity of 
performance indicators used in SAKIP. 4.39 4 4 0.61 
Review of ILG’s outcome achievement by parliament is 
mainly based on SAKIP. 4.03 4 4 0.82 
The achievement of the current year’s output indicators 
are crucial in determining the next year’s appropriation 
level. 
3.92 4 4 0.99 
There is an independent review that evaluates the 
accuracy of information on SAKIP. 3.72 4 4 0.79 
In determining performance indicators, an ILG has fully 
implemented a set of criteria for good performance 
indicators such as relevance, attribution, timeliness, 
reliability, and verifiability. 
2.80 2 2 1.13 
 
5.2.5.6 Diagnostic controls 
The survey shows that ILG management teams currently rely on performance 
information in SAKIP to review key measures and to develop a common vocabulary in 
the institutional setting for strategy and program priorities. They also use performance 
information in SAKIP to focus on organisational critical success factors, tie the 
institution together, develop a common vocabulary in the institution setting for strategy 
and program priorities, and focus on common issues.  
SAKIP is moderately used for vertical/horizontal discussions, tracking progress towards 
goals, enabling continual challenge and debate of underlying data, assumptions, and 
action plans, and for providing a basis for reward and punishment. 
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Table 5.10: Diagnostic controls 
  Mean Median Mode Std. Dev 
Review key measures. 3.85 4 4 0.95 
Develop a common vocabulary in the institutional setting 
for strategy and program priorities. 3.83 4 4 0.84 
Enable the institution to focus on critical success factors. 3.77 4 4 0.87 
Tie the institution together. 3.76 4 4 0.91 
Enable the institution to focus on common issues. 3.74 4 4 0.94 
Provide a common view of the institution. 3.72 4 4 0.85 
Monitor results. 3.71 4 4 0.93 
Compare outcomes to expectations. 3.66 4 4 0.98 
Enable discussion in meetings of superiors, subordinates 
and peers. 3.61 4 4 0.98 
Track progress towards goals. 3.60 4 4 0.97 
Enable continual challenge and debate of underlying data, 
assumptions, and action plans. 3.41 3 4 0.87 
Provide a basis for implementing reward and punishment 
mechanisms in the institution. 3.28 3 3 1.09 
 
5.2.5.7 Interactive controls 
The interactive use of SAKIP shows that top management pays little attention to SAKIP 
and relies on specialists in preparing and interpreting information from SAKIP. This 
result may show that ILGs’ managers have not used SAKIP interactively even though 
they have formally implemented the system and used SAKIP terminology. This result 
could also indicate that top management have put in significant effort to comply with 
the variety of central government agencies that require similar information, but they fail 
to understand the specific purpose of SAKIP within the ILG technical environment. 
Table 5.11: Interactive controls 
  Mean Med Mode Std. Dev 
Top management holds regular meetings with operating 
managers to discuss performance achievements reported on 
SAKIP. 
4.14 4 4 0.79 
Top management interprets information from SAKIP. 3.93 4 4 0.81 
Operating managers are frequently involved with SAKIP. 3.82 4 4 0.87 
Top management pays daily attention to the information in 
SAKIP. 3.50 4 4 0.91 
Operating managers are involved with SAKIP infrequently and 
on an exception basis. 3.15 4 4 1.19 
Top management relies heavily on staff specialists in preparing 
and interpreting information from SAKIP. 3.01 3 4 1.10 
Top management pays little attention to SAKIP. 2.74 2 2 1.17 
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5.2.5.8 Organisational learning 
The organisational learning variable shows that that all ILGs moderately had the 
procedures and ability to collect, store and distribute information that can be used for 
detecting problems and proposing solutions. Most ILGs had a regular coordination 
meeting routine where information could be shared among ILG managers. 
Table 5.12: Organisational learning 
  Mean Med Mode Std. Dev 
There are extensive formal and informal procedures and processes 
for the acquisition of information and knowledge from internal and 
external sources that are potentially useful to your institution. 
4.17 4 4 0.67 
Meetings are periodically held to inform all employees about the 
latest innovations in the institution. 4.06 4 4 0.76 
Employees share knowledge and experience by talking to each 
other. 4.01 4 4 0.69 
The institution stores information and knowledge from prior 
experience in formal systems (e.g., databases, documentation of 
programs, plans, procedures, and reports). 
3.99 4 4 0.74 
The institution has databases to stock its experience and knowledge 
so as to be able to use them later on. 3.99 4 4 0.74 
New ideas and approaches on work performance are explored 
continuously. 3.98 4 4 0.73 
The institution’s beliefs, attitudes and ways of doing business 
provide a strong basis for interpreting information. 3.93 4 4 0.66 
All members of the institution share the same aim, to which they 
feel committed. 3.93 4 4 0.83 
There are well-established ways to share information and 
knowledge between people within the ILG.  3.87 4 4 0.755 
The institution has directories or emails filed according to the field 
they belong to, so as to find an expert on a concrete issue at any 
time. 
3.87 4 4 0.77 
The institution has formal mechanisms to guarantee the sharing of 
best practice among the different fields of activity. 3.82 4 4 0.81 
The institution encourages its employees to join formal or informal 
networks made up of people from outside the institution. 3.26 3 3 0.86 
 
5.3 Comparison of Indonesian Local Governments 
An initial analysis using descriptive statistics was conducted with results presented here.  
5.3.1 By Government Type 
This section analyses the mean comparison between respondents from cities (urban 
government with typically more dense populations) and districts (rural government with 
less dense populations), as provided in Table 5.13.  
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Table 5.13 Comparison by Government Type 
Variables 
Province 
(n=13) 
City 
(n=41) 
District 
(n=111) 
Total 
(n=165) 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
External Pressures 4.14 0.55 4.31 0.43 4.14 0.42 4.25 0.44
Internal Pressures 4.31 0.48 4.15 0.49 4.14 0.37 4.16 0.46
Facilitator 4.50 0.30 4.36 0.32 4.36 0.35 4.37 0.33
Barriers 3.78 1.07 3.92 0.81 3.69 0.97 3.85 0.88
Adoption 4.04 0.34 3.88 0.43 3.83 0.43 3.88 0.43
Diagnostic Use 3.63 0.93 3.60 0.80 3.87 1.09 3.67 0.89
Interactive Use 3.18 0.56 3.54 0.57 3.32 0.73 3.46 0.62
Organisational Learning 3.87 0.43 3.95 0.53 3.77 0.51 3.90 0.52
 
With regard to external pressures, all types of local governments obtain relatively high 
mean scores. The result indicates the role of external users of information such as 
central government agencies in imposing regulations that influenced ILGs’ decision to 
adopt SAKIP, remained crucial in local government. With regard to facilitators of 
change, response from cities and districts showed similar means indicating promoters 
that foster ILGs to adopt SAKIP, such as MSAEBR and BPKP have relatively similar 
access to both types of governments. 
5.3.2 By Location 
Table 5.14 presents the mean comparison between respondents from Java and non-Java. 
Java was selected because it is the most populated island in Indonesia, while non-Java 
was islands spread over the Indonesian archipelago. 
Table 5.14 Comparison by Location 
Variables  
 In-Java 
(n=46)  
 Out-of-Java 
(n=119)  
 Total 
(n=165)  
 Mean   SD   Mean   SD   Mean   SD  
 External  4.24  0.45  4.26  0.44  4.25  0.44  
 Internal  4.19  0.47  4.15  0.46  4.16  0.46  
 Facilitator  4.36  0.40  4.38  0.30  4.37  0.33  
 Barrier  3.94  0.86  3.82  0.88  3.85  0.88  
 Adoption  3.89  0.43  3.88  0.43  3.88  0.43  
 Diagnostic  3.89  1.03  3.59  0.82  3.67  0.89  
 Interactive  3.46  0.66  3.45  0.61  3.46  0.62  
 Learning  3.87  0.51  3.91  0.52  3.90  0.52  
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Similar with the previous comparison analyses, the result of the mean comparison 
showed that there are no apparent differences for all variables between responses from 
in-Java and out-of-Java. This indicates that all local governments are familiar with the 
requirement to adopt SAKIP and share relatively similar approach in utilising the 
system. 
5.3.3 By Financial Independence Ratio  
Table 5.15 presents the mean comparison between respondents from high and low 
financial independence ratio. ILGs’ financial independence ratio (FIR) is an indicator 
used by the Ministry of Finance that determines the degree of local governments’ ability 
to rely on their own revenue and/or on the central government’s transfer fund in funding 
their programs and activities. ILGs with a high are considered to have relatively high 
revenue and less reliance on the central government’s transfer fund. On the other hand, 
ILGs with a low financial independence ratio depend more on the central government 
transfer money to fund their program and activity. 
Table 5.15 Comparison by Financial Independence Ratio 
Variables 
Low  
(n=110) 
High  
(n=55) 
Total  
(n=165) 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
External 4.25 0.45 4.26 0.43 4.25 0.44 
Internal 4.12 0.46 4.23 0.46 4.16 0.46 
Facilitator 4.36 0.30 4.39 0.39 4.37 0.33 
Barrier 3.77 0.89 4.03 0.82 3.85 0.88 
Adoption 3.85 0.43 3.94 0.43 3.88 0.43 
Diagnostic 3.60 0.81 3.82 1.03 3.67 0.89 
Interactive 3.44 0.58 3.49 0.70 3.46 0.62 
Learning 3.89 0.52 3.92 0.52 3.90 0.52 
 
The result of the mean comparison showed that responses from ILGs with high financial 
freedom are relatively higher mean than those with low financial freedom for all 
variables. This indicated that the extent of adoption and utilisation of SAKIP in “richer” 
ILGs was higher than it was in “poorer” ones. 
   
 Page 119 of 255 
 
5.4 Independent t-Tests for Control Variables 
An independent t-test was employed for the three control variables in order to provide 
statistical support to the previous mean comparison analyses. The summary of results 
for the independent t-test for all control variables is presented in Tables 5.16. 
5.4.1 By Government Type 
The results of the independent sample t-test for districts and cities; and and for the eight 
dependent variables were mixed. For external pressures, the test revealed a score of 
0.034 indicating a significant difference between districts and cities with regard to 
external pressures variable. Cities usually have better human resources and experiences 
in responding to the central government’s demand regarding SAKIP adoption and 
implementation. The result implied that respondents from districts tend to rely more on 
compliance with SAKIP-associated regulations as their way to show improved 
accountability and gain social legitimacy.  
5.4.2 By Location  
The results of the independent sample t-test for different locations of ILGs and the eight 
dependent variables were similar. ILGs located in Java island experienced pressures to 
adopt SAKIP to relatively the same extent as the one located out-of-Java island. This 
finding also indicated that the extent of utilising SAKIP within ILGs was indifferent, 
regardless of the ILG’s location.  
5.4.3 By Financial Independence Ratio  
The results of the independent sample t-test for ILGs with different FIR and the eight 
dependent variables were similar. ILGs with high FIR experienced external and internal 
pressures to adopt SAKIP to relatively the same extent as the one with low FIR. This 
finding also indicated that the extent of utilising SAKIP within ILGs was indifferent, 
regardless of their revenue and reliance on the central government’s transfer fund. In 
order to provide richer explanation, further analyses were conducted in section 5.6 by 
statistically investigating the significant path of the hypothesised relationship within each 
control group.  
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Table 5.16 Independent Sample t-Tests for Control Variables 
Control Variables Type Location FIR 
External 
Sig.  0.034*  0.732   0.853  
Mean  0.167   0.026   -0.014  
Internal 
Sig.  0.927   0.569   0.135  
Mean  0.008   -0.046   -0.114  
Facilitator 
Sig.  0.983   0.758   0.596  
Mean  0.001   0.020   -0.031  
Barrier 
Sig.  0.134   0.405   0.074  
Mean  0.236   -0.127   -0.258  
Adoption 
Sig.  0.532   0.928   0.230  
Mean  0.050   -0.007   -0.085  
Diagnostic 
Sig.  0.096   0.053   0.125  
Mean  -0.271   -0.298   -0.226  
Interactive 
Sig.  0.089   0.966   0.588  
Mean  0.219   -0.005   -0.056  
Learning 
Sig.  0.057   0.630   0.805  
Mean  0.183   0.044   -0.021  
Legend: *=Significant at 95% confidence level (< 0.05, 2-tailed) 
5.5 Evaluating the Measurement Model 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, SmartPLS 2.0 was the SEM-PLS statistical 
software used to evaluate the reliability and validity of the measurement model. At the 
same time, the software was also used to conduct the path analysis to examine the sets 
of hypotheses associated with relationships between the use of SAKIP and the 
organisational capabilities in ILG; and relationship between the adoption of SAKIP and 
its influence on how ILG managers use SAKIP.  
One major reason to use PLS-SEM is because PLS-SEM can analyse a complex 
structural model comprising reflective and formative constructs. A reflective 
(consequent) construct is a set of observable variables that are assumed to be affected by 
a latent construct. All observed variables within a reflective latent construct share 
similar meanings because they are part of the same construct. There were seven 
reflective constructs in this study: (1) external pressures, (2) internal pressures, (3) 
facilitator, (4) barriers, (5) diagnostic use, (6) interactive use, and (7) learning. 
A formative construct is a set of observable variables that cause the formation of a latent 
construct. All observed variables in a formative latent construct do not share similar 
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meaning because they are the components that form the construct. The formative 
construct in this study is the adoption of the SAKIP construct. Using SmartPLS, a PLS-
SEM path model was created based on the conceptual model presented in Chapter 
Three. Table 5.13 presents the summary of initial variables in the model. 
Table 5.17: Summary of initial variables in the model 
No Latent Variables Short 
Code 
Variables 
Types 
Observed 
Variables 
Number 
of Items 
1 External Pressures  EP exogenous EP_a-EP_f 6 
2 Internal Pressures IP exogenous IP_a–IP_l 12 
3 Facilitator FC exogenous FC_a–FC_m 13 
4 Barriers BR exogenous BR_a–BR_m 13 
5 Adoption ADP endogenous ADP_a–ADP_f 6 
6 Diagnostic Use DIG endogenous DIG_a–DIG_l 12 
7 Interactive Use ITR endogenous ITR_a–ITR_g 7 
8 Organisational Learning LRN endogenous LRN_a–LRN_l 12 
Total 81
 
There were eighty-one observed items within eight latent variables used in the model. 
The number of observed variables for each construct ranged from six to thirteen items. 
The model comprised of four exogenous variables (external pressures, internal 
pressures, facilitator of change, and barriers to change), and four endogenous variables 
(adoption of SAKIP, diagnostic control, interactive control, and organisational 
learning).  
5.5.1 Reliability 
5.5.1.1 Indicator reliability 
In order to assess the indicator reliability of a reflective construct, the study examined 
the factor loading of each indicator. SmartPLS creates an outer loading report that 
contains the factor loading of each observable item toward its respective construct. The 
accepted minimum threshold for factor loading is 0.70, which means the latent variables 
can explain 50% of the indicator’s variance. Indicators with a factor loading below 0.70 
are subject to removal in order to increase the latent construct’s composite reliability 
score to meet the suggested threshold value.  
The final results of the indicator reliability analysis are reported in Table 5-14. After the 
indicator reliability assessment was conducted, 33 observable variables with factor 
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loading values of lower than 0.7 were removed from further analysis. The observable 
items dropped from their corresponding constructs were: three items from external 
pressures, seven items from internal pressures, ten items from facilitator to change, one 
item from barriers to change, three items from interactive use, and seven items from 
organisational learning.  
5.5.1.2 Internal consistency reliability 
Internal consistency reliability refers to how well a set of observable items is mutually 
assigned to a construct. The minimum thresholds for internal consistency reliability are: (1) 
the composite reliability score should be higher than 0.70 and (2) the communality score 
should be higher than 0.50. Table 5.15 provides a summary of the internal consistency 
reliability for all reflective measurement constructs. The evaluation results found that all 
constructs achieved adequate internal consistency reliability from the respective observable 
items. 
5.5.2 Convergent Validity 
Convergent validity was assessed through the average variance extracted (AVE). The 
results showed that all latent constructs had an adequate AVE score. The thesis also 
examined convergent validity by testing the significance of the loading of each 
observable item within each corresponding latent variable (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). 
Table 5.16 provides evidence that all observable indicators of a latent construct 
adequately operate in similar ways.  
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Table 5.18: Indicator reliability – final model 
Latent Variables Observed 
Variables 
Indicator 
 Loading 
External Pressures (EP) EP2d 0.79 
EP2e 0.73 
EP2f 0.76 
Internal Pressures (IP) IP3b 0.73 
IP3d 0.78 
IP3e 0.74 
IP3j 0.74 
IP3k 0.70 
Facilitator (FC) FC4c 0.80 
FC4f 0.72 
FC4k 0.79 
Barriers (BR) BR5a 0.90 
BR5b 0.81 
BR5c 0.89 
BR5d 0.81 
BR5f 0.87 
BR5g 0.75 
BR5h 0.89 
BR5i 0.88 
BR5j 0.93 
BR5k 0.86 
BR5l 0.87 
BR5m 0.84 
Diagnostic Use (DIG) DIG7a 0.89 
DIG7b 0.89 
DIG7c 0.88 
DIG7d 0.89 
DIG7e 0.87 
DIG7f 0.87 
DIG7g 0.82 
DIG7h 0.83 
DIG7i 0.81 
DIG7j 0.85 
DIG7k 0.88 
DIG7l 0.81 
Interactive Use (ITR) ITR_Q8d 0.76 
ITR_Q8e 0.83 
ITR_Q8f 0.82 
ITR_Q8g 0.81 
Organisational Learning (LRN) LRN9e 0.82 
LRN9f 0.83 
LRN9g 0.75 
LRN9k 0.74 
LRN9l 0.78 
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Table 5.19: Internal consistency reliability 
    Composite Reliability Communality 
 External Pressures 0.80 0.58 
 Internal Pressures 0.86 0.54 
 Facilitator 0.82 0.60 
Barriers 0.97 0.74 
Diagnostic 0.97 0.73 
Interactive 0.88 0.65 
Organisational Learning 0.89 0.62 
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Table 5.20: Convergent validity 
Construct (latent variable) Indicator t-statistic 
External Pressures 
AVE = 0.60 EP2d 7.16 *** 
 EP2e 5.51 *** 
  EP2f 4.78 *** 
     
Internal Pressures IP3b 9.85 *** 
AVE = 0.54 IP3d 11.98 *** 
  IP3e 10.74 ***
  IP3j 10.52 *** 
  IP3k 8.47 *** 
     
Facilitator FC4c 12.51 *** 
AVE = 0.60 FC4f 10.23 *** 
  FC4k 12.30 *** 
     
Barrier BR5a 2.53 ** 
AVE = 0.74 BR5b 2.44 ** 
  BR5c 2.61 *** 
  BR5d 2.49 **
  BR5f 2.55 ** 
  BR5g 2.48 ** 
  BR5h 2.58 *** 
  BR5i 2.57 ** 
  BR5j 2.59 *** 
  BR5k 2.59 *** 
  BR5l 2.55 ** 
  BR5m 2.56 ** 
    
Diagnostic Control DIG7a 31.68 *** 
AVE = 0.73 DIG7b 30.94 *** 
  DIG7c 32.64 *** 
  DIG7d 34.06 *** 
  DIG7e 29.62 *** 
  DIG7f 24.85 *** 
  DIG7g 17.65 *** 
  DIG7h 21.08 *** 
  DIG7i 17.90 ***
  DIG7j 21.59 *** 
  DIG7k 27.60 *** 
  DIG7l 19.35 *** 
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Table 5.16 (cont…) 
Construct (latent variable) Indicator t-statistic 
Interactive Control ITR_Q8d 13.17 *** 
AVE = 0.65 ITR_Q8e 24.30 *** 
  ITR_Q8f 20.69 *** 
  ITR_Q8g 26.10 *** 
      
Learning LRN9e 26.56 *** 
AVE = 0.62 LRN9f 23.66 *** 
  LRN9g 17.19 *** 
  LRN9k 11.14 *** 
  LRN9l 18.52 *** 
      
*** >=2.58 / *p<0.01;  **>=1.96 / *p<0.05;  
*>=1.65 / *p<0.1 
 
5.5.3 Discriminant validity 
Discriminant validity refers to the distinctiveness of observable variables in measuring a 
latent construct. The observable variables should have a higher association with their 
theoretically corresponding latent variable than to any other latent variable. The 
discriminant validity of the measurement model is demonstrated by (1) comparing the 
square root AVE of each latent construct to the correlations with other latent variables 
(Hair et al., 2011; Lowry and Gaskin, 2014), and (2) by examining the matrix of cross-
loadings of indicator variables. Table 5.17 indicates that the measurement model meets 
the first discriminant validity test, with the square root of AVE of each latent variable 
being higher than the construct’s correlation with any other latent variables. 
Furthermore, the cross loading matrix in Table 5.18 indicates that the measurement 
model also passes the second discriminant validity test, with the indicator’s factor 
loadings being higher than all of its cross loadings. 
Table 5.21: Discriminant validity through the Square Root of AVE 
         BR     DIG      EP      FC      IP      IT     LRN 
 BR 0.86        
DIG -0.13 0.86       
 EP 0.10 0.07 0.76      
 FC 0.09 0.32 0.26 0.77     
 IP 0.02 0.34 0.38 0.55 0.74    
 IT -0.06 0.36 0.17 0.35 0.35 0.81   
LRN 0.07 0.37 0.23 0.32 0.41 0.68 0.79
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Table 5.22: Loadings of the measurement items 
               BR     DIG      EP      FC      IP      IT     LRN 
     BR5a 0.896 -0.1975 0.0825 -0.0074 -0.0362 -0.1211 0.0208
     BR5b 0.809 -0.1263 0.1261 -0.0609 -0.0711 -0.0111 0.0617
     BR5c 0.8907 -0.1489 0.1221 0.1165 0.0196 -0.0201 0.0541
     BR5d 0.8051 -0.1695 0.0519 0.0895 -0.0136 -0.1641 -0.0005
     BR5f 0.8658 -0.1756 0.078 0.0473 -0.0627 -0.0852 0.0223
     BR5g 0.7479 0.0021 0.0369 0.0955 0.0653 -0.03 0.0262
     BR5h 0.8899 -0.081 0.0296 0.0564 0.087 -0.0525 0.1083
     BR5i 0.8805 -0.1301 0.1328 0.0719 0.059 -0.0617 0.0654
     BR5j 0.9279 -0.1246 0.0786 0.0416 0.0345 -0.0913 0.0679
     BR5k 0.8627 -0.0694 0.0566 0.1771 0.0455 -0.0625 0.0147
     BR5l 0.8686 -0.1238 0.0551 0.0679 -0.0009 0.011 0.1181
    BR5m 0.84 -0.0796 0.1578 0.0545 -0.0379 0.0478 0.1578
    DIG7a -0.106 0.8877 0.0394 0.3166 0.2411 0.2852 0.2684
    DIG7b -0.1423 0.8872 0.0287 0.3208 0.2781 0.2777 0.2768
    DIG7c -0.1043 0.8833 0.0296 0.3621 0.2663 0.398 0.3251
    DIG7d -0.0868 0.8899 0.0955 0.3478 0.3147 0.3142 0.3441
    DIG7e -0.1018 0.8682 0.0373 0.3202 0.2882 0.3238 0.325
    DIG7f -0.1848 0.8661 0.0621 0.291 0.205 0.2988 0.3224
    DIG7g -0.1118 0.8224 0.0615 0.2494 0.3135 0.2883 0.2705
    DIG7h -0.1425 0.8311 0.0909 0.2371 0.3368 0.3505 0.32
    DIG7i -0.1061 0.8096 0.0469 0.1922 0.3372 0.2421 0.3072
    DIG7j -0.0825 0.8462 0.0949 0.1956 0.3065 0.3006 0.3642
    DIG7k -0.1134 0.8772 0.0785 0.236 0.3368 0.3104 0.3394
    DIG7l -0.0851 0.8076 0.0594 0.2487 0.2345 0.3263 0.2993
     EP2d 0.1016 0.1399 0.7889 0.3218 0.4292 0.2277 0.2774
     EP2e 0.1113 -0.0408 0.7284 0.1093 0.1817 0.0369 0.0737
     EP2f -0.0088 0.0302 0.7588 0.1244 0.1886 0.0927 0.1434
     FC4c 0.0217 0.3102 0.1405 0.7977 0.5153 0.2067 0.191
     FC4f 0.0838 0.1786 0.3251 0.723 0.3812 0.4307 0.3594
     FC4k 0.1042 0.2488 0.1653 0.7924 0.3718 0.2 0.1971
     IP3b 0.0234 0.3486 0.2902 0.3888 0.727 0.2461 0.2932
     IP3d 0.0351 0.1953 0.3325 0.4214 0.7768 0.246 0.3089
     IP3e 0.0104 0.2222 0.3418 0.4375 0.7388 0.2576 0.2967
     IP3j 0.0013 0.2343 0.1985 0.4084 0.7384 0.3594 0.3483
     IP3k 0.0041 0.2125 0.1949 0.3812 0.6988 0.1894 0.2576
ITR_Q8d -0.0308 0.2744 0.082 0.3468 0.3066 0.7628 0.43
ITR_Q8e -0.1146 0.3377 0.202 0.2801 0.2788 0.8347 0.5414
ITR_Q8f 0.022 0.2667 0.1768 0.2542 0.2813 0.8247 0.5991
ITR_Q8g -0.0722 0.3019 0.0929 0.2761 0.275 0.8128 0.5972
  LRN9e 0.096 0.2602 0.1644 0.3444 0.321 0.6123 0.8228
  LRN9f 0.0319 0.3391 0.1148 0.2358 0.2977 0.5767 0.8319
  LRN9g 0.0853 0.2922 0.1619 0.2581 0.2861 0.5154 0.7534
  LRN9k 0.0334 0.3151 0.2781 0.1889 0.3835 0.4447 0.7375
  LRN9l 0.0237 0.2434 0.2268 0.1956 0.3308 0.4889 0.7822
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5.5.4 Formative construct – Adoption of SAKIP 
The observable variables within the adoption of the SAKIP construct were selected 
based on supporting literature discussed in Chapter Four. The study also conducted 
several statistical validity tests that provided empirical evidence and support for the 
underlying theoretical basis. Firstly, the thesis measured the significance of observable 
measurements by examining each indicator’s weight (Hair et al., 2011). Non-significant 
variables were removed from the construct. As a result, the study removed items ADP 
6b and 6f. Secondly, the study conducted multicollinearity of the remaining indicators, 
where indicators with a variance inflation factor (VIF) score of less than 5 would be 
dropped from the construct. The result found that all remaining items had a VIF above 
the threshold. Table 5.19 provides the remaining items with significant scores. 
Table 5.23: Formative variables  adoption of SAKIP construct 
     Observable variables   Weight contribution to ADP construct t-stats 
ADP6a 0.368 1.917 
ADP6c 0.452 2.550 
ADP6d 0.525 2.784 
ADP6e 0.435 2.044 
5.6 Evaluating the Structural Model 
This section will present the results of the evaluation of the structural model. The 
primary purpose of the evaluation is to estimate the coefficient and the significance of 
the hypothesised causal model among latent variables that were compiled based on 
theoretical analyses and logical interpretation. The main criteria for the evaluation are 
the coefficient of the endogenous latent variables’ variance (R2) and the significance of 
the path coefficients. The R2 is the measure that indicates the degree to which variance 
in a dependent/endogenous variable can be explained by the exogenous variables that 
predict it (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). A higher R2 value reflects a larger portion of the 
endogenous latent variables’ variance explained by the exogenous ones. Despite there 
being no general rule for a minimum R2 value, Hair et al. (2011) suggest that the rule of 
thumb of R2 level can be different for specific research disciplines. The R2 scores of 0.25 
are considered weak in marketing research study but they are considered high in 
consumer behaviour research discipline. This study applied an R2 of 0.10 as the 
minimum threshold suggested by (Santosa, Wei, and Chan, 2005).  
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Since PLS-SEM does not assume the normality of the data, it uses a nonparametric 
bootstrapping technique to assess the significance of the path coefficients. A 
nonparametric bootstrap procedure calculates the standard errors and t-statistics by 
randomly withdrawing a large number of subsamples from the original sample. The study 
used a re-sampling method of 5,000 samples (Hair et al., 2011). A significant path 
coefficient that showed an agreed expected sign was considered as empirical evidence 
that supported the hypothesised causal relationship. The critical t-values for a two-tailed 
test were 1.65 (significance level = 10%), 1.96 (significance level = 5%), and 2.58 
(significance level = 1%).  
5.6.1 Structural model results 
The results of the PLS-SEM structural model evaluation are presented in Table 5.20. 
The table offers a summary of the evaluation of the structural model, including path 
coefficients and t-values. Strong and significant paths in the expected direction indicate 
support for the hypothesised path.  
Table 5.24: Summary of path coefficients and significance levels 
Hypotheses and corresponding paths Expected signs 
Path 
Coefficient t-value  
External Pressures (EP)  Adoption of SAKIP (ADP) + 0.211 1.82 * 
Internal Pressures (IP)  ADP + 0.193 1.97 ** 
Facilitator (FC)  ADP + 0.216 2.17 ** 
Barrier (BR)  ADP - 0.086 1.00  
ADP  Diagnostic Use (DIG) + 0.081 0.74  
ADP  Interactive Use (IT) + 0.290 3.40 *** 
DIG  Organisational Learning (LRN) + 0.140 1.69 * 
IT  DIG + 0.341 4.25 *** 
IT  LRN + 0.625 9.83 *** 
Significance path:  t-stats >=2.58/***p<0.01;  t-stats >=1.96/**p<0.05;  t-stats >=1.65/ *p<0.1 (two-
tailed). Statistical results were computed using bootstrapping method with 5,000 resampling. 
 
As shown in Figure 5.1, the R2 values for the endogenous variables indicate that the 
model explains the following constructs: (1) the model explains 47.5% of the variance 
in Organisational Learning (LRN) and 52.5% is unexplained - which is considered to be 
moderate, (2) the model only explains 8.4% of the variance in Interactive Use (IT), 
which is below the 0.10 minimum thresholds, (3) the model adequately explains 24.4% 
of the variance in the Adoption of SAKIP (ADP).  
The R2 results indicate that the model does not show a reasonable proportion of the 
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relationship between ADP and IT variables. The variance in the interactive use of 
SAKIP variable was not adequately explained by the adoption of SAKIP.  
 
Figure 5.1: PLS structural model results – path coefficients 
Significance path:  t-stats >=2.58/***p<0.01;  t-stats >=1.96/**p<0.05;  t-stats >=1.65/ *p<0.1. 
R2: 0.67 = substantial, 0.33 = moderate, and 0.19 = weak 
Figure 5.1 also describes a graphical relationship among the hypothesised latent 
variables and the significance of the relationship respectively. Following the R2 
assessment, this research also assessed the effect size (f2) and the predictive relevance 
(Q2 and q2) of the structural model results. The f2 is to measure the strength of a 
predictor latent variable on an endogenous construct (Hair, Hult, Ringle, and Sarstedt, 
2017). The f2 values of 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 can be viewed as a weak, medium, or large 
impact of an exogenous construct on the endogenous construct. The Q2 and q2 are used 
to measure the predictive relevance of the model. The Q2 values above zero indicate the 
model has predictive relevance and that the observer values are well reconstructed. On 
the other hand, the values of Q2 below zero indicate a lack of predictive relevance. The 
q2 values indicate the impact of the structural model on the observed measures 
(Henseler, Ringle, and Sinkovics, 2009). Table 5.21 provides the summary of the effect 
size and predictive relevance assessment.  
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Table 5.25 Summary of the effect size and predictive relevance assessment 
Variable 
IT LRN 
R2 Q2 R2 f2 Effect Q2 q2 Effect 
DIG       0.0286 Small   0.0236 Small 
IT 0.084 0.0543   0.6381 Large   0.3002 Medium 
LRN     0.475     0.2932     
 
As shown in Table 5.21, all endogenous constructs have Q2 values above zeros. It 
provides evidence and support for the predictive relevance of the endogenous constructs 
in the SAKIP use and organisational learning model. The table also showed that the 
interactive use of SAKIP has a large effect (f2=0.6381) in producing the R2 for 
organisational learning (R2=0.475). In contrast, the diagnostic use of SAKIP has only a 
small effect (f2=0.0286) in producing the organisational learning’s R2. The interactive 
use also has better effect size (q2=0.3002) and predictive relevance (Q2=0.2932) for the 
organisational learning than the diagnostic use of SAKIP (q2=0.0236).   
The finding of each relationship is interpreted separately in the following sections. 
5.6.1.1 Hypotheses H1 
Hypotheses H1 investigates whether external pressures are positively related to the 
adoption of SAKIP in ILGs. The result in Table 5-20 (t-value = 1.82) reveals that there 
is a statistically significant relationship between external pressures and the adoption of 
SAKIP. In this research, ILG respond to the external pressures that require them to 
arrange ILGs’ management control systems that meet with the MSAEBR regulations 
(indicator loading=0.79) and with other regulations related with the central’s 
government funding (indicator loading=0.76). The ILG’s decision to adopt SAKIP is 
also influenced by the public pressure to be perceived as a transparent, efficient and 
accountable organisation (indicator loading=0.73). 
This result suggests that the external organisational factors can shape the process of 
change in ILGs. It is consistent with the study of institutional theory in the public sector 
where a new organisation’s decision to adopt a new system is influenced by formal and 
informal pressures coming from other organisations (Akbar et al., 2012; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Kanter, 1972; Tsamenyi et al., 2006).  
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5.6.1.2 Hypotheses H2  
Hypothesis H2 is concerned with the relationship between pressures from internal 
organisational factors and the adoption of SAKIP. It predicts that internal pressures are 
positively related to the adoption of SAKIP. As can be seen in Table 5.11, the path 
between the two variables is significant (t-value = 1.97) and in the predicted direction, 
providing full support for H2. The result suggests that pressures from the internal ILG 
environment and users of information have motivated the adoption of SAKIP. The 
result of the PLS-SEM analysis indicates that ILGs respond to the internal pressures that 
require them to have a tighter control over their expenditure (indicator loading=0.78) 
and provide better information in the budget preparation process (indicator 
loading=0.74). The ILG’s decision to adopt SAKIP is also motivated by the ILG leaders 
demand to upgrade the monitoring system (indicator loading=0.74). 
5.6.1.3 Hypothesis H3  
Hypotheses H3 investigates whether facilitators of change are positively related to the 
adoption of SAKIP in ILGs. The PLS-SEM result in Table 5.11 shows that the path 
from facilitators of change to the adoption of SAKIP is significant (t-value = 2.17) and 
in the expected direction (positive). This result empirically suggests that the facilitators 
of change have a significant impact on the adoption of SAKIP in ILGs. In this research, 
it is revealed that: (1) the clarity of SAKIP’s role in the local government’s financial 
management system (indicator loading=0.80) and (2) the necessary culture and mindset 
within the ILG to support change (indicator loading=0.79) are two main factors that 
facilitate and bring direct influence on a successful change or reform. These findings 
were further explored in the qualitative stage by identifying institutional actors that play 
important roles in clarifying SAKIP position and shaping mindset within the ILGs. 
Finally, the statistical result shows that all exogenous latent variables have fairly similar 
moderate effect to the adoption, with the facilitator of change (FC) has the strongest 
linkage among them. This indicates the shift of pressures from EP that represents a 
coercive pressure to FC that represents normative pressure.   
5.6.1.4 Hypotheses H4  
The fourth hypothesis is concerned with the relationships between barriers to change 
and the adoption of SAKIP. Hypothesis H4 predicted that the barriers to change are 
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negatively related to the adoption of SAKIP in ILGs. However, the PLS-SEM does not 
support this hypothesis. The result in Table 5.11 reveals that the pairs are not 
significantly related and the path is not in the expected direction. It indicates that 
barriers of change do not have significant impact on the adoption of SAKIP in ILGs. 
5.6.1.5 Hypotheses H5a and H5b  
The fifth set of hypotheses examines the associations between the adoption of SAKIP 
and the extent of the styles of use of SAKIP in ILG. There are two possible paths that 
relate to the diagnostic and interactive use of SAKIP by ILG officials. Table 5.11 
delivers mixed results from the PLS-SEM analyses. Hypothesis H5a predicted that the 
adoption of SAKIP is positively related to the use of SAKIP as a diagnostic control 
system. However, the PLS-SEM path analysis does not support this hypothesis. The 
results in Table 5.11 reveal that the pairs are not significantly related. It indicates that 
the adoption of SAKIP does not have a significant impact on the use of SAKIP as a 
diagnostic control system in ILGs. Based on the outer weight analysis of the adoption of 
SAKIP (ADP), it can be identified that the use of current year output to determine the 
next year appropriation has the lowest outer weight (0.368). Therefore, it is indicated to 
be the major factor that contributes to the insignificant path of the relationship between 
the adoption of SAKIP and the diagnostic control system. The other contributing factor 
is the ILGs’ inability to fully implement a set of criteria for good performance indicators 
(0.435). 
Hypothesis H5b predicted that the adoption of SAKIP is positively related to the use of 
SAKIP as an interactive control system. Contrary to the result for hypothesis H5a, the 
PLS-SEM results for hypothesis H5b in Table 5.11 show that the path from the adoption 
of SAKIP to the interactive use of SAKIP is significant (t-value = 3.40) and in the 
expected direction (positive). The result empirically suggests that the adoption of 
SAKIP has a significant impact on the use of SAKIP as an interactive control system in 
ILGs. Based on the ADP outer weight analysis, it can be identified that reviewing ILGs’ 
outcome by the parliament and the mechanism to review the validity of performance 
indicators used in SAKIP contribute to the significant path of the relationship between 
ADP and the interactive use. On the other hand, the low R2 values for the interactive use 
variables (R2=0.08) does not allow the model to provide a convincing explanation for 
any variance in the interactive use of SAKIP.  
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The non-significant association between the adoption and the diagnostic use of SAKIP; 
and the very weak effect size that below the prerequisite threshold between the adoption 
and the interactive use of SAKIP indicate that the adoption of SAKIP does not lead to 
an effective utilisation of SAKIP.  
5.6.1.6 Hypotheses H6a, H6b, and H6c  
The last set of hypotheses examines the associations between the styles of use of SAKIP 
in ILGs and the organisation’s orientation to learning. Hypothesis H6a predicted that the 
emphasis ILGs place on the use of SAKIP as a diagnostic control system is positively 
associated with an organisation’s orientation to learning. In this research, SAKIP is 
diagnostically used for: (1) tracking progress toward goals (indicator loading=0.89), (2) 
monitoring results (0.89), (3) comparing outcomes to expectations (0.88), (4) reviewing 
key measures (0.89), and developing a common vocabulary for strategy and program 
priorities (0.88). The PLS-SEM result in Table 5.11 shows that the path from the 
diagnostic use of SAKIP to the organisational learning is significant (t-value = 1.69) and 
in the expected direction (positive). This result empirically suggests that the diagnostic 
use of SAKIP can facilitate ILGs’ orientation to generate organisational learning.  
Hypothesis H6b predicted that the emphasis ILGs place on the use of SAKIP as an 
interactive control system is positively associated with an organisation’s orientation to 
learning. The PLS-SEM result in Table 5.11 shows that the path from the interactive use 
of SAKIP to organisational learning is significant (t-value = 9.83) and in the expected 
direction (positive). In this research, SAKIP is used interactively by top managers who: 
(1) interpret information from the SAKIP system (indicator loading=0.83) and (2) pay 
daily attention to the SAKIP system (0.82). This result empirically suggests that the 
interactive use of SAKIP can facilitate ILGs’ orientation to generate organisational 
learning. The result in Table 5.21 reveals that the interactive use of SAKIP has a better 
effect size and predictive relevance for the organisational learning than the diagnostic 
use. 
Hypothesis H6c predicted that the emphasis ILGs place on the use of SAKIP in an 
interactive control system is positively associated with the emphasis they place on the 
use of SAKIP in a diagnostic control system. The PLS-SEM result in Table 5.11 shows 
that the path from the interactive use to the diagnostic use of SAKIP is significant (t-
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value = 4.25) and in the expected direction (positive). This result empirically suggests 
that the interactive use of SAKIP can influence the diagnostic use of performance 
measures embedded in SAKIP.  
The result of the PLS-SEM analysis also identified two indicators: (1) formal 
mechanisms to share best practices among different fields within ILGs (indicator 
loading=0.83) and (2) periodic meeting to inform all employees regarding the latest 
innovation (indicator loading=0.82) as the two main indicators of perceived 
organisational learning. Since the two indicators only focus on the distribution of 
knowledge, the ILGs’ capability to learn will be further explored in the qualitative 
stage. The qualitative stage would identify activities taken by ILGs to use the collected 
and shared information in order to change the organisation structure and process. 
5.6.2 Control group analysis 
The statistical analyses in the previous section have used all respondent data to test the 
R2 and the significance of hypothesised relationship. In order to provide richer 
explanation to the findings, this section further analysed the significant path of the 
hypothesised relationship by dividing the data into five control groups and statistically 
comparing each significant path within the group. In management accounting literature, 
it is common to analyse path relationships based on control group membership such as 
type of organisations, location or organisation size. Past research in ILGs used these 
control variables to describe the relationship between core variables and ILG 
characteristics (Akbar et al., 2012).  
Based on the ILG characteristic, the sample data were divided into four control groups: 
(1) academic qualification, (2) current position working experiences, (3) location, and 
(4) ILG’s financial independence ratio. 
5.6.2.1 Academic qualification 
Previous research in ILGs reported that there has been a growing number of universities 
that offer new degree programs in public administration/management as a response to 
the ILGs’ growing demands for more qualified staff in the performance management 
fields (Akbar et al., 2012). Questions 5 and 6 in Part C of the survey asked respondents 
for their highest academic qualification and the field of study of their qualification. 
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Based on their responses, the sample data were divided into undergraduate and 
postgraduate control groups.  
5.6.2.2 Current position working experience 
Current position working experience refers to the duration of time the respondent has 
been working in the position that holds him/her responsible for maintaining SAKIP. The 
information on a respondents’ SAKIP-related experience was captured in question 9 in 
Part C of the survey. Based on their responses, the sample data were divided into less 
than 2 years and more than 2 years of current position working experience.  
5.6.2.3 Location 
Following previous PMS studies in ILGs, the research divided the sample data into 
respondents from Java and ones from non-Java as the location control group 
comparison. Java was selected because it is the most populated island in Indonesia, 
while non-Java was islands spread over the Indonesian archipelago.  
5.6.2.4 ILGs’ financial independence ratio 
ILGs’ financial independence ratio is an indicator used by the Ministry of Finance that 
determines the degree of local governments’ ability to rely on their own revenue and/or 
on the central government’s transfer fund in funding their programs and activities. The 
ILGs’ financial independence ratio data were gathered from the website of the Ministry 
of Finance and downloaded on 17 April 2014. The sample data were divided into “high” 
for ILGs with self-revenue ratio greater than 8.6% and transfer fund ration below 79%. 
ILGs falling into this category are considered to have relatively high revenue and less 
reliance on the central government’s transfer fund. On the other hand, ILGs with a low 
financial independence ratio depend more on the central government transfer money to 
fund their program and activity.  
5.6.2.5 Multi-group moderation tests 
To provide empirical evidence in the control group comparison, multi-group moderation 
tests for significant path were conducted. The thesis used the formula provided by Chin 
(2000) to calculate the t-statistic for the difference between the groups. The formula 
requires the regression weight, and standard errors from the path being tested.  
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Table 5.26 Moderated mediation test. Interactive use on organisational learning 
  
 
   IT  DIG à LRN 
Group Comparison based on Sample size t-stat p-value 
Education 
Undergraduate 63 
3.790 0.000** Post-graduate 97 
Experiences 
02 years 72 
0.732  0.465  
> 2 yrs 84 
Location 
Java 45 
0.620  0.536  
Non-Java 120 
Funding 
Independence Ratio 
High 54 
0.949 0.297 
Low 111 
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Table 5.27: Summary of significant group comparisons 
      Paths 
     EP à ADP  IP à ADP  FC à ADP  ADP à IT DIG à LRN  IT à DIG  IT à LRN 
Group Comparison based on Samplesize t-stat p-value t-stat 
p-
value t-stat p-value t-stat 
p-
value t-stat p-value t-stat 
p-
value t-stat p-value 
Education 
Undergraduate 63 
1.721 0.087* 1.097 0.274 3.621 0.000** 1.692 0.093* 4.401 0.000** 1.532 0.127 5.802 0.000**
Post-graduate 97 
Experiences 
02 years 72 
2.098 0.038** 1.065 0.288 0.160 0.895 1.131 0.260 0.782 0.435 0.386 0.700 0.772 0.441 
> 2 yrs 84 
Location 
Java 45 
1.288 0.199 1.142 0.255 0.322 0.748 1.899 0.059* 0.899 0.370 0.464 0.643 0.868 0.387 
Non-Java 120 
Funding 
Independence 
Ratio 
High 54 
2.187 0.030** 1.510 0.133 0.302 0.763 1.787 0.076* 1.582 0.116 1.321 0.188 1.294 0.198 
Low 111 
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The results of the multi-group moderation test are shown in Table 5.21. The results of 
the test suggested the following points: 
1.  The association between external pressures and the adoption of SAKIP  
The results in Table 5.21 showed that the effect of external pressures on the 
adoption of SAKIP (EP  ADP) is significantly stronger for ILGs officials whose 
highest education level was an undergraduate degree. It also showed a significantly 
stronger effect for those who had less than 2 years of SAKIP-related working 
experience. The findings suggest that experience and formal education are factors 
that determine ILG behaviour when responding to external pressures to secure 
legitimacy. ILGs with less experience and less knowledgeable officials tend to rely 
more on compliance with SAKIP-associated regulations as their way to show 
improved accountability and gain social legitimacy.  
The effect of external pressures on the adoption of SAKIP is also stronger for ILGs 
with low funding independence ratio. It indicates that a high reliance on central 
government funding is still an important factor that drives organisations to 
accommodate external pressures from the central government.  
2. The association between facilitator of change and the adoption of SAKIP  
Table 5.21 shows that the effect of facilitator of change on the adoption of SAKIP 
(FC  ADP) is significantly stronger for ILG officials with a postgraduate degree. 
As Upping and Oliver (2012) included education as one major element of 
communicators for change, the finding implies that education is a significant factor 
in better responding to normative pressures.  
3. The association between the adoption and the interactive use of SAKIP  
The multi-group moderation test result indicated that the association between the 
adoption and the interactive use of SAKIP (ADP  IT) is influenced by the senior 
officer’s level of education, the ILG’s location and the ILG’s degree of reliance on 
central government funding. Table 5.21 showed that the effect of the adoption of 
SAKIP on the interactive use of SAKIP is significantly stronger for ILGs located in-
Java. The moderation effect is also stronger for ILGs with a high funding 
independence ratio. Lastly, the effect is stronger for ILGs officials with an 
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undergraduate degree.  
4. The association between the diagnostic use of SAKIP and organisational learning 
The results indicated that the association between diagnostic use and organisational 
learning (DIG  LRN) is moderated by the SO’s educational attainment. Table 5.21 
showed that the effect of the diagnostic use of SAKIP on organisational learning is 
significantly stronger for ILG officials with an undergraduate degree.  
5. The association between the interactive use of SAKIP and organisational learning  
The results indicated that the association between the interactive use of SAKIP and 
organisational learning (IT  LRN) is moderated by educational background. The 
test results in Table 5.21 showed that the effect of the interactive use of SAKIP on 
organisational learning is significantly stronger for ILG officials with a postgraduate 
degree.  
5.6.2.6 Moderated mediation test: interactive use to learning 
The thesis also performed a moderation mediation test that examined whether the effect 
of the interactive use of SAKIP on organisational learning, mediated by the diagnostic 
use of SAKIP, is significantly different for each category in control groups. The test 
used the same formula provided by Lowry and Gaskin (2014) to calculate the t-statistic 
for the difference between the groups. The only difference is that the test used the 
regression weight and standard error for the total effects of path from the interactive use 
of SAKIP to organisational learning. Table 5.22 offers the results of the moderated 
mediation test. The results indicate that the mediated effect (i.e., the diagnostic use of 
SAKIP) is stronger for officials whose highest academic qualifications were 
postgraduate degrees.  
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has presented the description and analysis of the data obtained from the 
mail questionnaire survey. It also has tested the measurement model and the structural 
model of the study using PLS-SEM analysis. Out of nine hypotheses tested, seven were 
supported and two were rejected. The external pressures, internal pressures, and 
facilitators of change were found to positively influence the adoption of SAKIP. The 
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barriers to change was not found to have a significant effect on the adoption of SAKIP. 
The adoption of SAKIPs was not found to have a significant effect on the diagnostic use 
of SAKIP. However, it was found to significantly influence the interactive use of 
SAKIP with R2 below the 0.10 minimum thresholds. Lastly, the interactive use of 
SAKIP was found to positively influence the diagnostic use of SAKIP, and both the 
diagnostic and interactive use of SAKIP were found to positively influence 
organisational learning.  
In addition to the nine hypotheses tested, PLS-SEM analysis revealed the results of the 
control group comparison test for significant paths. The results indicated that the effects 
between unobserved variables on significant paths are significantly stronger for one 
category than the other. The control group comparison analyses revealed several 
significant relationships provided richer explanations for the proposed hypothesised 
relationships and the structural model. These findings and their implications are 
explored in greater detail in Chapter Seven. The next chapter discusses the qualitative 
data collection and analysis using thematic content analysis. The qualitative analysis 
will elaborate on the weak relationships between the adoption and use of SAKIP. 
Furthermore, the qualitative analysis will focus on: (1) finding the reasons behind ILGs’ 
decision to adopt SAKIP but not to use it as the diagnostic tool to control the 
organisation; (2) finding other factors that affect the ILGs’ decision to use SAKIP as the 
interactive control system; (3) finding the impact of the weak relationship on ILGs’ 
organisational learning capabilities. The qualitative phase will also include the results 
from the control group comparison analyses in identifying isomorphic pressures 
surrounding the adoption and use of SAKIP. 
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 Qualitative Results and Analysis Chapter 6:
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed empirical findings from the survey to answer research 
questions employing a quantitative approach. Descriptive statistics and PLS-SEM were 
used in the analysis to test each hypothesis. The results identified factors that are 
significant to SAKIP adoption and to the ILGs’ organisational learning capabilities. The 
quantitative analysis showed that external pressures, internal pressures, and facilitators 
of change were found to positively influence the adoption of SAKIP. The adoption of 
SAKIP was not found to have a significant effect on the diagnostic use of SAKIP. It 
was found to significantly influence the interactive use of SAKIP variable, but with a 
weak explanation with the variance. Lastly, the interactive use of SAKIP was found to 
positively influence the diagnostic use of SAKIP; and both the diagnostic and 
interactive use of SAKIP were found to positively influence organisational learning. 
The quantitative analysis also indicated the existence of isomorphic pressures,  coercive, 
mimetic, and normative,  in the adoption and utilisation of SAKIP.  
This chapter examines evidence collected from the interviews by highlighting patterns, 
themes and elements that explain the significant relationships among variables 
identified in the quantitative stage. The theoretical framework and quantitative findings 
shape the qualitative research stage by providing an outline that connects the identified 
themes. The results are described and discussed according to the thesis’s research 
questions. The major reason for conducting the qualitative stage was to obtain evidence 
on the impact of institutional isomorphism on the use of SAKIP and how it impacts 
ILGs’ learning capabilities. 
This next section explains the interviewees’ selection process and profiles. Section 6.3 
discusses the results of the qualitative study, whereby the factors influencing the 
adoption of SAKIP in ILGs, the relationship between the adoption and the utilisation of 
MCS in ILGs, and SAKIP’s impacts on ILG learning capabilities are presented. Finally, 
Section 6.4 draws conclusions from the findings in this chapter. 
6.2 The Interviewees’ Selection Process and Profile 
Interviews were performed with selected officials from ILGs. The list of potential 
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interviewees was obtained during the quantitative phase. During the survey distribution, 
a research form stating the ILG official’s willingness to participate in the interview was 
included in each package. As many as 112 ILG officials indicated their willingness to 
participate in the interview. In order to gain a deeper understanding regarding the 
utilisation of SAKIP and its impact on organisational learning, the selection of the 
interviewees considered the diversity of the Indonesian population’s characteristics. A 
purposive sampling was used to select 20 participants from the list. The participants 
were selected based on the type, location, and size of the ILGs in order to have a 
relatively balanced representation in the samples. The ILG SAKIP score was also 
among the selection criteria in order to identify organisational characteristics and factors 
that affect ILGs with a high SAKIP score and ILGs with a lower score. 
 In order to protect the identity of the interviewees, all information that may directly be 
linked to the ILGs and interviewees was made anonymous. Pseudonyms replaced ILGs’ 
names by using the code L# in the process of studying and describing the data.  
The interviewees for this research were managers from Indonesian local governments 
who were responsible for the implementation of SAKIP. In general, there are two 
departments in ILGs that share a role in SAKIP’s implementation. The first department 
is called the Organisation Administrative department (OAD). The OAD is the leading 
sector in preparing the ILG’s consolidated performance report to be submitted to the 
MSAEBR by the end of March every year. The OAD’s role is to ensure all departments 
within an ILG prepare their performance report by the end of February every year and 
to prepare a consolidated ILG performance report by the end of May. The second 
department is the Internal Audit department (IA). The IA department’s role is to review 
all departments’ performance reports. The consolidated performance report and the 
evaluation result are submitted to the MSAEBR by the end of March every year.  
The size of the ILGs that participated in the interviews varies from a total budget of less 
than Rp1.0 trillion to a total budget of over Rp50.0 trillion. The area of the ILGs is also 
varied, from an area of less than 50 km2 to an area sized over 40,000 km2. From 20 
interview participants, 10 ILGs are located in Java islands and the other 10 are located 
out of Java islands. Table 6-1 presents the profiles of the qualitative research 
respondents. 
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Table 6.1: Interviewee profile 
ILG Division Type Score Location  Population  Size (km2)  Budget*  
L1 OA District A In Java 2,035,111 5,782.40 2,802,183.00  
L2 OA City A In Java 2,341,097 167.67 7,214,820.00  
L3 IA City BB In Java 321,154 48.25 1,236,100.00  
L4 OA Province BB Out of Java 4,165,115 5,780.06 5,704,727.00  
L5 OA District BB In Java 963,526 508.13 2,223,664.00  
L6 IA District B Out of Java 444,789 839.54 1,811,460.00  
L7 OA District CC In Java 1,013,084 677.50 1,823,605.00  
L8 OA District C Out of Java 73,647 42,620.70 1,829,692.00  
L9 OA Province B In Java 9,988,495 664.01 59,945,523.00  
L10 OA District C Out of Java 304,689 3,791.64 1,304,677.00  
L11 OA District BB In Java 417,473 586.28 1,477,685.00  
L12 OA District CC Out of Java 133,092 1,357.03 953,966.00  
L13 OA District B In Java 1,408,089 2,198.79 3,864,897.00  
L14 OA District C Out of Java 313,607 5,302.86 1,513,507.00  
L15 OA District CC In Java 1,420,643 1,386.05 2,889,597.00  
L16 OA District B Out of Java 655,876 23,601.91 6,980,371.00  
L17 OA District B In Java 806,941 1,431.42 1,758,139.00  
L18 OA District B Out of Java 257,763 2,391.54 1,123,476.00  
L19 OA District B Out of Java 518,695 1,804.30 1,534,101.00  
L20 OA District B Out of Java 259,388 912.75 994,909.00  
Note: *IDR millions 
As explained in Chapter Four, semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to 
acquire information from the participants about the adoption and use of SAKIP in their 
institutions. Interviews began with open-ended questions such as, “What aspects of the 
performance reports are top ILG officials mostly interested in”, “What is the central 
agencies’ main focus when they review ILG’s performance reports”, and “What is the 
main factor that drives ILGs to use/not SAKIP”. Thematic follow-up questions were 
asked based on answers provided by the participants. The first few interviews were 
more open-ended and broader that the latter ones. As themes started to arise from earlier 
interview sessions and from data analysis, the subsequent interviews became more 
directed. The interviews were carried on until no new themes and interconnections 
between the themes emerged. The full guide of open-ended questions used during the 
interviews is provided in Appendix B at the end of this thesis. The coding was 
conducted by using Microsoft Excel software. Interview transcripts were arranged 
according to the classified themes. The quotations used in this thesis were extracted 
from the interview transcripts in order to clarify the findings and to add value to the 
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analysis result. 
6.2.1 Interviewees’ SAKIP score profile 
During the interviews, the ILGs’ SAKIP score was gathered from the MSAEBR and the 
breakdown of the score was gathered directly from the ILGs. There were three ILGs 
that refused to provide the scoring breakdowns. Therefore, the details of their score 
components were not available to be used. Table 6.2 presents the components of the 
SAKIP scores. 
Table 6.2: Interviewees' SAKIP score profile 
ILG 
Performance Scoring Components 
Score Planning 
(30) 
Measurement 
(25) 
Reporting 
(15) 
Evaluation 
(10) 
Achievement 
(20) 
L1 89.50 79.08 86.20 83.40 61.15 A 
L2 82.73 82.68 79.27 74.70 78.80 A 
L3 82.10 71.36 77.40 71.70 64.00 BB 
L4 83.00 66.56 74.07 83.20 77.45 BB 
L5 78.13 70.56 74.67 63.80 75.00 BB 
L6 69.93 60.00 68.27 60.10 55.10 B 
L7 59.47 38.20 59.73 56.20 40.30 CC 
L8 52.57 19.96 69.00 63.90 48.40 C 
L9 69.50 46.52 68.07 60.60 56.90 B 
L10 35.07 12.20 52.33 35.00 39.35 C 
L11 78.80 67.28 68.47 61.20 73.60 BB 
L12 58.23 49.00 64.73 28.30 41.15 CC 
L13 68.33 53.92 72.53 44.20 62.30 B 
L14 40.30 25.88 36.07 30.40 39.35 C 
L15 59.60 35.52 63.53 41.90 57.50 CC 
L16 74.63 54.84 64.53 59.30 71.95 B 
L17 66.00 54.28 65.93 47.10 63.15 B 
L18 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A C 
L19 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A B 
L20 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A B 
 
The SAKIP score consists of 5 components and each component has a different 
apportioned contribution to the total score. Every component has a list of questions used 
to measure how well ILGs have met the criteria. There are several types of questions, 
with different scoring criteria for each type of question. The first type is a question with 
a “Yes” or “No” answer. One point is given for every “Yes” answer with zero points for 
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a “No” answer. The other type of question required the assessor’s professional 
judgement to give a score. If an assessor believed that an ILG has showed sufficient 
evidence to respond to 80% of the question, one point is given. The point given will get 
lower accordingly if there is only evidence to respond to a smaller portion of the 
question. Table 6.3 presents the complete SAKIP scoring criteria.  
Table 6.3: Types of questions 
Type of Questions 
Type 1: General question Scores 
1 Assessor is satisfied with 80%100% of the answers. 1 
2 Satisfied 60%80%  0.75 
3 Satisfied 40%60%  0.50 
4 Satisfied 20%40%  0.25 
5 Satisfied <20%  0 
Type 2: Yes or No question Scores 
1 Yes 1 
2 No 0 
Type 3: Current performance achievement Scores 
1 KPI achieved >100% from the target. 1 
2 KPI achieved  = 91%100% 0.75 
3 KPI achieved  = 61%90% 0.50 
4 KPI achieved  = 40%60% 0.25 
5 KPI achieved  <40% 0 
Type 4: Performance achievement compared to last year’s  Scores 
1 KPI achieved  >100% from last year performance 1 
2 KPI achieved  = 100% 0.75 
3 KPI achieved  = 91%-99% 0.50 
4 KPI achieved  = 60%90% 0.25 
5 KPI achieved  <60% 0 
After all answers have been acquired, the assessor tallies up all scores and multiplies the 
total scores by the proportion that applies for each component. The complete scoring 
breakdown for all components can be seen in Table 6.4: 
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Table 6.4: SAKIP scoring elements 
Components Weighted Document Quality Utilisation 
SAKIP 
A. Performance Planning 
80% 
     
  1. Strategic Plan Documents 10% 2% 5% 3% 
  2. Annual Plan Documents 20% 4% 10% 6% 
B. Performance Measurement 25% 5% 12.5% 7.5% 
C. Performance Reporting 15% 3% 7.5% 4.5% 
D. Internal Evaluation 10% 2% 5.0% 3.0% 
Performance Performance Achievement 20% 
5% Output achievement 
10% Outcome 
5% Other achievement 
 
6.2.1.1 Component 1: performance planning (30%) 
The first component is the performance planning score, which contributes 30% of the 
total score. The evaluation process for this component is mainly the reviewing of 
information in strategic and annual plan documents. Under the SAKIP system, a 
strategic plan is a five-year planning document that should have an ILG’s vision, 
mission statement, and a set of key elements that are objectives, goals, programs, and 
activities. The main focus of evaluating this component is to ensure: (1) there are logical 
causeeffect relationships between the ILG’s objectives or goals and activities that are 
in place; (2) high-quality outcome or output KPIs are used for each of the key elements; 
(3) a strategic plan is used in preparing an annual plan; (4) the periodic review of the 
strategic plan is in place; and (5) the strategic plan document is published and visible to 
the public.  
An annual plan is a planning document that contains organisational goals, annual 
programs, key performance indicators, performance contracts for heads of divisions and 
managers, and action plans to implement performance contracts. Almost similar to the 
strategic planning evaluation, the main focus of evaluating annual performance planning 
is to ensure (1) the annual performance plan document is published and visible to the 
public; (2) the use of high-quality outcome or output KPIs for goals and programs; (3) 
the annual performance plan is used in the budget cycle; (4) individual performance 
contracts or agreements for heads of divisions and managers are in place; (5) action 
plans are implemented and regularly monitored.  
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6.2.1.2 Component 2: performance measurement (25%) 
The second component is the performance measurement score, which contributes 25% 
of the total score. The evaluation process for this component is mainly reviewing the 
process of measuring performance in an ILG. The main focus of evaluating this 
component is to ensure: (1) KPIs are formally used in the organisation to measure the 
performance of ILGs’ heads of divisions and managers; (2) there is a formal mechanism 
to collect and validate performance indicators for each level in the organisation; (3) the 
use of high quality KPIs that meet with the prescribed criteria, that align with the 
organisational goals and programs, and that are linked with the corresponding action 
plan; (4) KPIs are published and visible to public; (5) KPIs are regularly collected and 
monitored; (6) there is a reward and punishment system in place relating to KPI 
achievement. 
6.2.1.3 Component 3: performance reporting (15%) 
The third component is the performance reporting score, which contributes 15% of the 
total score. The evaluation process for this component is mainly reviewing the process 
of reporting on performance in ILGs. The main focus of evaluating this component is to 
ensure that the performance report: (1) is prepared on time and published on the 
website; (2) provides information regarding performance achievement and money spent 
to achieve performance targets; (3) is utilised to improve an ILG’s programs and 
activities; (4) is used to evaluate staff performance. 
6.2.1.4 Component 4: internal performance evaluation (10%) 
The fourth component is the internal evaluation assessment, which contributes 10% of 
the total score. The evaluation process for this component is mainly reviewing the 
performance evaluation process in an ILG. The main focus of evaluating this 
component is to ensure: (1) there is a formal, internal performance and program 
evaluation process in an ILG; (2) the performance and program evaluation is applied to 
the ILG’s programs and action plans; (3) the evaluation’s results and recommendations 
are followed up by all divisions. 
6.2.1.5 Component 5: performance achievement (20%) 
The final component is the performance achievement score, which contributes 20% of 
the total score. The evaluation process for this component is mainly reviewing the 
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performance of the ILG’s outcome and output performance indicators and by assessing 
the reliability of the performance information.  
6.2.1.6 Redundancy/multiplicity in SAKIP scoring elements 
It can be seen that there is an emphasis on several performance factors that leads to 
redundancy in the score given due to repeated scoring given to similar items. The 
alignment among planning documents, the use of reliable performance indicators, and 
the utilisation of performance information are three major items that are assessed and 
scored repeatedly within the same and in different components. The alignment among 
planning documents are evaluated repeatedly within the performance-planning 
component. The use of reliable performance indicators is numerously used as a scoring 
element in the performance planning, performance measurement, and performance 
reporting components. The utilisation of performance information is assessed repeatedly 
in all components except in the performance achievement component.  
Arithmetically, the redundancy in the scoring components has created a significant 
chunk of points that can be exploited only by providing the required documents. Most 
ILGs that identify this condition have improved their score by merely focusing on 
fulfilling the documentation requirements in these particular components. Several ILGs 
have improved their SAKIP scores significantly from “C” to “B”. As two respondents 
mentioned: 
“Alignment gives (us) a big score. The MSAEBR helped us to identify 
planning documents that needed to be aligned.” (L19)  
“the main thing is to achieve ‘CC’ by completing the required documents. 
The performance evaluation and performance achievement components 
are for ILGs with A and B scores.” (L4) 
 
6.2.2 Interviewees ILG Profiles 
In order to provide a better context for the interview’s results, this section elaborates the 
ILGs’ profile of the qualitative research respondents by using several statistical tools to 
describe each scoring component. Several statistics analyses have been performed to 
identify possible correlation between a score’s components and an ILG’s organisational 
characteristics. The first statistical analysis is the descriptive statistical analysis that will 
provide overview information regarding the mean, median and standard deviation of the 
 Page 150 of 255 
 
respondents’ SAKIP scores. Table 6.5 presents the descriptive statistic of the 
respondents’ SAKIP scores. 
Table 6.5: Descriptive statistic of SAKIP score 
 
Performance Scoring Components 
Planning Measurement Reporting Evaluation Achievement Total Score 
Mean 67.52 52.23 67.34 56.76 59.14 59.43 
Median 69.50 54.28 68.27 60.10 61.15 61.17 
Std Dev 14.75 19.87 10.91 16.37 13.29 14.31 
Min. Value 35.07 12.20 36.07 28.30 39.35 30.95 
Max. Value 89.50 82.68 86.20 83.40 78.80 80.61 
 
From Table 6.5, it can be seen that the sample represents the population by including 
ILGs with varying of SAKIP scores. In 2016, the MSAEBR reported that the average 
SAKIP score for ILGs was C (Jajeli, 2017). In general, the respondents have better 
scores in the performance planning and performance reporting components. The 
statistical result also shows that ILGs scored lower in the measurement and evaluation 
components than in other components. Based on the statistical result and SAKIP scoring 
component analysis, it can be seen that ILGs focus more on getting evaluation points 
from components that place emphasis on providing documents and less on getting 
points from components that require ILGs to create new routines such as measuring 
performance or evaluating internal performance. The result also shows that measuring 
performance is still not a common routine in ILGs despite the SAKIP initiative was 
introduced 16 years ago. On the other hand, ILGs are more comfortable with the 
reporting requirement of SAKIP, which indicates ILGs’ tendency to meet requests from 
the central agencies. Eighty-five percent of respondents indicate that various 
performance information templates issued by various ministries should be combined 
because they are essentially covering the same information.  
The second statistical analysis was to seek the impact of ILG location on each of the 
SAKIP score components. The statistical result shows that there is no significant impact 
of the respondent’s location (i.e., in Java or out of Java) on the achievement of each 
score component. This result is in line with the PLS-SEM analysis in Chapter 5 that 
showed location was not a significant factor that determined ILGs’ decision to adopt 
SAKIP. In contrast with previous research that considered the location on the Java 
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Island as a favourable factor for SAKIP’s adoption and implementation (Akbar, 2011), 
this result showed that it is no longer a factor after 16 years of its implementation 
because all ILGs have fairly similar knowledge about SAKIP and its implementation. 
The result also indicates that the MSAEBR has provided relatively similar support and 
assistance for ILGs regardless of their location in Indonesia.  
The final statistical analysis performed is to seek a correlation between the total SAKIP 
score and the ILGs’ population, area size, and budget size. The result of the statistical 
analysis shows that only the population variable has a significant correlation with the 
SAKIP score. On the other hand, the area and the budget sizes of the ILGs do not have 
significant correlation with the SAKIP score. The result of the correlation analysis 
indicates that financial resource and the size of the ILG’s administrative area do not 
play a key role that affects SAKIP implementation in ILGs. Population becomes an 
important factor in SAKIP implementation because the ILGs may need SAKIP to assist 
in evaluating more complex programs launched to tackle increasing social matters that 
came from the increasing population. The findings from this statistical analysis will be 
used to explain factors influencing the adoption and utilisation of SAKIP in ILGs.  
6.3 Qualitative Results  
This section discusses the findings from the second stage of the study – the qualitative 
method. The purpose of the qualitative study was to confirm results from the 
quantitative stage and to comprehensively gain participants’ thoughts and views regarding 
institutional pressures surrounding the relationship between the adoption and utilisation of 
SAKIP and organisational learning. The interviews gave a direction to answer the fourth 
research question: “Do the isomorphism mechanisms of institutional theory aid in 
explaining the utilisation of a centralistic MCS as local governments’ attempt to comply 
with the associated regulations?”  
As mentioned in Chapter Two, previous researchers have identified the existence of 
institutional isomorphism regarding the adoption of SAKIP in ILGs. However, how the 
three types of isomorphic pressures shape ILG behaviour in utilizing SAKIP as a means 
to achieve organisational learning capabilities in Indonesian local government is still not 
clear. Organisational learning is defined as the capacity of an organisation to collect, 
interpret, share, and recall knowledge. Organisations may use performance feedback to 
have a better understanding of the current environmental change and to adapt to new 
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challenges by modifying their structure, procedures or strategy. This study will identify 
the interplay among institutional isomorphism to investigate the context and purpose 
that shape ILG learning capabilities (learning process and outcomes) after having been 
implementing SAKIP for almost 16 years. 
6.3.1 Factors influencing the adoption of SAKIP in ILGs 
The following sections present the factors influencing the adoption of SAKIP in ILGs. 
The results show the interplay of exogenous and endogenous factors that promote the 
adoption of SAKIP in all ILGs. Table 6.6 highlights the interview results regarding 
factors that influence ILGs in adopting SAKIP. 
Table 6.6: Highlights of SAKIP's adoption actors 
Factors Elements Total Responses 
External Pressures 
Presidential regulations 20 
MSAEBR regulations 20 
MSAEBR guidelines 
Political pressures 
14 
2 
Penalties 8 
Internal Pressures 
Organisation Administrative department 16 
Internal audit department 10 
Planning department 2 
Top management want to change the system 
Prestige
8 
6 
Facilitators of Change 
Promoter: The MSAEBR 20 
Promoter: The BPKP 13 
Producer of information: Management commitment 11 
Communicator: The MSAEBR and the BPKP 6 
Barriers Lack of supportive culture and mindset within the ILGs 4 
 
As can be seen in Table 6.6, there are four factors that influence the adoption of SAKIP 
in ILGs. From Chapter Four, it was found that external pressures, internal pressures, and 
facilitators of change are significantly correlated with the adoption of SAKIP. Despite it 
not being found to be statistically significant, barriers to the adoption of SAKIP is still 
included in the analysis to add more dimension in explaining the connection between 
the adoption and the use of SAKIP. 
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6.3.1.1 External pressures  
Prior to 1998, ILGs were part of government entities that operated under a centralised 
authoritarian government administration for four decades. During this time, the central 
government was very dominant to the point that it had more controlling power than the 
parliament. Regulations issued by central government agencies were always followed 
by ILGs. After the fall of Suharto in 1998, the government system was transformed into 
a more decentralised democratic government that gave autonomy to ILGs to govern. 
However, it did not promptly remove the controlling power possessed by central 
government agencies. Despite ILGs now having more freedom, regulations from central 
government agencies still have strong and binding coercive powers that require ILGs to 
pay attention to fulfilling them. 
In this thesis, external pressures refer to organisational factors that can shape the 
process of change. In discussing external pressures surrounding the adoption of SAKIP, 
all of the ILG officials (100%) acknowledge the role of SAKIP’s regulation and 
periodic guidelines issued by the MSAEBR as factors that mainly drove them to adopt 
and implement SAKIP. Most interviewees acknowledge that despite there being no 
financial consequence for failing to adopt SAKIP, the instructions issued in the form of 
the MSAEBR regulations have given them no choice but to and comply with them 
(L10, L19). As one respondent mentioned: 
 “(…) The reason why we adopt SAKIP is because of the presidential 
regulation and the MSAEBR regulation that require us to do so. We do 
not want to receive any warning or be in a difficult situation if we do not 
apply it”(L4). 
Another coercive power possessed by central government agencies, including the 
MSAEBR, is the ability to provide a warning note to an ILG that fails to comply with 
their regulations. Since all ILGs’ leaders are elected officials, such a note is sufficient to 
make them pay more attention to SAKIP or they may lose face if the MSAEBR brings 
up the issue in any national-scale meeting or event. For some ILGs leaders, “losing 
face” carries a big political price that may harm their opportunity to be re-elected in the 
next term. As one interviewee put it,  
“SAKIP came to us in the form of regulations. Therefore, we need to 
implement it. Otherwise, the Regent will lose face if we receive a warning 
from the MSAEBR for failing to do it” (L19). 
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Contrary to previous research, the interviewees revealed that there is no financial 
consequence if an ILG failed to implement SAKIP or to submit an annual performance 
report. There has been a continuous threat from the MSAEBR to cut funds from the 
central government if ILGs fail to adopt SAKIP or perform poorly. However, all of the 
threats stop at the newspaper headlines and discussions. None of them has been 
implemented in any regulation or formal letter issued by the MSAEBR. ILGs have 
learned that such threats to cut transfer funding from the central government to ILGs 
will never come into effect due to the complicated political aspects surrounding the 
issue. The worst-case scenario is the fund would be delayed, but not stopped. As 
acknowledged by one interviewee,  
“last year the MOF decided to cancel a portion of the transfer fund due 
to the national budget deficit. However, it did not take long until they 
changed the word from ‘cancelling’ into ‘delaying’” (L11).  
Another interviewee noted: 
“Until now, there has been no consequence if we fail to submit a 
performance report. The MSAEBR has been developing ideas about it. 
However, no decision regarding a penalty has been made.” (L4) 
When discussing pressures from other external users of information, such as politicians 
or parliamentary committees, the interviewees disclosed that none of those possible 
external users of information used SAKIP as in an attempt to satisfy voters’ needs and 
to remain politically competitive. There are two reasons that can explain the lack of 
pressure from the local parliament to submit SAKIP. The first one is that ILGs provide 
a different performance report to the local parliament every year called LKPJ. LKPJ is 
submitted to local parliament at the end of the budget year. Despite containing various 
performance information elements that can be retracted from SAKIP,  LKPJ is not 
derived from the same regulations that apply to SAKIP. As acknowledged by one 
interviewee, “we provide a different report to the local parliament called LKPJ”(L19). 
LKPJ is a performance report that is regulated by GR No. 3 of 2007. The regulation 
requires LKPJ to focus on reporting certain aspects of ILGs, such as financial, 
procedures, and products/output (Hudaya, 2014). As a result, members of a local 
parliament focus on asking output-related questions such as budget absorption or update 
on a program’s progress. As one interview put it: 
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“Unlike SAKIP, LKPJ focused on reporting output and not outcome. I 
think that is why local parliaments often ask about programs and budget 
money absorption. They never ask an outcome-related question such as 
why the budget money absorption is high (good output) but there are still 
complaints out there (bad outcome)” (L2). 
6.3.1.2 Internal pressures 
Internal pressures refer to factors from within organisations that can lead and motivate a 
change in the organisation (Upping and Oliver, 2011). Regarding pressures from the 
internal organisational environment, the interviewees mention attitudes toward change 
as one element of such pressure that mainly comes from three departments: (1) the 
planning department; (2) the internal audit department; and (3) the organisation 
administrative department. The planning department is responsible for translating the 
ILG’s vision and mission into planning documents, such as 5-year plans and annual 
plan documents. The planning department is also responsible for translating an ILG’s 
general policies into priority programs with sound performance indicators to measure 
program achievement. While all departments are required to report their activities and 
actual performance, the organisation administrative department is responsible for the 
performance report for the ILG. The internal audit department is responsible for 
auditing the programs carried out by all the ILG’s departments and reporting their audit 
and evaluation result to the head of the ILG. In regards to SAKIP implementation, the 
organisation administrative department is responsible for preparing a consolidated 
performance report, and the internal audit department is responsible for evaluating the 
implementation of SAKIP in all ILG departments. One interviewee explained the 
pressures that come from the relationship among these departments. 
“The performance accountability regime embedded in SAKIP is carried 
out by three departments, i.e., the planning, internal audit, and 
organisation administrative departments. The head of ILGs monitors all 
departments’ performance by using the outputs from these three 
departments.” (L3). 
Most interviewees admitted the important role of leadership in shaping the ILG’s choice 
to utilise SAKIP. Different leaders may have different attention levels towards SAKIP. 
ILGs with good scores (A and BB) tend to have leaders who are willing to use SAKIP 
further by integrating it with other systems within their ILG. Since most ILGs are still 
run with strict regulations and procedures, it requires some extra initiatives from the 
head of an ILG to push the bureaucracy to integrate different systems into SAKIP 
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without having to align the regulations behind those systems. The additional benefit of 
integrating SAKIP with other systems is a bonus point from the SAKIP scoring system 
that can change a SAKIP evaluation score from “B” to “BB” or from “BB” to “A” (L1, 
L2, L3, L11). As this participant indicated: 
“Our mayor committed to use SAKIP extensively. He is able to move the 
bureaucracy machine to use technology despite it not having been 
regulated. He linked SAKIP with other systems in the form of internet-
based applications. He set up a command centre where all applications 
are connected and integrated” (L2). 
The other strong motivation for ILG leaders to use SAKIP is the SAKIP awards 
ceremony held by the MSAEBR as the culmination of the evaluation process. The 
awards ceremony is attended by important national figures  sometimes it is attended by 
the Vice President of Indonesia  and covered by the national media. The seating 
arrangement during the ceremony is based on the SAKIP score, which means the heads 
of ILGs with high SAKIP scores will sit the front rows near the main stage, and those 
with lower scores will sit at the back. During the ceremony, the Minister of State 
Apparatus will generally praise the heads of ILGs with high SAKIP scores and criticise 
those with low SAKIP scores. Most ILGs identify the fame and the shame that can be 
experienced from the Annual SAKIP Awards ceremony as another factor behind the 
head of an ILG’s willingness to strive for achieving a better SAKIP score. Despite there 
being no financial reward for the award, being seated at the back bench in an event 
covered by the media is an unpleasant situation that they do not want to experience 
again in the following year’s award ceremony. The following are the expressions of 
three interviewees regarding the heads of their ILGs’ feelings toward the ceremony: 
“(…), the Regent will be very upset if we score ‘C’ again this year.”(L19) 
“(…) the achievement in performance report gives us confidence that we 
are on the right track. We were very proud when the Regent received the 
award. At that time, there were only 11 districts that received such an 
award.”(L11). 
“I remember one Regent suddenly left the ceremony after he found out his 
ILG got “D”. He left to avoid being asked by other ILGs’ leaders” (L2). 
On the other hand, there are also ILGs that tend to maintain their use of SAKIP at a 
minimum level. These are ILGs with scores of “CC” and below. The heads of these 
ILGs seem to be satisfied with their current state of SAKIP implementation. As one 
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interviewee mentioned: 
“SAKIP is a tool provided by the central government for politically 
elected officials such as the Regent. It is up to him on how he wants to use 
it. If he does not want to use it to the next level, I cannot do anything 
about it. Does he worry about the grade? Yes, he does because he is a 
public official, and public officials need some degree of 
acknowledgement. If he wants to be more than what we have achieved, we 
have to be ready to respond to him”(L15).  
Another reason for the head of the ILG to be satisfied with the organisation’s current 
SAKIP achievement is because the head of the ILG is still focused on other bigger 
issues, such as corruption. The incongruity between a good SAKIP score and corruption 
has been an ongoing discussion among Indonesia’s government practitioners, because 
corruption, including major corruption, also happens in institutions with a good SAKIP 
grade. As one interviewee put it:  
“(…) he (the head of ILG) always said, it is more important to have a 
clean government than to have a good SAKIP score but in the following 
day there is still corruption in my ILG” (L9). 
6.3.1.3 Facilitators of change 
Facilitators of change refers to factors that directly influence a successful change or 
reform. Chapter Three has identified three actors that facilitate the change to process. 
They are promoters of change, producers of information, and communicators of change. 
The majority of interviewees acknowledged the role of the MSAEBR and the central 
government’s audit authority (BPKP) as the promoter that fosters them to adopt and 
implement SAKIP in their ILGs. The MSAEBR and the BPKP shared similar roles 
regarding the evaluation of SAKIP implementation in ILGs. The only difference is they 
look after different entities based on the entity’s location. The MSAEBR and the BPKP 
can review the current SAKIP implementation and provide input to improve the ILGs’ 
SAKIP score for the next assessment period. The MSAEBR and the BPKP offered help 
to ILGs with low SAKIP scores (C or D) by offering the consultation times to identify 
elements from the SAKIP scoring components that need to be improved. As explained 
by one interviewee,  
“The MSAEBR proactively invited us twice to have two meetings with 
them in order to review our SAKIP and to identify factors that can 
improve our grades. Now we have had “B” from the last evaluation.” 
(L19).  
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Previous research observed that there is always a bureaucratic actor inside a government 
agency that is responsible for providing performance information to the users, such as 
central agencies, politicians, or auditors (Christensen, 2002; Upping and Oliver, 2011). 
In SAKIP’s case, this responsibility is exerted by the ILG’s senior officials from the 
organisation administrative department, one of whose roles is to prepare the 
consolidated performance report. Officials from the organisation administrative 
department manage and maintain SAKIP implementation by issuing SAKIP guidelines 
to the ILG’s other departments, conducting SAKIP-related training, and rectifying other 
departments’ SAKIP implementation mistakes. As one respondent mentioned:    
“We conduct training every year to get other departments familiar with 
the SAKIP guidelines that we issued. There are some technical 
departments who do not pay attention to our guidelines and directions. As 
a result they make repetitive mistakes by using incorrect KPIs.” (L18) 
Lastly, communication is also an essential part in facilitating change through knowledge 
transfer. In their research, Upping and Oliver (2012) included training, seminars, 
publications, technology, and allocated staff resources as elements of communicators 
for change. In this case, the MSAEBR and the BPKP become the main source of 
information. They have resources and skilled personnel who are able to provide 
information to help ILGs to improve their SAKIP implementation. In addition, BPKP 
has branch offices across Indonesia that make consultation accessible to all ILGs that 
needed them. Beside SAKIP implementation, BPKP is also responsible for maintaining 
the implementation of the internal control system in local governments, which makes 
them always accessible to provide advice for local government. 
“We invite BPKP to give us training or refreshment training on how to 
prepare a good performance report.” (L14). 
“Regarding SAKIP, we assume that each department should know what 
to do because it has a planning unit inside each department. We can 
invite BPKP if they want to have some training about SAKIP.”(L15). 
“We invite assessors from the MSAEBR or BPKP to train us twice a 
year.” (L11). 
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6.3.2 The relationship between adopting and utilizing a centralistic management 
control system in ILGs 
In this thesis, the relationship between the adoption and the utilisation of SAKIP in 
ILGs is represented by the diagnostic and interactive use of SAKIP. The dynamics in 
the use of SAKIP information by the heads of ILGs can indicate the diagnostic and 
interactive use of SAKIP by ILG officials. Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 highlight the 
interview results regarding various sources of information used by top management in 
their regular coordination meetings and the frequency of the meetings respectively. 
Table 6.7: Source information used at the coordination meetings 
Major source of Information 
Total 
Responses 
Activity report 14 
Progress report  budget used and activity done 20 
Budget and KPI report 7 
Previous meeting agenda 16 
Whatsapp group discussion 11 
Internal audit 2 
Presentation from each division 8 
Social media page 7 
 
Table 6.8: Frequency of the coordination meeting 
Coordination meeting frequency Total Responses
Weekly 14 
Monthly 4 
Quarterly 2 
 
In discussing the diagnostic use of SAKIP, the interviewees highlighted two points that 
can explain the insignificant statistic relationship between the adoption and diagnostic 
use of SAKIP: (1) instead of using information from SAKIP, the majority of ILGs use 
accounting information in their regular coordination meetings; (2) information from 
SAKIP is highly used diagnostically during the performance report preparation between 
January and March each year. 
6.3.2.1 The intensive use of information from finance and activity reports 
The adoption of SAKIP is not followed by a continuous diagnostic use in ILG 
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managerial meetings. All ILGs have regular meeting routines attended by all heads of 
department. The meeting is generally held monthly, although some ILGs have it weekly 
or quarterly. During such meetings, most ILGs discuss: (1) the progress of current year 
programs and the actual use of budget money; and (2) selected topics at the 
Governor/Mayor/Regent’s discretion. The main source of data is the information 
provided by the accounting information system. The use of information from the 
finance or accounting system is preferable because it provides detailed and up-to-date 
information regarding the actual and budgeted figures for all activities. Generally, the 
first thing that always attracts the head of the ILG’s and other senior executives’ 
attention in a coordination meeting is a significant gap between the actual and budgeted 
figures (L8 and L10). This phenomenon is common in Indonesia because government 
agencies have been using information from the accounting department since for a long 
time since they still applied the line budgeting system. As acknowledged by one 
interviewee,  
“Most of the time they used a monthly progress report. The report 
contains percentage of activities done and percentage of money spent” 
(L4).  
Other sources of information used by the heads of ILGs for their coordination meetings 
are complaints from citizens and performance feedback from SAKIP. Complaints from 
citizens are gathered from several sources, such as open house sessions, direct messages 
to the heads of ILGs’ mobile phones, and Whatsapp and other social media lines that 
can be used by publics to voice their suggestions. There are only a few ILGs that 
regularly used SAKIP in their coordination meetings. One general reason for not using 
SAKIP as the main source of information is because the information is not fully 
available until the end of the year. Only ILGs that have integrated SAKIP with other 
systems are able to use performance information in their coordination meetings. As 
explained by one interviewee,  
“We use any kind of information available to be discussed in our 
coordination meeting. We use progress reports, performance information 
from SAKIP; and citizens’ inputs or complaints gathered from open house 
sessions or from social media” (L1). 
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6.3.2.2 Temporary diagnostic use of SAKIP 
Another reason behind the lack of diagnostic use of SAKIP information is because the 
intensity of ILGs’ use of information from SAKIP increases only during the preparation 
and the submission of the ILG’s consolidated performance report during the period 
from January until March each year. According to Permenpan RB53/2014, there are two 
kinds of performance report that need to be prepared by the ILGs. The first one is the 
department’s performance report. All departments within ILGs are required to prepare 
their performance report within two months after the end of the budget date. Once it is 
finished, the reports will be evaluated by the internal audit department using the 
evaluation format and template provided by the MSAEBR. The second one is the ILG’s 
consolidated performance report. The consolidated performance report is prepared by 
combining the department’s performance report. At the end of the cycle, the 
consolidated report and the performance evaluation report are submitted to the 
MSAEBR to be assessed and graded. During this period, the performance information 
from SAKIP is used intensively in ILG coordination meetings because performance 
evaluation and performance achievement are two of the five components that will be 
evaluated by the MSAEBR. Two interviewees said: 
“After completing the SAKIP assessment, the internal audit department 
presents their SAKIP recommendation for each department to the Regent 
in the coordination meetings. The Regent gives directions to all 
departments regarding findings from the internal audit; and the 
departments have to respond by presenting the follow-up actions in the 
following meetings” (L20). 
“The MSAEBR uses a different approach when reviewing ILGs. For ILGs 
with score “A” or “B”, they focus on the performance achievement 
component. If the grade is still “C” or below, the MSAEBR only looks at 
the completeness of the supporting documents.” (L4). 
From the interviews, it was found that ILGs with good SAKIP scores (“A” or “BB”) 
have used SAKIP diagnostically on a regular basis. They use information from SAKIP 
to regularly evaluate the performance of the heads of departments throughout the year. 
They also use performance information from SAKIP to evaluate the departments’ 
performance. Using SAKIP along with other sources of information, mentioned in the 
above sections, these ILG leaders monitor every department’s performance and identify 
problems that can distract ILGs from performing well. Other ILGs’ leaders use the 
information to infuse a sense of competitiveness among heads of departments by 
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announcing each department’s performance achievements in each meeting. As 
explained by one interviewee:  
“In our quarterly coordination meeting, the Regent evaluates the 
performance of all departments and announces three departments with 
the best performance and three departments with the worst performance. 
Every three months, all departments are evaluated based on: (1) the 
budget absorption; (2) the number of audit recommendations that have 
been followed up; (3) staff attendance; and (4) the KPI achievement.” 
(L11). 
6.3.2.3 The interactive use of SAKIP 
Chapter Two has identified interactive control systems as systems used to discuss 
strategic uncertainties, to learn novel strategic responses to a changing environment and 
to promote and provoke discussion (Tuomela, 2005). Based on this definition, Bobe 
(2012, p. 115) identified several main features of interactive control systems, such as 
“feedback and measurement systems used to elaborate and implement strategy, to 
facilitate strategic change, to help manage strategic uncertainties, and to serve learning 
and adaptation”. 
In discussing the interactive use of SAKIP, the interviewees highlighted an important 
point that can explain the low statistical explanatory proportion between the adoption 
and interactive use of SAKIP that was below the minimum threshold.  
The majority of ILGs use SAKIP interactively only to find ways to improve their 
SAKIP score next year. The evaluation result from the MSAEBR is reviewed and 
broken down to a departmental level. Different ILGs take different approaches in 
reviewing the results of the MSAEBR assessment. Some of them form a team to discuss 
the findings from the MSAEBR, to identify and monitor actions taken to follow up the 
MSAEBR recommendations. The team consists of a group of people coming from 
different departments, such as planning, internal audit, accounting, and organisation 
administrative departments. They focus on identifying efforts that need to be taken to 
increase their score and on encouraging departments to implement those efforts (L1, L2, 
and L3).  
ILGs with good grades have a tendency to include the evaluation results from the 
MSAEBR and internal audit department in their decision to promote or demote a head 
of department. In those ILGs, the performance evaluation is conducted on regular basis 
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 i.e., quarterly or half yearly. If the department with the worst performance does not 
show any signs of improvement, the head of department is very likely to be replaced 
(L11). As explained by one respondent,  
“The Mayor does not want to waste his energy to find out why a 
department still performs poorly. He just quietly replaces the head of 
department so that no one will be humiliated.” (L2) 
ILGs with the highest grade showed extra initiative in seeking more intensive assistance 
from the MSAEBR to improve their SAKIP score by encouraging not only the heads of 
department but also the managers to visit the MSAEBR office in Jakarta to have a one-
on-one SAKIP consultation session. As a result, almost all managers in the ILG are 
fluent in the SAKIP scoring system and fully aware of tips and tricks to improve their 
scores. As one participant indicated,  
“After we send managers to the MSAEBR office in Jakarta to learn how 
to have a proper SAKIP. Now all managers are familiar with difficult 
issues such as aligning strategic plan to annual plan or cascading KPIs 
from organisational level to division and sub-division levels.”(L2) 
All interviewers agree that all these efforts revolved around the issue of improving their 
SAKIP grades and not losing face in the awards ceremony attended by all ILGs leaders 
from all over Indonesia. As one participant explained,  
“we remember the first time our Mayor went to the ceremony. He sat at 
the front row only to be asked to move to the back because our score at 
that time was C. It was so shameful.” (L2) 
6.3.3 SAKIP’s impact on organisational learning capabilities in ILGs 
The final question of this research is how government can learn from performance 
information provided by its management control system? What kind of feedback 
mechanism exists in ILGs that can help manager’s fine tune or change their business 
strategy? In order to tackle these questions, the interviews focused on identifying the 
roles of SAKIP as a tool that can trigger learning in ILGs. An MCS can be identified as 
one of the many sources of organisational learning (Burr, 2009). It can be used to 
collect and store significant knowledge from the experience of past success and failures. 
The essence of organisational learning is the capacity to make change in an 
organisation. Common (2004) suggested that government agencies should apply their 
knowledge to change the policy implementation or change departmental activities in 
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order to perform well. Table 6.9 highlights the interview results regarding ILGs’ 
organisational learning capacity. 
Table 6.9: ILGs organisational learning capacity 
ILGs’ Organisational learning capacity Total Responses 
The availability of a discussion forum 3 
The ability to regularly revise SOP 16 
The ability to change organisational structure 1 
SAKIP is used as the basis for HR policy 5 
SAKIP is used to trigger innovation 11
 
During the interviews, the respondents were asked about the ability of their ILGs to 
perform several activities that indicate the organisation’s learning capacity. These 
activities were: the availability of a discussion forum where all employees are free to 
voice their ideas, the organisational ability to look at their current standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) and review them on a timely basis, the organisational ability to 
change its organisational structure to meet current challenges, the use of performance 
information as the basis for HR policy, and the use of performance information to 
trigger innovation.  
This section provides the results of the thematic analysis of the responses 
collected from questions regarding the impact of SAKIP use on the ILGs’ 
organisational learning capabilities. The patterns (themes) are derived from 
several examples from the literature explained in Chapter Two.  
6.3.3.1 SAKIP as a tool to trigger discussions 
One major component of organisational learning is a safe space for employees to be 
able to throw or challenge ideas to improve the organisation’s performance. The 
majority of ILGs do not have a discussion forum available in its structure where 
opinions are freely expressed and ideas are unreservedly raised. There is only one ILG 
that indicated it had a formal discussion forum but it is restricted in the department 
level.  
“We have had an SOP that encourages staff to report progress or discuss 
any program-related issue within their department by using formal and 
non-formal channels, including by using social media” (L1). 
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The other ILGs only describe a dynamic discussion in their regular coordination 
meetings where participants (i.e., heads of departments) are given opportunities to speak 
their ideas or opinions regarding the issues being discussed. If one department has 
difficulty executing a program, other heads of department can offer possible solutions 
(L2, L13). However, the meetings are generally limited to senior officials only. 
Therefore, it curbs the possibility of getting ideas for a solution from many sources, 
including from frontline staff that may have valuable insights (Burr, 2009).  
6.3.3.2 SAKIP as a tool to trigger change in the organisational structure 
Another indicator of having a working organisational learning capacity is the ability to 
use past performance to modify the current organisational structure to adapt to the 
dynamic of environmental changes in order to improve. ILGs are still unable to use their 
performance information from SAKIP to adjust their structure because the ability to 
modify structure is still under the authority of the MOHA. The MOHA issued a 
regulation that rigidly required ILGs to have a particular organisational structure based 
on the local government pre-defined groups. ILGs across Indonesia have a similar 
organisational structure because they have to comply with the centralistic organisational 
structure designed by the MOHA. ILGs have to try to fit the current structure with their 
current or even ongoing challenges, and any mismatch will result in overlapping roles 
or wasted resources. The ILGs’ inability to freely adjust their organisational structure 
may affect their motivation to fully implement SAKIP. One interviewee noted: 
“Last year, the MOHA issued a regulation regarding the new 
organisational structure. However, the new structure cannot fully support 
us to achieve our strategic goals because it does not match with our 
strategic issues and purposes. As a result, there are still positions that 
overlap with each other and are underutilised, but there is nothing we can 
do about it. We just have to make sure the underutilised position still has 
KPIs attached to it” (L2) 
6.3.3.3 SAKIP as a tool to trigger Standard Operating Procedures’ reviews 
There are mixed results regarding the use of SAKIP and the ongoing revision of 
standard operating procedures (SOPs). Most ILGs have already a mechanism to review 
their SOPs. When a current SOP is considered to be no longer viable with the current 
demand, a new SOP is drafted, tested, and implemented. ILGs usually identified the 
need to make a new SOP when the old one is considered no longer effective in 
producing high-quality outputs. ILGs usually form a team to review the current SOP 
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before deciding to make a new one (L9). As a result, the use of performance 
information from SAKIP to revise the current SOP is only an option for ILGs that 
already have a good SAKIP system in place. 
6.3.3.4 SAKIP used as a Human Resource Management (HRM) tool  
Another important factor that can trigger effective organisational learning is a close link 
between organisational achievement and personal reward. Unfortunately, most ILGs 
still do not have a clear link between performance and HRM policy, such as the 
decision to promote or demote their employees. While most ILGs still emphasise that 
informal factors such as closeness to the source of power. For example, the head of an 
ILG or a political party  are a key factor in personal reward five ILGs have already 
linked performance information to HRM decisions. These ILGs have linked a 
department’s performance with staff bonuses for the corresponding department, or with 
the promotion or demotion of the heads of departments. The link between organisational 
and individual performance has been included in the SAKIP scoring system. The 
inability of most ILGs to implement it indicated a cultural barrier that may impede the 
ILGs’ learning ability. As explained by one interviewee,  
“the head of ILG prefer to use the locals to fill up key positions in this 
ILG because he is also a local. He wants to dignify the locals and to 
preserve our values”. (L8)  
 
6.3.3.5 SAKIP as a tool to trigger innovation in ILGs 
Previous research argued that innovation in the public sector is limited to improving a 
program’s input and output ratio, instead of improving the program’s outcome (Burr, 
2009). Similar to Burr’s argument, most ILGs focus their innovation on input and 
output efficiency. All ILGs do not have a research mechanism to innovate in place. 
Most ILG innovation is due to the awards provided by the MSAEBR for an annual ILGs 
innovation competition and a bonus point in the SAKIP scoring system.  
6.3.4 The role of isomorphism in ILG behaviour toward SAKIP 
It can be seen that SAKIP is used diagnostically and interactively in ILGs. However, the 
utilisation of SAKIP is limited during the preparation of performance reports to be 
submitted to the MSAEBR for a very specific purpose, for example to have a better 
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SAKIP score, to avoid shame at the SAKIP Awards ceremony and, hopefully, to 
achieve fame by getting the SAKIP Award.  
The role of isomorphism is clearly demonstrated in SAKIP implementation in ILGs 
because almost all ILGs show great similarity in their behaviour toward SAKIP 
utilisation. Coercive isomorphism is displayed when ILGs conform to a series of 
SAKIP-related regulations despite there being some confusion or contradiction among 
regulations. Normative isomorphism is displayed by the continuous consultations 
between ILGs and the MSAEBR or BPKP. Some ILGs regularly invite the MSAEBR to 
conduct a workshop on SAKIP implementation and to receive some tips to get a better 
SAKIP score. Mimetic isomorphism is displayed by ILGs through comparing with and 
copying from ILGs that have better SAKIP scores. 
The utilisation of SAKIP does not influence the ILGs learning capabilities. ILGs cannot 
use the performance feedback from SAKIP to observe their surroundings and respond 
properly by making a timely change in their organisational structure because they are 
still significantly controlled by the MOHA. ILGs are still unable to link organisational 
performance to individual performance because political and cultural aspects are still 
important factors in HRM policy. More advanced ILGs only apply performance-based 
promotion and demotion decisions to managers and supervisors, but not to all 
employees. As a result, this limits the learning culture in the organisation.  
Based on the interviews, SAKIP’s components are not utilised by ILGs as a tool to 
anticipate future circumstances. SAKIP’s features intended to anticipate future threats 
and opportunities, such as strategic planning and performance evaluation, cannot be 
used interactively because some essential organisational aspects of ILGs are 
circumscribed by external parties, such as the MSAEBR, MOHA, and local parliament. 
ILGs are unable to change their 5-year strategic plan without having to go through a 
long political process between ILGs and the local parliaments. Interviewees indicated 
their reluctance to change their strategic plans because they do not want to spend too 
much energy going through the process. Some ILGs prefer to keep their old strategic 
plan and simply include elements from the new plan in the programs in an annual plan. 
As a result, they do not receive a good SAKIP score because the strategic plan is not 
aligned with the annual plan. With this problem occurring from time to time, the 
MSAEBR, instead of taking the initiative to talk to the MOHA to solve the problem, 
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decided to accommodate the partial changes in the annual plan and advised ILGs to 
continue such practice as long as they include new KPIs in the existing strategic plan 
that link to the new program in the annual plan. The reward for tweaking the KPIs is 
some extra points in the SAKIP score. Such a solution gives a strong message to ILGs 
that it is more important to align the performance indicators between strategic planning 
and annual planning to avoid penalties during performance measurement and 
evaluation. ILG bureaucrats dance around the conflicting regulations and cultural 
barriers in order to get along with all parties and avoid any problems. However, they do 
so by sacrificing the full potential of SAKIP as a tool to anticipate future opportunities 
and to identify potential risks to their organisations. 
Learning from past experience, most ILGs strategically reduce the meaning of SAKIP 
from a system that can provide information that will assist managers in planning, 
decision making, and evaluation into a system that focuses on: (1) the alignment of the 
strategic plan document to the annual plan document, (2) the accuracy in cascading the 
strategic plan’s KPIs to individual KPIs, and (3) providing supporting documents prior 
to MSAEBR evaluation in order to have a good SAKIP score.  
It can be seen that ILGs strategically limit their learning capabilities by only using 
SAKIP to the degree that it will only improve their SAKIP score. The existing coercive, 
normative and mimetic isomorphisms have created a prison for ILGs regarding how to 
fully use SAKIP. SAKIP is narrowly defined as a system that aligns planning and 
performance evaluation documents. As a result, ILGs fail to identify and provide 
necessary organisational infrastructures to follow up performance feedback from 
SAKIP. The overall ILGs bureaucratic environment do not have a structure or formal 
process that rewards ILGs for analysing and anticipating future trends and establishing a 
free and safe space to express their ideas without fear of being punished or humiliated.  
The availability of a unit that uses key information from SAKIP to identify new 
possibilities in providing better services to citizens or to recognise potential risks would 
bring SAKIP utilisation to the next level: from the performance planning and 
measurement level to the performance improvement level. The availability of a safe 
space for ILG employees to express their thoughts would create a learning culture in the 
organisation. The ILGs’ ability to modify their structure would bring agility and 
dynamism for ILGs in responding to new issues, thus providing better services to 
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citizen. Finally, the ILGs ability to link individual with organisational performance 
would bring clarity for employees in doing their job and provide clear incentives that 
would improve competitiveness in ILGs. 
6.4 Summary 
SAKIP as the management control system in ILGs is the tool for ILGs to continuously 
improve their services to their citizens by providing performance feedback to the ILG 
management. The SAKIP guidelines emphasise the ongoing plan, do, check and act (P-
D-C-A) cycle to ensure ILGs accomplish their mission and achieve the vision stated in 
their strategic plan. 
During SAKIP’s implementation, ILGs recognise that they have to observe various 
SAKIP-related regulations issued by the MSAEBR in order to achieve a good grade and 
avoid shame during the Annual SAKIP Awards ceremony. On the other hand, SAKIP-
related regulations do not always comply with other regulations issued by the MOHA 
and the MOF. Having to obey various regulations applied upon them, the ILGs have to 
manoeuvre through the regulations by identifying and delivering the minimum 
requirements for each regulation at first and fulfil the rest of the requirements over the 
time.  
This situation has impeded ILGs’ capability to anticipate future opportunities or 
problems; and to creatively look for solutions. Further, it has encouraged ILGs to be 
more reactive than anticipative in making decisions. The opportunity to be creative in 
responding to performance feedback from SAKIP is hampered by the inability to 
change their organisational structure due to strong control by the MOHA or by the 
inability to effectively change their strategic plan due to a long political process with the 
local parliament. ILGs become organisations with a strong tendency not to change their 
planning documents. If there is any deviation from the plan or any new problems arising 
along the way, these will be dealt with accordingly without having to change the 
existing plan or organisational structure. The ILGs inability to effectively change their 
structure or systems has hindered their capacity to learn because they cannot use their 
knowledge to change their organisations accordingly.  
When ILGs are required to be innovative in providing services to citizens, they focus on 
innovation that only affects input and output in order to keep the current system intact. 
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Previous research has mentioned that government agencies tend to focus on input and 
output for their innovation, and not on their outcome. This finding may provide a 
certain degree of explanation regarding innovation in public organisations.  
From the interviews, it emerged that all respondents do not have formal mechanisms to 
anticipate the future. ILGs tend to be reactive by only facing the problems at hand. ILGs 
do not use the features in SAKIP for learning purposes due to (1) being highly 
dependent on an ILGs leader’s willingness to use SAKIP to a certain extent, (2) there 
being no formal structure in place to encourage ILG staff to freely propose an idea, and 
(3) ILGs not having flexibility to modify their structure. ILGs’ organisational structure 
is designed and regulated by the MOHA.  
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 Discussion and Conclusion Chapter 7:
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis has examined the adoption and implementation of a centralistic management 
control system in ILGs. A theoretical model of the adoption of SAKIP in ILGs and the 
relationship between the use of SAKIP and ILGs’ organisational learning capabilities 
was developed and tested empirically within an institutional theory framework. This 
final chapter draws a summary of previous chapters, highlights the key findings, 
provides theoretical and practical implications, recommends questions for future 
research, and finally offers closing remarks. A summary of the research objectives is 
presented in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 provides a summary of the results and key findings 
of the study. Section 7.4 details the contributions of this research. Section 7.5 highlights 
managerial and policy implications of this thesis. Section 7.6 discusses the limitations 
of this thesis and proposes future research directions, and finally, the remarks in Section 
7.7 complete this thesis. 
7.2 Summary of the Research Objectives 
There is an increasing demand for greater accountability and transparency in the public 
sector. The demand for more accountability has motivated a widespread interest in 
measuring the financial and non-financial performance of government agencies to 
explain the way policy and programs are developed and managed. On the other hand, 
the demand for greater accountability may bring an undesirable consequence to 
organisational learning capabilities. The fear of being punished and humiliated can 
trigger defensive reporting and gaming behaviour on the part of the managers subject to 
performance monitoring.  
The demand for greater accountability has also led the Indonesian government to 
develop a centralistic management control system, known as SAKIP. This system 
integrates performance measurement into the management process and discloses the 
performance information of Indonesian government agencies to the public. This 
research focused on a model that examined the motivations for the adoption and 
implementation of SAKIP in ILGs, along with investigating the relationship between 
the diagnostic and interactive use of SAKIP and organisational learning. The aim was to 
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establish a framework for adopting and implementing a MCS in the public sector to 
facilitate effective practices. Four research questions were examined by empirically 
testing 9 hypotheses using data from a questionnaire survey and semi-structured 
interviews. These four research questions were: 
1. What are the factors that influence the adoption of SAKIP in local 
governments in Indonesia? 
2. Does the adoption of SAKIP influence the diagnostic and/or interactive use of 
SAKIP in local governments in Indonesia? 
3. Does the diagnostic and/or interactive use of SAKIP affect local governments’ 
organisational learning capabilities? 
4. Do the isomorphism mechanisms of institutional theory aid in explaining the 
utilisation of a centralistic MCS as local governments’ attempt to comply with 
the associated regulations?  
The research questions were addressed in three phases. The first phase focused on 
providing a critical review of the literature and the development of the model that 
underpinned this research. The concept of accountability in the public sector and the 
adoption and use of SAKIP as a centralistic MCS in ILGs was emphasised. This phase 
allowed the development of a theoretical model of the adoption of SAKIP in ILGs and 
provided support for examining the relationship between the use of SAKIP and the 
organisational learning capabilities of ILGs.  
The second phase involved a mailed questionnaire survey to a population of 530 ILGs. 
Following a pilot study of the survey instrument, the final useable response rate for the 
main study was 165 ILG responses or 31%. Quantitative data collected from the survey 
allowed the model to be tested using various multivariate statistics. Structural equation 
modelling (PLS-SEM) was the primary statistic used to test the model relationships and 
the significance of the path coefficients from each hypothesised relationship detailed in 
Chapter Three. Chapter Four outlines the rationale for this statistic while Chapter Five 
presents the results and analyses of the survey data.  
The third and final phase provided qualitative information obtained through semi-
structured interviews with 20 ILG officials. These qualitative interviews with willing 
and experienced participants from phase two of the research facilitated a more in-depth 
investigation of opinions and explanations of beliefs and behaviours relevant to the 
research objectives. Findings were able to highlight patterns and themes that added 
valuable supplementary explanations and support for the significant relationships found 
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in phase two of the research. 
7.3 Summary of the Results and Key Findings of the Study 
The results of the phase two survey and subsequent statistical analysis (PLS-SEM) 
found support for 7 out of the 9 hypotheses tested. Table 7.1 presents a summary of the 
statistically significant factors that influence ILGs’ decision to adopt and use SAKIP, 
and their impact on ILGs organisational learning capabilities. The results of the survey 
were also explored through interviews with 20 ILGs managers to further understand the 
impact of institutional isomorphic pressures, namely; coercive, mimetic, and normative, 
in the adoption and use of SAKIP; and how SAKIP influences ILGs learning 
capabilities. The following sections 7.3.1 to 7.3.4 outline the key findings for each of 
the four research questions. 
Table 7.1: Results of Hypothesis Testing (H1-H6) 
  
  
Description 
  
Result of PLS-SEM analysis 
Expected
sign 
Influence t-stats Path Significance
RQ1: What are the factors that influence the 
adoption of SAKIP in local governments 
in Indonesia? 
   
H1 External Pressures +ve Weak 1.82 0.211 p<0.1* 
H2 Internal Pressures +ve Strong 1.97 0.193 p<0.05** 
H3 Facilitators of changes +ve Strong 2.17 0.216 p<0.05** 
H4 Barriers to changes -ve No Influence 1.00 0.086 
RQ2: Does the adoption of SAKIP influence the 
diagnostic and/or interactive use of SAKIP 
in local governments in Indonesia? 
 
 
 
 
 
H5a Adoption  the diagnostic use of SAKIP +ve No Influence 0.74 0.081 
H5b Adoption  the interactive use of SAKIP +ve Very Strong 3.40 0.290 p<0.01*** 
RQ3: Does the diagnostic and/or interactive use 
of SAKIP affect local governments’ 
organisational learning capabilities? 
 
 
 
 
 
H6a Diagnostic use organisational learning +ve Weak 1.69 0.140 p<0.1* 
H6b Interactive use organisational learning +ve Very Strong 4.25 0.625 p<0.01*** 
H6c Interactive use diagnostic use +ve Very Strong 9.83 0.341 p<0.01*** 
Significance path:  t-stats >=2.58/***p<0.01; t-stats >=1.96/**p<0.05; t-stats >=1.65/ *p<0.1 (two-
tailed). Statistical results were computed using bootstrapping method with 5,000 resampling. 
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7.3.1 Research question one: SAKIP adoption factors 
As outlined in Chapter Three the model used by Upping and Oliver (2011) was adapted 
for the present study to examine the factors that influence the adoption of SAKIP in 
ILG. The factors included in the research model are: (1) external pressures, (2) internal 
pressures, (3) facilitators of change to better understand the likelihood and the purpose 
of change, and (4) barriers to change. Three out of the four factors were found to 
influence the adoption of SAKIP in ILG as illustrated in Table 7.1. The results for each 
of the factors are now reviewed.  
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a positive relationship between external pressures and 
the adoption of SAKIP. 
The external pressure variable was used to measure external organisational factors that 
can shape the process of change. The elements of external pressures variable included 
for example regulatory bodies and central government agencies that could apply 
coercive pressures to ILGs. Survey analysis found that the MSAEBR, was able to 
impose rules, monitor compliance, provide recognition, and set up cultural expectations 
to compel ILGs to adopt SAKIP.  Coercive pressures that came from regulations issued 
by the President, MSAEBR and other central government agencies were found to be the 
main external factors that influenced ILGs’ decision to adopt SAKIP. Results also show 
that the impetus for the original regulations, the financial crisis in 1998, through the 
passage of time is now of lesser importance. This is supported by the descriptive results 
shown in Table 5.5 in Chapter Five that presents the ranked mean scores of survey 
responses by ILG officials for the different sources of external pressures that influenced 
the adoption of SAKIP.  
Results of PLS-SEM analysis shown in Table 7.1 found a weak significance of external 
pressures (t-stat=1.82, p<0.1) to adoption of SAKIP.  Findings suggest central 
government agencies continue to exert external coercive pressure on ILGs. Despite the 
autonomy in managing their local affairs, ILGs are still not free from the cross-
departmental regulatory framework imposed by several central government agencies. 
For example, the MSAEBR continues to issue regulations or guidelines regarding 
SAKIP and closely monitors adoption of SAKIP principles and ongoing implementation 
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and review, and provides awards to recognise agencies that satisfactorily apply SAKIP 
principles.  
The MSAEBR’s ability to compel ILGs to adopt SAKIP principles was not supported 
by the provision of clear and consistent regulations or guidelines to integrate SAKIP 
with other management control systems, such as planning, budgeting, treasury, and 
government accounting systems. After several attempts to integrate SAKIP with other 
control systems, the central government finally issued the Presidential regulation that 
comprehensively explained SAKIP for the first time after 15 years of its adoption, 
implementation, and review.  
The time lag from the introduction of SAKIP to the provision of clear guidelines created 
confusion and may in part explain the weak significance (p<0.1) of external pressures 
with the adoption of SAKIP. The lack of guidance led ILGs to look to the MSAEBR for 
advice on SAKIP implementation, changing the perception of the MSAEBR of being a 
regulator to more of a facilitator of change. This shifts the MSAEBR’s role as more of a 
facilitator of change that employs normative pressures to encourage ILGs to adopt and 
use SAKIP as opposed to coercive pressure.  
The finding indicates that coercive pressure was strongly enforced in the early adoption 
of SAKIP when the central government exerted political influences to offset the pre-
existing organisational cultures and beliefs prior to the reform.  Normative pressures 
emerged over time when the new value systems evolved up to the time of the SAKIP 
adoption.  Despite the weak relationship, the survey results are still found to be 
consistent with previous research that examined coercive isomorphism in the 
Indonesian public sector, where powerful external parties were able to affect the 
organisation’s decision to adopt and implement a new system (Akbar et al., 2012; Akbar 
et al., 2015; Djamhuri, Khalid, and Zainuddin, 2012; Manafe and Akbar, 2014; 
Primarisanti and Akbar, 2015).  
The ability of central government agencies to impose coercive pressures on ILGs was 
confirmed and elaborated in the qualitative phase of this research.  All interviewees 
recognised the role of central agencies and their regulatory framework in shaping the 
process of SAKIP’s adoption and implementation.  The MSAEBR has the ability to 
issue a ministerial level regulation that can be used to direct ILGs.  Further, the 
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MSAEBR could issue a warning note to ILGs that fail to comply with the regulation 
and bring unwanted negative attention and embarrassment to ILGs.  
For example, as one interview stated: 
“(…) the reason why we adopt SAKIP is because of the presidential 
regulation and the MSAEBR regulation that require us to do so. We do 
not want to receive any warning or be in a difficult situation if we do not 
apply it” (L4). 
Another important finding is the non-existence of financial penalty or punishment for 
failing to comply with SAKIP requirements. For example, Akbar (2012) argued that one 
of several coercive pressures that drove ILGs to submit a performance report derived 
from SAKIP was the central government’s ability to stop the distribution of funding. He 
argued that ILGs that failed to submit a performance report might not receive their 
centrally allocated funds that could amount to 60% of an ILG’s total budget. Contrary to 
Akbar’s finding, all 20 participants interviewed in this study reported that there was no 
financial penalty given to ILGs if they failed to comply with SAKIP requirements. The 
finding reflects the adequacy of the central government’s influence over ILGs through 
regulations alone. As part of the state finance system, most ILGs are dependent on the 
central government’s funding allocation. Despite there has not been any penalty 
implemented, the intensity of the assessment process and the rhetoric used during and 
after the SAKIP award ceremony have developed the sense of insecurity resulting from 
being humiliated for non-complying ILG.  
Another external pressures factor that may have driven ILGs to conform to SAKIP is to 
avoid the perception of corruption by the general public. Perception of the general 
public was ranked 5th (mean=4.12) on the list of external pressures that may influence 
the adoption of SAKIP. There are two terms that always appear in all SAKIP 
regulations: accountability and performance. Further, the annual SAKIP Award was 
also called the “Accountability Award”. Failing to observe SAKIP requirements and 
submit a performance report may be perceived by the central government and public as 
an indication of possible corruption and thereby negatively affect the reputation of the 
non-complying ILG.  
Therefore with this in mind, SAKIP adoption and compliance by ILGs are 
accommodating coercive pressures with the reward being legitimacy and stability. By 
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implementing SAKIP, ILGs maintain a positive impression of NPM reform and serves 
to minimize any potential conflict with powerful government officials or public figures 
that can impact or interrupt their day-to-day activities.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a positive relationship between internal pressures and 
the adoption of SAKIP. 
The variable internal pressures were used to measure organisational factors that can lead 
to and motivate a change from within the organisation. The elements of internal 
pressures were the internal organisational environment or internal users of information. 
Table 5.6, Chapter Five presents the results of the descriptive statistical analysis for the 
internal pressures that influenced the adoption of SAKIP from the perspective of ILG 
officials.  
The descriptive statistical analysis found that the internal pressures to adopt SAKIP 
mainly came from the top management18 (i.e. the Governor, Mayor, or Regent). The 
results reported in Table 7.1 reveal that internal pressures have a significant and positive 
relationship (t value, 1.97, p<0.05) with the adoption of SAKIP. Further, the results of 
the PLS-SEM analysis shown in Table 5.14 in Chapter Five support this finding by 
indicating that the ILG’s decision to adopt SAKIP is motivated by the ILG leaders 
demand to upgrade the monitoring system (indicator loading = 0.74). ILGs also respond 
to the internal pressures that require them to have a tighter control over their 
expenditure (indicator loading = 0.78) and provide better information in the budget 
preparation process (indicator loading = 0.74). On the other hand, the need to use 
SAKIP in the day-to-day decision-making process was not considered as the main 
driver for ILGs to adopt SAKIP.  
The lack of a clear and consistent definition about SAKIP has affected its’ use in ILG 
operations. The study found in interviews that the leaders’ perception toward the 
importance of SAKIP influences the degree of SAKIP utilisation in ILGs. There are few 
leaders of ILGs who aspire to use SAKIP to its full extent. Further, most interviewees 
exposed that ILG managers choose to implement SAKIP at a minimum level when their 
leaders show little interest in fully utilizing SAKIP. By making the most of the SAKIP 
                                                            
18  The role of ILGs’ leaders and top management in defining the adoption and use of SAKIP were 
further elaborated in the qualitative phase of this study. 
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scoring structure, ILGs can reach an acceptable score (CC) and avoid criticisms from 
the MSAEBR with minimum effort.  
Interviewees disclosed that the other internal factors that impacted the adoption of 
SAKIP were the planning, internal audit, and organisation administrative departments. 
These departments work together to ensure the implementation of SAKIP in all ILG 
departments. The planning department’s role is to link the strategic plan performance 
indicators to the annual plan performance indicators. The internal audit department is 
responsible for conducting regular assessments on how well each department 
implemented SAKIP. The organisation administrative department is responsible for 
preparing the ILG’s consolidated performance report. Interviews indicated that good 
collaboration among these departments leads to better utilisation of SAKIP and results 
in a good SAKIP assessment grade. 
Interviews also highlighted that the shame-and-fame policy was an important factor. 
Participants suggested that the main motivation behind ILGs’ active participation in 
adopting and implementing SAKIP was to have a good assessment score from the 
MSAEBR. A good score means ILG leaders can secure front seats at the centre of 
attention during the SAKIP Award ceremony. While having the best score places the 
ILG leader in the spotlight. The SAKIP Award ceremony is an important ceremony 
attended by influential government officials and covered by the national media. 
Consistent with the findings from the external pressure variable, the SAKIP Award 
recipients enjoy the stability that comes from being perceived as an accountable entity. 
They manage public legitimacy, preserve a good image of the ILG’s leader, and protect 
the ILG’s image from the prejudice of lack of accountability and corruption. On the 
other hand, having a bad score may affect an ILG’s stability and put the leader in an 
unfavourable position of being a low achiever and warranting greater scrutiny. 
 
Hypothesis (H3): There is a positive relationship between facilitators of change and 
the adoption of SAKIP.  
The variable facilitators-of-change was used to identify factors that actively foster the 
implementation of SAKIP in ILGs and stimulators of reform or change. Table 5.7 in 
Chapter Five presents the descriptive results for the items that measured the facilitators 
of the adoption of SAKIP. 
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Facilitators of change that influenced successful SAKIP adoption in ILGs were found in 
the survey to be mostly related to the; (1) leader’s commitment, (2) knowledge of data 
requirement, (3) adequacy of resources committed to adopt SAKIP, and (4) a full 
understanding of how to collect data. The use of external consultants and the clarity of 
SAKIP’s role in each individual ILG’s financial management system were considered to 
be less influential in the success of SAKIP implementation. This finding indicates that 
there appears to have been a shift in the normative pressures to adopt SAKIP from 
external consultants to the MSAEBR that actively provides SAKIP assistance to ILGs. 
Results reported in Table 7.1 suggest that facilitators of change have a significant (t 
value, 2.17, p<0.05) and positive relationship with the adoption of SAKIP in ILGs. The 
SEM-PLS result (see table 5.14 Chapter Five) empirically suggests that: (1) the clarity 
of SAKIP’s role in the local government’s financial management system (indicator 
loading=0.80) and (2) the necessary culture and mindset within the ILG to support 
change (indicator loading=0.79) are two main factors that facilitate and bring direct 
influence on a successful change or reform. This is supported by qualitative interview 
findings. Interview participants acknowledged the role of the MSAEBR and BPKP19 in 
aiding the process of SAKIP adoption and implementation. These two organisations 
actively shared their SAKIP knowledge and expertise with ILGs providing SAKIP 
training and seminars. With their resources and professional skills, the MSAEBR and 
BPKP are able to impose effective normative pressures on ILGs to implement SAKIP. 
This finding also explained the non-significant differences in adoption factors between 
ILGs located in the island of Java and out of Java. Over time, the active role of the 
MSAEBR and BPKP has reduced the knowledge gap among ILGs that was identified in 
previous research (Akbar, 2012). 
 
Hypothesis (H4): There is a negative relationship between barriers to change and 
the adoption of SAKIP. 
Survey results showed that barriers to change did not have a significant relationship 
with the adoption of SAKIP. A possible explanation for this non-significant relationship 
is that the role of the MSAEBR as the regulatory body and the main facilitator for 
SAKIP in ILGs outweighs the features of the ILGs that hindered or prevented the 
                                                            
19  BPKP is the government auditor that can provide consulting work and training for all government 
agencies, including local governments. 
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adoption of SAKIP. Several issues that may have been barriers in the past such as the 
opaqueness of SAKIP’s role in the ILG’s financial management system and the high 
cost of implementing SAKIP are no longer considered as the barriers because ILGs 
have a better access to get assistance from the MSAEBR and BPKP.   
Previous research has stressed the importance of having a comprehensive approach to 
improve bureaucratic reform in the Indonesian government. This includes regulation 
harmonization (Kasim, 2013), and improved integration between planning and 
budgeting system in SAKIP implementation (Jurnali and Nabiha, 2015). The findings of 
the current study add to the literature by recognizing the cost of having an unclear and 
inconsistent external pressure on management commitment and ILGs perception toward 
SAKIP. 
Findings in the ILG in this study suggest that due to the prolonged gap in the regulation 
and the guidelines for SAKIP implementation, the original purpose of SAKIP to focus 
on disclosing and monitoring strategic performance achievement in order to achieve 
efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability within the Indonesian public 
sector, has been distorted. After 16 years of implementation, SAKIP has evolved to 
mean the preparation of a performance report and achieve a sufficient score to minimise 
embarrassment or scrutiny of the ILGs leaders at the SAKIP award ceremony rather 
than as a tool to improve operations.  
The evolved interpretation has also affected the MSAEBR approach in providing 
advice, training and seminars to adopt and implement SAKIP. The MSAEBR approach 
is driven by the need to improve the SAKIP score of ILGs. By 2019, the MSAEBR has 
targeted that 50% of districts and cities should have the minimum score of “B”. In 2017, 
there are only 9% of districts and cities that meet with the qualification. However, the 
number of districts and cities that reach “B” has doubled since 2014 (Jajeli, 2017).  
Table 7.2 provides the performance of provinces, districts and cities in 2012, 2014 and 
2015. The progress of district and city that have improved their SAKIP implementation 
to reach the minimum score “B” and above is still below 10%.  
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Table 7.2: Province/District/City Performance 2012, 2014 and 2015 
Grade Predicate 
Province     District/City     
2012 % 2014 % 2015 % 2012 % 2014 % 2015 % 
AA Excellent     0 0   0 
A Great 0       2 5.9% 0   0 0.0% 1 0.2% 
BB Very Good 0 0.0% 5 14.7% 7 20.6% 0 0.0% 2 0.4% 7 1.4% 
B Good 6 17.6% 11 32.4% 8 23.5% 2 0.4% 19 3.8% 29 5.8%
CC Fair 19 55.9% 13 38.2% 13 38.2% 104 20.6% 156 31.0% 168 33.3% 
C Bad 8 23.5% 4 11.8% 3 8.8% 256 50.8% 233 46.2% 231 45.8% 
D Very Bad 0 0.0% 1 2.9% 1 2.9% 76 15.1% 94 18.7% 68 13.5%
TOTAL   33   34   34   438   504   504   
 
 
On the other hand, Table 7.2 above shows that 59.3% of the District / City grouping of 
ILGs SAKIP scores in the bad / very bad category (i.e. D and C category) indicating the 
improvement in accountability and transparency is only marginal. Also, Table 7.3 
below shows that the change in ILGs with level CC (i.e. fair) scores has slowed over the 
past 12 months. 
Table 7.3: Province / District /City (CC grade and above) 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2014 2015 
Province 3.7% 31.0% 63.3% 75.8% 85.3% 88.2% 
District / City 1.2% 4.3% 12.2% 24.2% 35.1% 40.7% 
 
The MSAEBR tries to meet the 2019 target by conducting a workshop on SAKIP 
implementation and providing some tips to get a better SAKIP score. Therefore, the 
number of ILGs with better scores is expected to increase in the coming years as the 
MSAEBR will intensify guiding ILGs to achieve a better score.  
7.3.2 Research question two: diagnostic and interactive controls 
The adoption of SAKIP variable was used to measure the managers’ ability to utilise 
SAKIP to access essential knowledge from the organisation to monitor the ILG’s 
programs and activities. Factors in SAKIP adoption can refer to the diagnostic and 
interactive use of SAKIP by ILG officials. The pressures surrounding the adoption of 
SAKIP can encourage the diagnostic and interactive use of SAKIP to provide an 
adequate and satisfactory basis for planning, decision-making, and evaluation.  
The elements of the adoption of SAKIP variable included the use of SAKIP to measure 
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ILG programs20 and manage their results. Table 5.9 from Chapter Five presents the 
result of the descriptive statistical analysis for the adoption of SAKIP from the 
perspective of ILG officials. 
Descriptive results found that ILGs view the outcome21 indicators (mean score 4.48) as 
more important than the output indicators (mean score 3.92). Despite considering 
themselves to have a mechanism22 in place to review the validity of performance 
indicators used in SAKIP (mean score 4.39), ILGs still find it difficult to have 
performance indicators that meet a set of criteria for good performance indicators such 
as relevance, timeliness, reliability, and validity (mean score 2.80). These findings 
indicate the difficulty for ILGs to have indicators that accurately measure the impact of 
their programs. It also revealed that local parliament does not use SAKIP as their only 
source of information in reviewing ILG performance. This finding is also consistent 
with the external pressures finding discussed under the research question one.  
PLS-SEM results indicates that the adoption of SAKIP does not appear to have a 
significant impact on the use of SAKIP as a diagnostic control system23 in ILGs. On the 
other hand, the PLS-SEM results showed that the path from the adoption of SAKIP to 
the interactive use of SAKIP is significant (t-value = 3.40, p<0.01) and consistent with 
the expected direction (positive). The result suggests that the adoption of SAKIP has a 
significant impact on the use of SAKIP as an interactive control24 system in ILGs. 
However, the low R2 values for the interactive use variables (R2=0.08) does not allow 
the model to provide a convincing explanation for any variance in the interactive use of 
SAKIP. 
                                                            
20  Under the decentralization program, most of government functions are devolved to ILGs including 
social affairs, education, health, public work, housing, agriculture and forestry.  
21  MSABR guidelines describes: (1) output as good or services as the direct result of a program; (2) 
outcome as the benefit of a program. 
22  The validity of performance indicators is reviewed by the ILG’s internal audit department and the 
MSABR.  
23  Diagnostic control system is referred to “the formal information systems that managers use to measure 
the outputs of a process, compare predetermined standards against actual results, and correct 
deviations from pre-set standards of performance” (Simons et al., 2000, p. 209). This involves regular 
monitoring on budget and performance indicators. 
24  Interactive control system, on the other hand, is the formal information systems used by managers to 
review strategic uncertainties and responses; and to regularly involve subordinates with decisions 
(Simons et al., 2000; Tuomela, 2005). Interactive control involves using several key information from 
an MCS to track new program and acquire strategic feedbacks by reviewing the information with key 
people.  Naranjo-Gil (2016, p. 868) emphasised that the difference between the two systems is “not in 
their technical design features, but in the way managers use both systems”. 
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Based on the adoption of SAKIP outer weight analysis, the non-significant relationship 
between the adoption and diagnostic use of SAKIP; and the non-convincing explanation 
between the adoption and interactive use of SAKIP, despite its significant relationship: 
are mainly due to the ILGs’ inability to fully implement a set of criteria for good 
performance indicators (outer weight=0.435) and the use of current year output to 
determine the next year appropriation has the lowest outer weight (0.368). At the same 
time, outcome indicator is not considered as the crucial elements for the next year’s 
appropriation. The adoption of SAKIP instruments such as long-term development plan, 
strategic planning, annual planning and performance indicators are not followed by a 
formal procedure to provide dependable data available to be used. Performance 
indicators were determined merely by using trend from last year and not by reliable 
baseline data. The findings also reveal that the coercive pressures from SAKIP 
regulations and normative pressures from the MSAEBR and BPKP have enabled ILGs 
to adopt SAKIP and produce the performance report. This indicates that most ILGs are 
no longer having a technical issue in implementing SAKIP.  
In prior research, ILGs were identified to have lack of knowledge in implementing 
SAKIP and producing the performance report (Jurnali and Nabiha, 2015). On the other 
hand, ILGs are still having difficulties to implement it with other management control 
system. The indication that SAKIP is decoupled from ILGs actual activities is not found 
because there is a mechanism in place to review the validity of performance indicators 
used in SAKIP and that the Indonesian Parliament uses outcome indicators to review 
ILGs’ achievement. These statistical findings are supported by the interview results and 
they will be explained in the next sections. 
 
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): There is a positive relationship between the adoption of SAKIP 
and its use in a diagnostic control system. 
The diagnostic use variable was used to measure the utilisation of SAKIP for regular 
monitoring purposes and communicating notable variances in the ILG’s critical success 
factors25. The diagnostic use of SAKIP was also referred to as a single-loop of learning 
because ILG managers only modify their activities without having to make a 
fundamental change. They use information from SAKIP to identify problems at an 
                                                            
25 Critical success factor represents areas or issues essential to organization’s current activities and future 
success (Somers and Nelson, 2001).  
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operating level and find solutions that allow ILGs to continue operating in a stable state. 
Table 5.10 in Chapter Five presents the results of the descriptive statistical analysis for 
the diagnostic use of SAKIP from the perspective of ILG officials. 
As in the case of diagnostic utilisation, the survey indicated that ILGs only moderately 
use SAKIP (mean=3.66). ILGs diagnostically use SAKIP for mainly reviewing current 
key performance indicators, reviewing the strategic plan and program priorities, 
monitoring results, and tracking progress toward goals. On the other hand, the use of 
SAKIP as a basis for implementing reward and punishment mechanisms is viewed as 
the least important use in ILGs.  Overall, this finding was in-line with previous research 
regarding the use of performance measurement systems and reporting in ILGs. For 
example, Akbar (2012) that found performance indicators were used mainly for setting 
ILG strategy and only used marginally for providing individual reward. 
The results reported in Table 7.1 suggests that the adoption of SAKIP does not have a 
statistically significant relationship with the diagnostic use of SAKIP. Several factors 
that explain the non-significant relationship between the adoption and the diagnostic use 
of SAKIP were found in interviews with ILG officials. For example, participants 
indicated that ILGs are inclined to diagnostically use SAKIP only during the 
preparation and the submission of the ILG’s consolidated performance report during the 
period from January until March each year. During this period, performance 
information from SAKIP is used in ILGs’ coordination meetings to prepare all the 
required documents to be submitted to the MSAEBR. For example, an ILG’s leader 
discussed the achievement of certain KPIs from all departments to ensure the 
availability of both accounting and performance information in the ILG’s performance 
report. An ILG is also required to conduct an internal assessment of SAKIP 
implementation in each department. The internal audit department conducts the 
assessment and submits the result to the MSAEBR along with the performance report. 
All departments in an ILG should respond to the assessment result in the coordination 
meeting. 
ILGs often diagnostically use information from the finance and accounting information 
system in their regular meetings. Interviewees disclosed that most ILGs had regular 
coordination meetings attended by heads of department. The meetings can be held 
weekly, monthly, or quarterly. During the coordination meeting, the progress of the 
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current year’s programs and the use of budgeted funds always becomes one of the main 
topics to be discussed. This finding is consistent with quantitative results that showed 
the role of SAKIP in collecting, storing and distributing information. However, SAKIP 
was not the main source of information for the discussions during these regular 
meetings. The main source of information used in the discussions is the detailed and up-
to-date information regarding current progress and amount of money spent for all 
activities. The other source of information used in the regular meetings is citizens’ 
complaints.  
There were only limited numbers of ILGs that diagnostically use SAKIP on a regular 
basis. These were ILGs with a good SAKIP implementation assessment score. For 
example, the leaders of these ILGs use performance information from SAKIP and 
accounting information from the finance and accounting system to monitor the 
achievement of their campaign promises and other program priorities. They use 
information from SAKIP to monitor all departments’ achievements, evaluate the heads 
of departments’ performance, and to link the reward and punishment policy to the 
managers’ performance.  
 
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): There is a positive relationship between the adoption of SAKIP 
and its use in an interactive control system. 
The interactive use variable was used to measure the utilisation of SAKIP for 
identifying obsolete strategy and promoting discussions. Top managers usually examine 
selected measures in order to learn the strategic meaning and consequences of the 
measures (Tuomela, 2005). Simons (1994) argued that an interactive control system is 
used to develop opportunity-seeking and learning as a response to a changing 
environment.  
The interactive use of SAKIP is considered to be equivalent to double-loop learning 
because such a system is used to develop new paradigms by questioning fundamental 
policies and assumptions (Kloot, 1995). The interactive use variables focused on 
identifying the use of SAKIP in order to improve the quality of strategic management 
and to increase commitment to strategic targets. Table 5.11 in Chapter Five presents the 
results of the descriptive analysis for the interactive use of SAKIP from the perspective 
of ILG officials. 
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As in the case of interactive utilisation, the survey indicated that ILGs only moderately 
use SAKIP (mean=3.47). ILGs’ top management mainly interprets information from 
SAKIP and discusses performance achievement reported on SAKIP with their operating 
managers on a regular basis. The survey also revealed that ILGs’ top managers pay 
daily attention to the information in SAKIP system. The evidence reported in Table 7.1 
suggests that the adoption of SAKIP had a significant and strong relationship with the 
interactive use of SAKIP in ILGs. On the other hand, the adoption of SAKIP only 
explained 8.4% of the variance in the interactive use of SAKIP, which is below the 10% 
minimum threshold. The main explanation of the weak relationship is because most 
ILGs have not implemented a set of criteria when implementing their performance 
indicators. The guideline for developing KPIs regularly issued by the MSAEBR only 
provides general directions for all government agencies to develop their performance 
indicators to be specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound or generally 
known as the SMART concept. However, there are no specific criteria for performance 
indicators for local government. Based on the SAKIP scoring system, the alignment of 
planning documents contributes significantly improve the score. On the other hand, the 
performance achievement is not the main focus on the assessment and only contributes 
20% of the total score.  
Consequently, ILGs use SAKIP interactively only to find ways to improve their SAKIP 
score. Interviews revealed that all respondents view low SAKIP score and its 
corresponding consequences as the undesirable result of the negative perception that 
needs to be addressed. While most ILGs aim for a minimum acceptable score, those 
with high SAKIP scores create a team within their organisation consisting of staff from 
various departments to discuss and follow up the recommendations from the MSAEBR. 
The team is focused on finding ways to increase the SAKIP score and to encourage 
departments to follow up the MSAEBR recommendations. These ILGs showed 
initiative in getting more intensive assistance from the MSAEBR by visiting the 
MSAEBR office to have a consultation session regarding SAKIP implementation.  
Several ILG leaders use the information from the evaluation result from the MSAEBR 
and from the SAKIP system to evaluate individual departmental performance and 
monitor their progress. If the heads of non-performing departments fail to show any 
sign of improvement, they are likely to be replaced or demoted. This activity is related 
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to the ILG’s effort to improve its SAKIP score. By improving departmental 
performance, the ILG’s overall performance would be improved. The improved 
performance and the use of SAKIP to assess the heads of department will eventually 
improve the SAKIP assessment score. 
 
7.3.3 Research question three: MCS impact on organisational learning 
The results of the quantitative study identify the utilisation of SAKIP influenced the 
ILGs’ organisational learning capabilities. The model used in this study was adapted 
from Widener (2007) and modified into Indonesia’s political and regulatory context. 
The adapted model incorporates (1) diagnostic use of SAKIP and (2) interactive use of 
SAKIP to better understand their impact on ILGs’ learning abilities.  
Organisational learning 
In the second phase of this research, the organisational learning26 variable was used to 
measure the ILGs’ ability to collect, store, and distribute knowledge from past 
performance that can be used to trigger learning. An ILG’s intention to use the 
identified capability to change its structure and process was explored in the third phase 
of the research.  Descriptive results of analysis for organisational learning from 
responses provided ILG officials are provided in Table 5.12 in Chapter Five. 
The survey indicated that all ILGs have the procedures and ability to collect, store, and 
distribute information that could be used for detecting problems and proposing solutions 
(mean = 3.90). However, the capacity is only considered to be moderate. The survey 
identified that periodic meetings and formal communication channels are the two main 
elements in distributing information in ILGs. These findings confirm that most ILGs 
have a regular coordination meeting routine where information about the latest 
innovations (indicator loading = 0.82) or new best practices (indicator loading = 0.83) 
could be shared among ILGs’ managers. Databases (indicator loading = 0.74) and mail 
directories (indicator loading = 0.78) were also found to be used in storing and recalling 
information in ILGs.  
                                                            
26  Organisational learning in this study refers to the organization’s capability to acquire, share, interpret, 
and recall knowledge with the intention to change their structure, culture, and behaviour over a 
sustained period of time (Barrados and Mayne, 2003; Huber, 1991). 
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On the other hand, the statistical results from phase one do not thoroughly explain the 
ILGs’ ability to utilise all the information acquired and stored for fine tuning or 
changing their business strategy. In order to answer this question, the qualitative study 
phase focused on exploring SAKIP’s role as the tool to trigger change in an 
organisation. 
 
Hypothesis 6a (H6a): The emphasis ILGs place on the use of SAKIP in a diagnostic 
control system is positively associated with an organisation’s 
orientation to learning. 
The diagnostic control was employed to examine notable variances in the ILG’s 
performance overtime. The diagnostic use of SAKIP means it was used in a single-
loop27 learning where managers altered their actions without making any major change.  
Results reported in Table 7.1 suggests that the diagnostic use of SAKIP has a weak 
relationship with organisational learning capabilities (t value = 1.69, p<0.01), 
suggesting that the use of SAKIP positively contributes to the ILGs’ capability to record 
and store information. SAKIP is linked with the budgeting and accounting information 
and regularly acquired and updated. Despite the majority of ILGs using SAKIP 
diagnostically only for the purpose of the MSAEBR evaluation, single-loop learning is 
achieved when the performance of all departments is regularly evaluated. The 
evaluation process is conducted formally by the internal audit department. All 
departments within ILGs are required to prepare their performance report to be 
evaluated by their internal audit department. The evaluation result is used by the ILG’s 
leader to assess the performance of each head of department, and by the MSAEBR to 
assess the ILG’s overall performance. 
 
Hypothesis 6b (H6b): The emphasis ILGs place on the use of SAKIP in an 
interactive control system is positively associated with an 
organisation’s orientation to learning. 
The interactive use of SAKIP is employed to develop opportunity-seeking and double-
loop learning. Double-loop learning allows organisations to provide solutions that 
                                                            
27  Single-loop learning refers to the development and use of performance information to perceive errors 
and offer adjustment to current practices. 
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require modification to their major policies. It also allows organisations to explore for 
alternative solutions, investigate new routines and innovate with new policies. From the 
qualitative phase, it was revealed that the ILG’s main reason for using SAKIP 
interactively is to look for opportunities to improve their SAKIP score. 
A statistically significant (t value = 4.25, p<0.01) and strong relationship between the 
interactive use of SAKIP and organisational learning variables was found and is 
illustrated in results shown in Table 7.1. This empirical finding indicates that the 
interactive use of SAKIP to improve its score positively contributes to the ILGs’ 
capability to record and store useful information for future use. This finding from the 
survey was followed up in interviews to further explore the ILGs’ double-loop learning 
capabilities. Interviewees were asked about the use of SAKIP to perform activities that 
indicate the organisation’s learning capacity. Activities examined were: the availability 
of a discussion forum where all employees are free to voice their ideas, the 
organisational ability to examine their current standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
and review them on a timely basis, the organisations ability to change its structure to 
meet current challenges, the use of performance information as the basis for HR policy, 
and the use of performance information to trigger innovation. Interview discussions 
revealed that the organisational learning capabilities in ILGs were still limited to 
collecting and storing knowledge, which is consistent with the earlier survey findings. 
Results indicated that ILGs still appear to be unable to use the knowledge to 
intentionally adjust their routines, structure, or behaviour to adapt to dynamic change in 
their environments. Interviewees revealed that ILGs are still unable to use performance 
feedback information to change their organisations structure to align with current 
circumstance and challenges. Any change in the structure needs to be aligned to the 
regulations issued by the MOHA. The ILGs’ inability to modify their structure can 
result in overlapping roles, wasted resources, and missed opportunities when their 
current structure is no longer compatible with ongoing challenges.  
Interviews also reveal that most ILGs do not clearly link organisational performance 
with individual performance, leading to the individuals’ failure to know their part in 
overall organisational performance. This finding also indicates that ILGs find it difficult 
to get feedback from their staff about improving organisational strategy. Some 
interviewees admitted that instead of individual performance, ethnicity or political 
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affiliation were still important factors in the human resource policy in ILGs. Such 
practices clearly impede ILGs from linking SAKIP with individual performance 
measurement. This finding reflects the growing importance of ethnic group in 
maintaining stability in Indonesian local governments identified in previous research 
(Gudgeon, 2016; Nasution, 2016). 
The majority of interviewees did not have a discussion forum available in their 
organisation’s structure where opinions toward ILG performance could be freely 
expressed and ideas unreservedly raised. The coordination meeting was not considered 
a discussion forum because it was limited to senior officials only.  
Finally, there is no research mechanism in place to follow up performance feedback 
from SAKIP. Such a mechanism is essential for an organisation to provide a formal 
opportunity for ILG staff to reflect on their current work and to conduct experiments in 
policy. On the other hand, most current innovations in ILGs are still driven by the 
MSAEBR, which also holds an annual innovation competition for all ILGs.  
 
Hypothesis 6c (H6c): The emphasis ILGs place on the use of SAKIP in an 
interactive control system is positively associated with the 
emphasis they place on the use of SAKIP in a diagnostic 
control system. 
The evidence reported in Table 7.1 reveals that there is a statistically significant and 
strong relationship (t value = 9.83) between interactive and diagnostic use of SAKIP. 
This result empirically suggests that the interactive use of SAKIP can influence the 
diagnostic use of performance measures embedded in SAKIP. Interviews revealed that 
some ILG leaders built a team to improve their SAKIP system and achieve better 
SAKIP assessment scores. The team consists of people from different departments. The 
role of the team is to move the bureaucracy, to manoeuvre among rigid and sometime 
conflicting regulations, and to incorporate other existing control systems with SAKIP. 
After a series of discussions and consultation time, all departments finally understood 
the leader’s expectations toward SAKIP utilisation within the ILG. As a response, all 
departments started to update their SAKIP with information that aligned with budgeting 
and planning control systems. Later, the newly revised SAKIP was electronically 
integrated with other systems to help the leader and managers to use SAKIP for 
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monitoring the ILG’s critical success factors and communicating achievement.  
7.3.4 Research question four: institutional theory and SAKIP 
This thesis employed institutional theory to examine the institutionalisation of SAKIP, 
as ILGs align with the prevailing conventions, such as those related to government 
regulations or the performance of other ILGs. After 16 years of implementation, SAKIP 
has been institutionalised and adopted without question by ILGs. SAKIP has become a 
rationalized myth codified into formal regulations and accepted as one of the many 
standards or norms in Indonesian government. By conforming to SAKIP, ILGs appear 
to be proper government organisations that are conducted in efficient, effective and 
accountable ways. ILGs adopt SAKIP in order to avoid criticism and gain legitimacy 
from their stakeholders. 
7.3.4.1 Institutional demands surrounding SAKIP implementation in ILGs 
Institutional theory acknowledges that human actions and routines are major factors that 
shape institutions. At the same time, these actions and routines can be influenced by the 
prevailing institutions that govern organisational activity (Scapens and Burns, 2000). 
The theory emphasises the contribution of the external environment, such as social, 
political, and cultural factors, in shaping organisational form and process become 
accepted, and provides guidelines for social behaviour ((DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scapens, 2006; Scott, 2014). In order to gain legitimacy from 
their constituents, ILGs will need to include new organisational innovations to enhance 
accountability reporting.  Eventually, the new innovation becomes part of a taken-for-
granted prescription for appropriate conduct (Scott, 2001).  
When a new innovation is not fully aligned with existing institutional demands, 
organisations may actively shape the new initiative to achieve legitimacy. Organisations 
can do so by strategically altering the institutional scripts to align an innovation with 
their organisational characteristics. From the survey and the interviews, it can be seen 
that SAKIP does not fully align with ILGs’ existing institutional demands. In order to 
align SAKIP with other demands, ILGs and the MSAEBR altered the meaning of 
accountability in SAKIP as the process of matching the ILGs’ mission, vision and five-
year plan performance indicators with their annual KPIs and budget. According to 
institutional theory, The MSAEBR’s and ILGs’ roles in changing the institutional 
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scripts were influenced by the following institutional demands.  
Firstly, the implementation of performance-driven logic in ILGs did not completely 
remove the practice of the old line-item budget approach. The approach has been used 
by ILGs for a very long time. Contradicting the performance-based budgeting system, 
the line-item budget approach did not consider performance as a factor in preparing and 
executing the budget. It simply focused on the spending of the allocated budget and not 
on the efficiency and effectiveness basis. The old system did not include a long-term 
development plan in drafting the current year’s budget and simply increased certain 
percentages from the previous year’s budget. 
Despite no longer being part of the system, the line-item incremental budget logic is still 
prevalent in both ILGs and central agencies. Many Indonesian government agencies still 
focus on spending the allocated budget instead of achieving the targeted goals. MOHA 
still issue budget monitoring forms that place emphasis on the absorption of budget 
money, with a template similar to a line-item budget, rather than on evaluating 
performance. The existence of the old line-item budget logic puts pressures on ILGs to 
gradually modify SAKIP’s original meaning to maintain stability with other 
stakeholders and, at the same time, achieve legitimacy.   
Secondly, ILGs are still affected by the long-standing traditions and norms from the 
command-and-control demand from central government. ILGs still strongly believe 
that, as the part of the unitary state of Indonesia, they need to adhere to central 
government rule and align their objectives with the national interests. This logic is 
inherited from 53 years of a centralistic government system before it shifted into a 
decentralised system implemented in 2001. ILGs that used to simply carry out orders 
from the central government now have huge decision-making authority and substantial 
financial resources (Sjahrir, Kis-Katos, and Schulze, 2014). Therefore, ILGs prefer to 
passively wait for national regulations issued by central government prior to 
formulating a policy.  
The tendency for ILGs to wait for a regulation from central government prior to 
implementing a policy impedes the interactive use of SAKIP. When there are 
conflicting national regulations, ILGs prefer to halt the innovation and look for an 
explanation than to take a risk by implementing it. They get annoyed and confused 
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when the MSAEBR, MOHA, and MOF issue conflicted regulations regarding 
measuring and reporting ILG performance. 
Finally, the complexity of Indonesia’s democratic political process and parliamentary 
conflicts of interest in local government budgeting makes the drafting process too 
complicated and it discourages ILGs from revising their strategic plan even when it is 
necessary. Decentralization and the democratic political process do not decrease the 
corruption that had reached epidemic levels prior to the reform. The local political 
process is shadowed by money politics and the rise of powerful local self-interested 
businesses that are involved in the process (Sjahrir et al., 2014). Sjahrir, Kis-Katos, and 
Schulze (2013); Sjahrir et al. (2014) argued that a lack of political accountability is 
responsible for the wasteful local government administrative spending. Their findings 
indicate the deep involvement of political elites (i.e. local businesses) in the budget 
drafting process, causes the process to become complicated and difficult to follow. For 
example, the practice of hiding budget money by allocating significant amounts in 
miscellaneous administrative accounts is still common in ILGs. Such practice is still 
prevalent because ILGs need to accommodate requests from politicians to fund specific 
projects for their constituents or to give grants for political purposes. The complexity in 
discussing budgets with politicians discourages ILGs from regularly modifying their 
planning documents. The interviews revealed that ILGs were reluctant to adjust their 
strategic plan and five year budgets even if they need to because of the complicated 
political process with the local parliament.  
Recognizing contradictions between SAKIP and the prevailing institutional demands, 
ILGs are required to strategically respond to them to maintain their image in accordance 
with a set of society’s rules and expectations. 
ILGs’ strategic responses to institutional pressures 
The results from the quantitative and qualitative phases indicate that after 16 years of 
SAKIP implementation, ILGs are entwined with institutional requirements and face 
multiple pressures and institutional demands from diverse stakeholders. The SAKIP 
regulations define SAKIP as the system that collects, measures, classifies, and reports 
performance information in order to improve ILGs’ performance and accountability. 
The SAKIP system requires agencies to describe their mission, vision, strategic 
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objectives, and key performance indicators (KPIs), and provides mechanisms to link 
KPIs with the agency’s objectives and budget (Rhodes et al., 2012). 
On the other hand, ILGs have difficulties streamlining their mission and vision with 
their KPIs and budget. They do not want to change their five-year strategic plan because 
they want to avoid a long political process between ILGs and local parliaments. The 
intense involvement from political elites during the budget drafting process also creates 
another difficulty for ILGs trying to smoothly align their planning documents. In 
addition, political elites can ask the ILGs to include their proposals in the annual budget 
despite the proposals’ lack of correlation with the ILG’s missing or five-year plan.  
As previously mentioned, the central government has introduced a performance 
accountability report evaluation system to assess local government performance and to 
analyse the implementation of the SAKIP and give recommendations for improvement. 
Some ILGs believe that the concept of being accountable has been simplified into 
achieving a good SAKIP evaluation score. Every year the MSAEBR evaluates the 
SAKIP implementation and assigns a score for each ILG. The list of the SAKIP scores 
is published and the ILGs with the best scoring  receiving an award in the annual 
SAKIP Award ceremony attended by important national figures. The SAKIP Award 
ceremony has created another pressure for ILGs whose leaders do not want to face 
negative attention caused by a low SAKIP score.  
The strategic response of compromise to tackle multiple institutional demands 
To manage the multiple demands from different stakeholders, ILGs shape their 
legitimacy by engaging in strategic isomorphism and by choosing the strategic response 
of compromise. The strategic response of compromise requires ILGs to accommodate 
institutional demands and negotiate acceptance behaviour with institutional 
stakeholders. ILGs try to balance the expectations of their constituents by 
accommodating their demands and through negotiation.  
Concerning the conflict between line-item budget and performance-based demands, the 
study found most ILGs try to attain a balance by adopting both logics in different time 
frames. While most of the time ILGs use information from finance and activity to 
monitor the progress of current year programs and the actual use of budget money, they 
intentionally use SAKIP during the system’s implementation assessment period. ILGs 
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interactively use SAKIP to identify efforts to improve their SAKIP assessment score 
and to encourage their departments to implement those efforts. Most of them discuss 
performance achievement and SAKIP implementation near or during the MSAEBR’s 
assessment process.  
ILGs also manoeuvre through various regulations applied upon them by identifying and 
delivering only the minimum requirements for each regulation initially, and fulfilling 
the rest of the requirements over time. By conforming to minimum standards, ILGs alter 
SAKIP practice that accommodates facets of conflicting demands and reconciles them.  
In order to avoid embarrassment and to be seen as accountable, ILGs recognise the 
importance of having a good score in their SAKIP assessment. With the aim of 
achieving a good SAKIP score, ILGs look to the MSAEBR for advice regarding their 
SAKIP implementation activities. The MSAEBR and the BPKP help ILGs in 
identifying elements in the SAKIP scoring system that could significantly improve their 
score. They also provide ILGs with some tips and tricks for improving their SAKIP 
score. For example, the MSAEBR highlighted to ILGs the multiplicity in SAKIP 
scoring elements that can be used to significantly boost their score. Based on the 
interviews, the SAKIP score of “CC” is considered to be the minimum “safe” score that 
needs to be achieved to avoid negative attention during the SAKIP award ceremony. 
Aiming for the minimum has resulted in limited utilisation of SAKIP. Most ILGs link 
the use of SAKIP with the purpose of achieving a better score. At the same time, ILGs 
also have limitations in using performance feedback from the SAKIP system for 
developing opportunity-seeking and learning capabilities.  
Besides resisting institutional pressures, ILGs choose to strategically respond to the 
conflicting demands by modifying institutional scripts to align with ILGs’ 
characteristics. ILGs modified the concept of accountability in SAKIP into a process of 
streamlining their mission and vision with their KPIs and budget in order to achieve a 
better SAKIP score and avoid humiliation. The modified concept of SAKIP is more 
easily understood by the ILG bureaucrats. Several ILG leaders went the extra mile by 
developing a computerized SAKIP system and forming a special team consisting of 
staff from the planning and reporting departments. Such a team disseminates the SAKIP 
concept and trains all ILG departments to prepare their SAKIP, in ways that facilitate 
higher and perhaps award winning SAKIP scores.  
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ILGs did not choose a decoupling strategy to face competing institutional demands 
because such strategy requires an organisation to avoid the scrutiny of external referents 
on a long-term basis. The performance and the SAKIP assessment reports are two major 
reports reviewed annually by the MSAEBR. The SAKIP’s annual assessment by the 
MSAEBR does not allow ILGs to implement a decoupling strategy to be implemented 
over an extended period of time.  
Through bargaining with the MSAEBR and by modifying the concept of accountability 
in SAKIP, ILGs are able to partially respond to conflicting institutional demands and 
avoid losing approval from their key stakeholders. However, the strategic response of 
compromise has also brought an undesirable consequence to the ILGs’ organisational 
learning capabilities. SAKIP is not effectively used interactively due to the alteration of 
its accountability concept and the ILGs’ inability to modify their policy and structure to 
respond to its changing environment.  
Isomorphism related to SAKIP implementation 
There were three types of institutional isomorphism displayed in SAKIP adoption and 
implementation. Coercive isomorphism mainly came from the MSAEBR, MOHA and 
BPKP central government agencies that were able to establish rules, monitor 
compliance and provide recognition. Despite there being some contradictions among the 
regulations that could lead to confusion, ILGs still conform to the series of SAKIP-
related regulations issued mainly by the MSAEBR. Scoring a good grade in the SAKIP 
annual evaluation can help ILGs to maintain their legitimacy and to build their image as 
organisations that plan and allocate their resources.  
Mimetic isomorphism occurred when some ILGs searched for SAKIP best practices 
from other ILGs that had a better SAKIP score. By imitating SAKIP practices from 
each other, ILGs are associating themselves with accepted activities and practices. An 
ILG with a better score is portrayed as an organisation that others perceive to be more 
accountable and to have successfully implemented SAKIP.  
The process of normative institutionalisation in ILGs is derived from social expectations 
and norms practiced by the MSAEBR and BPKP. The MSAEBR and BPKP are two 
central agencies that have sufficient resources and skilled personnel to provide ILGs 
with SAKIP best practices and to help them to improve SAKIP implementation. They 
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regularly issue or update SAKIP guidelines; and they allow ILGs to have several 
consultation sessions or run SAKIP workshops with them. 
7.4 Contribution of this Study 
The results of this study contribute to the management control system literature in 
several ways. First, in light of limited research on a centralistic management control 
system in the public sector in Indonesia or other developing countries, this study is one 
of the first known studies examining the diagnostic and interactive use of mandatory 
management control system practices in a local government context using institutional 
theory. Most prior studies did not specify the way ILGs utilise the performance 
information collected. The use of the diagnostic and interactive controls in the empirical 
model is important to explain the link between the utilisation of a control system and it 
is impact on organisational learning capabilities. Therefore, the findings of this study 
contribute to the growing literature on MCSs by focusing on the adoption and use of 
MCSs as a means to achieve organisational learning capabilities at provincial and 
municipal levels of government in Indonesia. 
Second, this study contributes to an understanding of the complex issue of institutional 
change. It contributes to the literature on institutional theory by identifying ILGs’ 
strategy and actors in managing institutional demands surrounding the implementation 
of SAKIP. Institutional theory describes the factors that drive organisations to fully or 
symbolically utilise new innovations in order to meet demands from different 
stakeholders (Tillema, Mimba and Helden, 2010). Internal and external stakeholders are 
identified as playing important roles in shaping the power in an organisation (Ma and 
Tayles, 2009).  
This study enriches our understanding by including actors that actively managed the 
competing institutional demands embedded in the field of ILGs. Besides simply 
accepting environmental pressures, ILGs were found capable of modifying an existing 
institutional prescription. ILGs were also able to align and adopt rationalized myths into 
their structure in order to bring benefits for themselves. By complying with existing 
institutional scripts, ILGs gain confidence and space within which to operate with 
minimal external oversight. Therefore, the findings of this study are expected to be the 
basis for subsequent studies that examine diverse interests within an organisation and 
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reposition key actors as factors in the adoption of new strategic management 
accounting. 
Finally, this study used survey and in-depth interviews to collect data in this thesis. 
Incorporating elements of quantitative and qualitative research approaches increased the 
rigor of the study by providing a better understanding of the research issue. The 
quantitative research was able to expose the causal relationship among MCS adoption, 
utilisation and other variables. On the other hand, the qualitative research was able to 
provide explanations of the results of the quantitative findings, such as institutional 
pressures involved in the causal relationship between the observed variables. This study 
has demonstrated the applicability of a mixed method in the field of public sector 
management and management accounting research. 
7.5 Managerial and Policy Implications 
7.5.1 Managerial implications 
The findings of this study indicate that the implementation of a centralistic management 
control system in ILGs is mainly driven by central government pressures. The ILGs 
respond to initiatives by conforming to pressures in order to earn social legitimacy and 
improve survival capabilities for their operation. The implications of the findings 
underline the complexity surrounding the local government environment in an emerging 
economic and political system. The findings indicate that there are structural constraints 
that create challenges for ILGs in respect to organisational learning and innovation. The 
findings also showed that the success of a centralistic initiative is determined by how 
ILGs manage the various institutional demands surrounding them. Therefore, in terms 
of practical managerial implications, this study suggests that ILG managers intensify 
their interaction with the MSAEBR through training and consultation in order to 
maintain the availability of relevant SAKIP skills and expertise within ILGs.  
Secondly, the findings emphasise the crucial role of ILG leaders in utilising SAKIP as a 
tool for learning. Without a strong direction from the leader, SAKIP will just be another 
system that collects information but fails to lead to improvements because an ILG’s 
management is not equipped to follow up the performance feedback. 
Thirdly, the findings indicate the necessity for ILG leaders to foster an innovative 
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culture that emphasises dialogue and discussion. Therefore, this study suggests the 
establishment of learning forums that provide communication channels between 
managers and their staff. Kroll (2015) suggested that learning forums allow managers 
and employees to reflect on their core process and performance, to suggest possible 
solutions, and to receive feedback regarding their suggestion. The findings also show 
the need for ILGs to have a formal structure and routine in place that support ILG staff 
to review past practice and to experiment with new ideas in order to anticipate the 
future.  
7.5.2 Policy implications 
This research also has important policy implications for the understanding of the social 
and political antecedents faced by ILGs. Since internal and external actors were 
identified as playing important roles in shaping institutional demands surrounding the 
implementation of SAKIP in ILGs, the finding showed that policy makers in the 
emerging economy countries including Indonesia should never underestimate the 
complexities in the adoption of commercial and western style reporting systems in their 
jurisdiction. The findings indicate that policy makers and international donors should 
understand the environmental background and consider the social context of the public 
in emerging economy countries in order to achieve an effective reform.  
The findings showed that by accommodating different institutional demands, ILGs alter 
the meaning and purpose of SAKIP to make it acceptable to all important stakeholders. 
One major reason for the competing institutional demands in ILGs is the lack of 
consistency between SAKIP and other related regulations. The inconsistencies in the 
regulations create a degree of uncertainty regarding SAKIP’s role in an ILG’s planning, 
budgeting, and reporting cycle. The uncertainties within the environment drive ILGs to 
imitate others perceived to be more successful in SAKIP implementation. A successful 
ILG in SAKIP implementation was represented by winning a SAKIP award, also known 
as the accountability award. As a result, the original ideal of accountable organisations 
that properly plan and allocate their resources to improve long-term future performance 
has now been reduced to merely winning the award. The MSAEBR and BPKP 
accentuate this altered definition by providing assistance to improve ILGs’ SAKIP 
score.  
The findings indicate that coercive pressures can still be used to force ILGs to adopt 
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central government programs. Scott (2005) claimed that regulations are much stronger 
institutions than belief systems, practices and norms. SAKIP-related regulations set the 
boundaries by defining the limits and scope of the new system. However, the perplexity 
in SAKIP’s definition due to conflicting regulations contributes to weakening the 
coercive pressure in the long term. Without clear and consistent coercive pressure, the 
meaning of SAKIP may gradually drift away as a result of the interactions among 
competing institutional demands. In a paternalistic environment such as Indonesian 
local government, mimetic and normative pressures use and preserve a reduced 
meaning, rather than as intended in the original definition of SAKIP. Therefore, a focus 
on implementing a consistent coercive pressure with well-defined rewards and 
punishment is essential for successful reform in ILGs. It is also important to note that 
the lack of clarity in SAKIP regulations can encourage important stakeholders such as 
the MSAEBR to shift the institutional pressures from coercive to normative pressures.   
Secondly, the findings also indicate that a central government agency initiative needs to 
be aligned with other agencies’ programs and agendas. Failing to do so will lead to 
confusion within ILGs and reduce the meaning of the initiative itself. ILGs may 
eventually implement the initiative for symbolic purposes but fail to fully utilise it due 
to their inability to see the benefit and full potential of the program.  
The findings of this study suggest that central government plays the most important part 
in the implementation of SAKIP. Since all MCSs (SAKIP, accounting, and budget 
systems) in ILGs were initiated by central government agencies, it is crucial for the 
MSAEBR, the Ministry of Finance, the MOHA and the Supreme Audit Institution to 
work together to ensure the meaningful utilisation of these systems.  
In order to improve local government efficiency and effectiveness, central government 
should be able to establish a logical link and clear explanation between the results of: 
(1) the SAKIP assessment and financial audit; (2) Budget evaluation and SAKIP 
assessment; (3) Budget evaluation and financial audit opinion. At the time of 
completing this research, there is no assessment framework linking the three 
management control systems that are very similar to one another. An ILG can have a 
good financial audit opinion but receive a low SAKIP score at the same time. The 
central government’s inability to set up a logical framework that connects the three 
management control systems may increase conflicting demands in the ILG environment 
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and eventually reduce the meaning of the MCS.  
Central government agencies must have a shared understanding in interpreting the 
conflicting institutional demands surrounding ILGs. One particular demand is the deep 
involvement of political elites during the budget drafting process. Such involvement 
encourages ILGs to hide budget money to anticipate future demands from political 
figures. Central government agencies should clearly describe such practice as fraud. 
They also need to take necessary collaborative actions to discontinue this practice by 
exercising their coercive power. For example, the MSAEBR should take this issue into 
account by reviewing the internal and external audit reports when evaluating submitted 
SAKIPs.  
In order to improve the ILGs’ organisational learning capabilities, the MOHA should 
provide a certain degree of flexibility for ILGs to manage their organisational structures. 
ILGs would then be able to interactively follow up performance feedback from their 
SAKIP system in order to cope with environmental change and to adapt to new 
challenges. 
7.6 Limitations and Future Research 
The limitations of the research are mainly associated with the study being confined to 
local government in Indonesia. Therefore, generalizing the results to other jurisdictions 
should be made with caution. Secondly, the study used a survey that mainly consisted of 
closed questions that required self-rated responses. There is a potential bias if 
respondents misinterpreted some questions or provided common responses rather than 
reflecting on their actual situation. However, a pilot test and the inclusion of space to 
allow for comments helped overcome this limitation. Lastly, the cross-sectional study in 
the thesis only provides a static representation of the relationship between variables in 
the conceptual model. Therefore, the specific combinations among variables were 
relevant at the time the study was conducted. 
The immediate future research potential is to observe the implementation of SAKIP and 
its impact on the learning capabilities in Indonesian central government agencies. In 
total, Indonesian central government agencies are appropriated with 1,315.5 trillion 
rupiah, equivalent to 63% of the total national budget. By covering central government 
agencies, these research results contribute to improving the adoption and use of SAKIP 
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by Indonesian government agencies in the future. Another possible research focus could 
be a longitudinal study on the implementation of SAKIP in several ILGs in order to get 
a more complete picture, taken from different perspectives.  
7.7 Summary 
This study provides important insights regarding the adoption and implementation of 
central government initiatives by ILGs. This study is one of few studies to address the 
implementation of a centralistic MCS by focusing on the diagnostic and interactive use 
of MCSs as a means to enhance organisational learning capabilities at provincial and 
municipal levels of government in Indonesia. 
Another important strength of this study is the inclusion of institutional factors to reveal 
the complexity and the dynamic process of adopting NPM-style control systems by 
highly bureaucratic local governments. The study, which views SAKIP as an integrated 
control system, provides insights into how performance measurement practices become 
accepted and modified by local governments in Indonesia. 
The findings from this study will equip ILG managers with a better understanding of the 
pressures and factors surrounding the implementation of SAKIP and allow them to 
identify areas that will improve their use of SAKIP in their ILGs. The empirical 
findings of this thesis are potentially important for regulatory bodies, local 
governments, central governments, and the users of local government performance 
reports. The findings can be applied to develop and improve public sector governance 
and ILGs’ organisational learning capabilities. 
From a theoretical perspective, there is evidence to support the use of isomorphic 
institutional theory as a useful framework for explaining the adoption and use of MCSs 
as a means to enhance organisational learning capabilities at provincial and municipal 
levels of government in Indonesia.  
In addition, the results of this study reveal how performance measurement practices 
became accepted and actively modified by local governments in Indonesia. Overall, the 
results of this study generate important insights about the implementation of a 
centralistic management control system in Indonesian local governments. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Survey Letter 
 
 
 
<date of letter> 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am currently undertaking research for my Doctor of Philosophy at Curtin University, 
Western Australia. The research will focus on the use of Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja 
(LAKIP), particularly on identifying the relationship between the adoption of LAKIP 
and organisational learning capabilities in local governments within Indonesia.  
 
My research will provide contextual internal and external insights regarding the pace 
and extent of implementing LAKIP. The research specifically focuses on the diagnostic 
and interactive use of LAKIP and its relationship to Indonesian Local Governments 
(ILGs) strategic success. As well, it is expected to facilitate information concerning the 
distinctive potential of LAKIP for ILGs. 
 
The first stage of this research requires obtaining information via a questionnaire that 
needs to be completed by ILG officers who are directly responsible for reporting and 
administering LAKIP. It would be appreciated if you could arrange to have the attached 
questionnaire completed and returned in the enclosed, pre-paid envelope by April 25, 
2014. A second pre-paid envelope is provided if you decide to complete and detach the 
follow up contact details section at the bottom of the introductory letter.  
 
All information will be treated with confidentiality and will be stored in a secure 
location. Only the researcher and supervisors will have access to the information for the 
purposes of the research project. No participant will be personally identifiable in any 
published material. 
 
Your assistance in providing this information is greatly appreciated. If you have any 
queries or comments regarding this request please contact Rony Sitorus on email 
ronylahi.sitorus@postgrad.curtin.edu.au, phone + 62 817 6675 350, +61 4 51787355 or 
fax +61 8 9266 7694. 
 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
 
Rony Sitorus 
Doctoral Student 
School of Accounting 
Associate Professor Robyn Pilcher  
Supervisor 
School of Accounting 
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Appendix 2: Survey Instrument 
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Appendix 3: Interview Questions 
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Appendix 4: Participant information statement 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT 
 
Management control system in Indonesian Local Government 
 
 
What is the Study About? 
 
The aim of the study is to identify the relationship between the adoption of LAKIP and 
organisational learning capabilities in Indonesian local governments (ILGs). The study 
will recognise contextual internal and external variables affecting the pace and extent 
of implementing LAKIP. It specifically focuses on the diagnostic and interactive use of 
LAKIP to ILGs strategic success. 
 
Who is Carrying out the Study 
 
The study is conducted by Rony Sitorus, a PhD Student within the School of 
Accounting, Curtin University, Perth Australia. He is under the supervision of Associate 
Professor Robyn Pilcher and Dr. Brian Perrin from the School of Accounting, Curtin 
University, Perth Australia.  
 
What Does the Study Involve 
 
The study involves sending a questionnaire to ILG officers who are directly responsible 
for reporting and administering LAKIP. The study will reveal the dynamic process of 
adopting and implementing LAKIP by local governments. The positive or negative 
effects of the use of LAKIP on learning will be investigated to expose the distinctive 
potential of LAKIP for ILGs. 
 
How Much Time Will the Study Take? 
 
The participant is asked to complete a questionnaire about the adoption and use of 
LAKIP in Indonesian local government. The questionnaire will take approximately 30 
minutes to complete.  
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Confidentiality 
 
All information will be treated with confidentiality. All information will remain secured. 
Only Rony Sitorus, Robyn Pilcher and Brian Perrin will have access to the information 
for the purposes of the research project. No participant will be personally identifiable in 
any published material. 
 
Participation 
 
Participation in completing the questionnaire is completely voluntary. Participants are at 
liberty to withdraw at any time without prejudice or negative consequences.  
 
If participants wish to make a complaint on ethical grounds the details of the Human 
Research Ethics Committee is provided in the box below. 
 
 
This study has been approved under Curtin University's process for lower-risk Studies 
(Approval Number xxxx). This process complies with the National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Human Research (Chapter 5.1.7 and Chapters 5.1.18-5.1.21). 
For further information on this study contact the researchers named above or the Curtin 
University Human Research Ethics Committee. c/- Office of Research and 
Development, Curtin University, GPO Box U1987, Perth 6845 or by telephoning 9266 
9223 or by emailing hrec@curtin.edu.au. 
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Appendix 5: Interview transcript with a respondent from ILG 
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